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ABSTRACT 
 
Current research in multi-agent systems (MAS) has advanced to the development 
of open MAS, which are characterized by the heterogeneity of agents, free exit/entry and 
decentralized control. Conflicts of interest among agents are inevitable, and hence 
automated negotiation to resolve them is one of the promising solutions. This thesis 
studies three modifications on alternating-offer bargaining protocols for automated 
negotiation in open MAS. The long-term goal of this research is to design negotiation 
protocols which can be easily used by intelligent agents in accommodating their need in 
resolving their conflicts. In particular, we propose three modifications: allowing non-
monotonic offers during the bargaining (non-monotonic-offers bargaining protocol), 
allowing strategic delay (delay-based bargaining protocol), and allowing strategic 
ignorance to augment argumentation when the bargaining comprises argumentation 
(ignorance-based argumentation-based negotiation protocol).  
Utility theory and decision-theoretic approaches are used in the theoretical 
analysis part, with an aim to prove the benefit of these three modifications in negotiation 
among myopic agents under uncertainty. Empirical studies by means of computer 
simulation are conducted in analyzing the cost and benefit of these modifications. Social 
agents, who use common human bargaining strategies, are the subjects of the simulation.  
In general, we assume that agents are bounded rational with various degrees of 
belief and trust toward their opponents. In particular in the study of the non-monotonic-
offers bargaining protocol, we assume that our agents have diminishing surplus. We 
further assume that our agents have increasing surplus in the study of delay-based 
bargaining protocol. And in the study of ignorance-based argumentation-based 
 iii
negotiation protocol, we assume that agents may have different knowledge and use 
different ontologies and reasoning engines.  
Through theoretical analysis under various settings, we show the benefit of 
allowing these modifications in terms of agents’ expected surplus. And through 
simulation, we show the benefit of allowing these modifications in terms of social 
welfare (total surplus). Several implementation issues are then discussed, and their 
potential solutions in terms of some additional policies are proposed. Finally, we also 
suggest some future work which can potentially improve the reliability of these 
modifications.  
 iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
First of all I would like to sincerely thank my supervisors Gord McCalla and 
Julita Vassileva for all their support, guidance, idea, help and encouragement in writing 
this thesis and doing my research throughout the past five years. Second, I would like to 
thank my Advisory Committee members, whose constructive criticisms have helped me 
to reshape this thesis. Third, I would also like to thank many people who read and 
provided invaluable comments to my early work submitted to various conferences and 
journals.  
Patience and love from my wife, Tiffany, and my son, Kevin, have also 
accompanied me during my study and work. They have always been there to encourage 
and inspire me, and help me to enjoy my life. I would also like to thank my parents for 
their moral support.  
Finally, the research and writing of this thesis is partially supported by Canadian 
NSERC research grants, to which my special acknowledgement is given. 
 v
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
   
 
PERMISSION TO USE i 
ABSTRACT ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS v 
LIST OF FIGURES x 
LIST OF TABLES xiii 
LIST OF NOTATIONS xiv 
 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION          1 
1.1 Some Economics Concepts and Terminology 3 
1.2 Research Background 5 
1.3 Thesis Objective and Contributions 7 
1.4 Thesis Organization 10 
 
CHAPTER 2 AUTOMATED NEGOTIATION: A REVIEW   12         
2.1 Automated Negotiation: An Interdisciplinary Study 12 
 2.1.1 Mathematical-based Economic Analysis and Game Theory 13 
 2.1.2 Experimental Economics 14 
 2.1.3 Business Management and E-commerce 14 
 2.1.4 Political Science, Philosophy and Linguistics 15 
 2.1.5 Artificial Intelligence and Multi-agent Systems 15 
2.2 Bargaining and Other Negotiation Types 16 
 2.2.1 Bargaining 16 
 2.2.2 Other Negotiation Types 19 
  2.2.2.1 Auctions 19 
  2.2.2.2 Contract-net Protocol 21 
  2.2.2.3 Voting 21 
2.3 Alternating-offers Bargaining Protocol 22 
 vi
 2.3.1 Argumentation-based Negotiation (ABN) 27 
 2.3.2 The Application Areas 29 
2.4 Research Methodology Used in the Study of Automated Negotiation 30 
 2.4.1 Game-theoretic Approach 31 
 2.4.2 Beyond Classical Game Theory: What can Computational Analysis Do? 33 
 2.4.3 When Everything Becomes Uncertain: The Decision-theoretic Approach 36 
 2.4.4 Empirical Study: Problems and Promises 37 
2.5 Chapter Summary 40 
 
CHAPTER 3 MODELLING AGENTS AND THEIR BARGAINING STRATEGIES 44 
3.1 Description of the Bargaining Problem and Solution 46 
 3.1.1 Formal Description of Bargaining Problem 49 
 3.1.2 The Existence of Bargaining Solution 52 
 3.1.3 Surplus and Utility 55 
3.2 Decision under Uncertainty and Evaluation Functions 58 
 3.2.1 Evaluation Criteria 59 
  3.2.1.1 EvalF-0 agent 59 
  3.2.1.2 EvalF-I agent 60 
  3.2.1.3 EvalF-II agent 62 
  3.2.1.4 A brief discussion 63 
 3.2.2 Myopic Agents that Maximize Expected Gain 65 
  3.2.2.1 Myopic-0 agents 65 
  3.2.2.2 Myopic-1 agents 66 
  3.2.2.3 Remarks 67 
3.3 Agent’s Belief 69 
 3.3.1 Belief toward Maximum Surplus in EvalF-II Agents 70 
 3.3.2 Belief Function pt(x) if the Opponent is EvalF-I Agent 72 
  3.3.2.1 Belief function 72 
  3.3.2.2 Belief revision 74 
 3.3.3 Belief Function pt(x) if the Opponent is EvalF-II Agent 77 
  3.3.3.1 Belief function 77 
 vii
  3.3.3.2 Belief revision 79 
  3.3.3.3 Remarks 82 
 3.3.4 Belief toward Probability of Breakdown 84 
 3.3.5 Belief toward Opponent’s Argument 86 
 3.3.6 EG’t+1(x) and Belief Update: Revisited 89 
3.4 Discussion 91 
 3.4.1 Commonsense Reasoning 91 
 3.4.2 Iterative Belief 93 
 3.4.3 Unpredictable Bargaining Rounds 94 
 3.4.4 Preference over Longer Bargaining Opportunity 95 
 3.4.5 Examples of Agents’ Decision Model 96 
 3.4.6 Convergence of Offers 97 
  3.4.6.1 Facilitating feasible set 98 
  3.4.6.2 Higher expected gain from conceding 98 
3.5 Chapter Summary 105 
 
CHAPTER 4 AGENT DECISIONS AND NEGOTIATION PROTOCOLS           107       
4.1 Non-monotonic-offers Bargaining Protocol 107 
 4.1.1 Motivation 107 
 4.1.2 Model Description 110 
 4.1.3 A Society of EvalF-I Agents 112 
 4.1.4 A Society of EvalF-II Agents 117 
 4.1.5 Summary 119 
4.2 Dynamic Delay Bargaining Protocol 120 
 4.2.1 Motivation 120 
 4.2.2 Strategic Delay in Automated Negotiation 122 
 4.2.3 Basic Model 125 
 4.2.4 Delay as a Result of an Increasing Surplus 127 
 4.2.5 Delay as a Result of Ambiguity 129 
 4.2.6 Delay as a Result of Verifying Arguments 132 
 4.2.7 Delay as a Result of Waiting for Better Opportunities 134 
 viii
 4.2.8 Summary 135 
4.3 Strategic Ignorance in Argumentation-based Negotiation 136 
 4.3.1 Motivation 136 
 4.3.2 Basic Model 139 
 4.3.3 Analysis I: Proactive Ignorance 143 
  4.3.3.1 Ignorance due to costly negotiation time 144 
  4.3.3.2 Ignorance due to recoiling arguments 146 
  4.3.3.3 Ignorance due to risk of breakdown 148 
  4.3.3.4 Summary 150 
 4.3.4. Analysis II: Responsive Ignorance 151 
  4.3.4.1 Ignoring αS1 154 
  4.3.4.2 Ignoring αS2 156 
  4.3.4.3 Summary 158 
4.4 Chapter Summary 158 
 
CHAPTER 5 SIMULATION AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 160  
5.1 Social Agents that Use Random or Reactive Strategy 160 
 5.1.1 Random Strategy 161 
 5.1.2 Reactive Strategy 163 
 5.1.3 Time-dependent Strategy 164 
5.2 Empirical Study of the Non-monotonic-offers Bargaining Protocol 166 
 5.2.1 Agents’ Valuation 166 
 5.2.2 Experimental Design 167 
 5.2.3 Evaluation Criteria 170 
 5.2.4 Results 171 
  5.2.4.1 Results of Part 1: Agents use random strategies in bargaining 171 
  5.2.4.2 Results of Part 2: Agents use reactive strategies in bargaining 174 
 5.2.5 Summary 176 
5.3 Empirical Study of Delay-based Bargaining Protocol 176 
 5.3.1 Experimental Design 177 
 5.3.2 Evaluation Criteria 180 
 ix
 5.3.3 Results 180 
 5.3.4 Summary 188 
5.4 Empirical Study of Ignorance-based ABN 189 
 5.4.1 Experimental Design 189 
 5.4.2 Evaluation Criteria 192 
 5.4.3 Results 192 
 5.4.4 Summary 199 
5.5 Chapter Summary 199 
 
CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION 201  
6.1 Non-monotonic-offers Protocol 201 
6.2 Delay-based Bargaining Protocol 204 
6.3 Ignorance-based ABN Protocol 207 
6.4 Theoretical Analysis: What We Have Learned? 210 
6.5 Limitations of the Current Work 211 
 
CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 215 
7.1 Conclusions 215 
7.2 Future Work 216 
 
LIST OF REFERENCES  219 
APPENDIX: FORMAL PROOFS  235 
 
 x
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure page 
 
2-1.  Automated negotiation and its major contributors ................................................ 12 
2-2.  The openness of MAS for automated negotiation ................................................. 26 
2-3.  Applications of automated negotiation ................................................................. 30 
2-4.  Research methodology used in the study of automated negotiation...................... 31 
2-5.  Context of this thesis in automated negotiation and some of its related work ...... 41 
3-1.  Topics covered in Chapter 3 .................................................................................. 45 
3-2.  Bargaining solution in (a) one-dimensional attribute and (b) two-dimensional 
attributes....................................................................................................... 48 
3-3.  Multiple-attribute bargaining................................................................................. 53 
3-4.  Single-attribute bargaining over time .................................................................... 54 
3-5.  Various agents’ belief functions pt(x) ................................................................... 73 
3-6.  An example of the shifting of a buyer’s belief towards seller’s acceptance rate 
after (a) seller concedes, (b) seller insists, and (c) seller increases its 
price.............................................................................................................. 75 
3-7.  Belief revision of EvalF-II agents when (a) before rejection, (b) after first 
rejection, (c) after second rejection.............................................................. 78 
3-8.  Belief of EvalF-II agents that is (a) stored and (b) effectively considered............ 82 
3-9.  An agents’ belief toward the probability of breakdown from (a) time-deadline, 
(b) lost-of-interest, (c) amplification of time-deadline and loss-of-
interest, and (d) reduction of time-deadline and loss-of-interest ................. 85 
3-10. Activity of an EvalF-II buyer after receiving a seller’s offer ............................... 96 
3-11. Process of generating counteroffer for (a) a myopic-0 buyer and (b) a buyer 
using tit-for-tat strategy................................................................................ 97 
3-12. The expected surplus of myopic-0 agents ............................................................ 101 
4-1.  An example of the bargaining under (a) M- protocol and (b) N-protocol............. 109 
4-2.  Imprecise belief versus precise belief functions.................................................... 130 
 xi
4-3.  An illustrative example of ABN in natural and agent language............................ 138 
5-1.  Various distribution functions for generating agent’s offers................................. 162 
5-2.  Some examples of time-dependent strategies........................................................ 165 
5-3.  Four pairs (out of 100) of upward valuation used in the experiments................... 167 
5-4.  A comparison between N-seller and NR-seller in four possible combinations 
of EvalF-I and EvalF-II agents as shown in Table 5-1 (average surplus 
is normalized)............................................................................................... 173 
5-5.  A comparison between R-averse and R-seeking in four possible combinations 
of EvalF-I and EvalF-II agents as shown in Table 5-1 (average surplus 
is normalized)............................................................................................... 174 
5-6.  Examples of encounters between agents with reactive strategies ......................... 175 
5-7.  Three groups of buyer valuations used in the experiments ................................... 178 
5-8.  The experimental results of HI (a and b), MI (c and d), and LI (e and f) for 
various d (x-axis) ......................................................................................... 181 
5-9.  The experimental results of HI (a and b), MI (c and d), and LI (e and f) when 
the sellers’ time deadline is the same as that of the buyer (the 30th 
period) .......................................................................................................... 183 
5-10. The experimental results of HI (a and b), MI (c and d), and LI (e and f) when 
the sellers’ time deadline is the shortest one (the 21th period).................... 185 
5-11. (a) The absolute success rate in HI group for the shortest sellers’ deadline 
and (b) the buyers’ valuations that caused the decreasing of success rate 
at d = 1, 2, and 3........................................................................................... 186 
5-12. The total surplus for various d (x-axis) in (a) HI, (b) MI, and (c) LI groups 
for both time-dependent and tit-for-tat groups............................................. 187 
5-13. The average surplus in (a) HI, (b) MI, and (c) LI groups..................................... 188 
5-14. The total surplus (y-axis) in (a) non-ignorance, (b) proactive-ignorance, and 
(c) full-ignorance-based ABN (cost-free) against various biases in 
predicting the real surplus (x-axis) under the uniform-distribution 
random generator ......................................................................................... 193 
5-15. The total surplus (y-axis) in (a) non-ignorance, (b) proactive-ignorance, and 
(c) full-ignorance-based ABN (cost-free) againts various biases in 
predicting the real surplus (x-axis) under the normal-distribution 
random generator ......................................................................................... 194 
 xii
5-16. The total surplus (y-axis) under the uniform-distribution random generator (a 
and b) and normal-distribution random generator (c and d) against 
various costs of ignorance (x-axis), where the bias is 0 (a and c) or 2 (b 
and d)............................................................................................................ 195 
5-17. The total surplus (y-axis) againts various mean values (μ) of the uniform-
distribution random generator (x-axis), for bias b = 0 and for (a) non-
ignorance, (b) proactive-ignorance, and (c) full-ignorance-based 
protocols....................................................................................................... 196 
5-18. The total surplus (y-axis) against various mean values (μ) of the uniform-
distribution random generator (x-axis), for bias equal to (a) 0, (b) 0.5, (c) 
1.0 and (d) 2.0, and under both non-ignorance and full-ignorance 
protocols....................................................................................................... 197 
5-19. The total surplus (y-axis) against various mean values (μ) of the uniform-
distribution random generator (x-axis), for bias equal to (a) 0 and (b) 
2.0, under both proactive-ignorance and full-ignorance protocols .............. 198 
6-1.  An illustration of the cost from restarting a bargaining session under the 
monotonic-offers bargaining protocol ......................................................... 202 
 
  
 xiii
LIST OF TABLES 
Table page 
 
3-1.  Common utility functions ...................................................................................... 56 
5-1.  Four treatments based on agents’ evaluation (non-monotonic-offers protocols) .. 169 
5-2.  Parameters used in both parts of experiments (non-monotonic-offers protocols)
...................................................................................................................... 171 
5-3.  Result of experiment in part 1 (non-monotonic-offers protocols)......................... 172 
5-4.  The p-values of the pair-wise t-test on “Average surplus” and “Success rate”..... 172 
5-5.  Result of experiment in part 2 (non-monotonic-offers protocols)......................... 175 
5-6.  Parameters used in both parts of experiment (delay-based protocols) .................. 179 
 
 xiv
LIST OF NOTATIONS 
 
Below are notations in general bargaining: 
X  A set of all alternative solutions of the bargaining, or the set of all prices 
that can be offered by both buyer and seller in a single-attribute bargaining 
x   A point in X or a price in a single-attribute bargaining 
Acci  Acceptable set for agent-i 
F  Feasible set or all the feasible prices in a single-attribute bargaining 
D  Disagreement set, i.e. X \ F, where “ \ ” denotes the set difference 
≿i  Preference order of agent i over X 
Vi  The agent’s private valuation over the negotiated item  
Suri(x) A surplus function of agent-i if x is the solution of the bargaining 
 
Below are notations used in a single-attribute (price) bargaining from buyer’s 
perspective: 
Td   The buyer’s time deadline 
It The buyer’s evaluation function 
x   A  variable representing the price that the buyer will offer 
xt   A price offered by the buyer at time t 
xt*   A price offered by the buyer that maximizes the buyer’s expected gain at 
time t 
yt   A price offered by the seller at time t 
Bt   The buyer’s valuation/reservation price at time t 
St   The seller’s valuation/reservation price at time t 
 xv
Surt(yt)   A surplus made if yt is accepted by the buyer 
Surte(xt)   A surplus estimated at time t if xt is accepted by the seller at time t+1 
Surte(yj)   An estimation made at time t of the surplus from the seller’s future offer at 
time j 
Surt+1(xt)  The surplus made by the buyer if xt is accepted by the seller at time t+1 
pt(xt)  Buyer’s belief (subjective probability) that xt will be accepted at time t+1 
pt(x)  Buyer’s belief function that x will be accepted at time t+1 
Rt+1(xt)  The estimated future surplus (residue) if xt is not accepted by the seller at 
time t+1. 
πt(x)  Buyer’s belief function that x will be accepted by EvalF-II seller at time 
t+1 
kt+1(x)  Buyer’s belief function that represents the likelihood of x being accepted 
by the seller because it is perceived as the best offer from the buyer at 
time t+1  
φ  The time when the breakdown occurs 
qt  The buyer’s belief of the likelihood of failure (breakdown) caused by the 
seller at time t which is independent of the buyer’s offer xt  
Bφ  The buyer’s valuation if the negotiation breaks down 
EGt(x)  The buyer’s expected gain function from offering x at time t 
EG’t+1(x)  The buyer’s expected gain function of the gain in the next period which is 
made on the current period t 
κ The buyer’s belief that the seller is EvalF-I 
ω The ratio of γ(1 – qt)(1 – pt(xt*)) / [1 – γ(1 – qt)(1 – pt(xt*))] 
 xvi
θt* The ratio of γ(1 – pt(xt*))EG’t+1 / [pt(xt*)(Bt – xt*)] 
αS  The seller’s argument  
αB  The buyer’s argument 
ϕ An imprecision factor that affects the judgment of pt(xt*) 
ψ(pt(xt*), ϕ) The weight function of imprecise pt(xt*)  
χ The likelihood that verification by the buyer results in the negation of the 
seller’s argument 
pαt(x) pt(x) after the seller accepts αB 
υt(αB) The buyer’s estimation of the likelihood that the seller will instantly 
accept αB resulting in the increase of pt(x) to pαt(x) = pt(x|αB) 
υφ(αB) The buyer’s estimation of the likelihood that αB will instantly trigger a 
breakdown 
EGαt(xt) EGt(xt) after the seller accepts αB 
μ f (p(x|α)) The mean value of pαt(xt*) assigned by the buyer under uncertainty 
μ f  The same as μ f (p(x|α)) 
wt(y)  The buyer’s estimation of the seller’s belief that the buyer will accept y at 
time t  
gt(Δt)  The buyer’s estimation of the likelihood of the seller to sell the item to 
another buyer within interval Δt and there are no more items left 
ρ  The likelihood of an overvaluation, i.e. Bt > Br 
β  The ratio of the buyer’s estimated future surplus with respect to the 
current one  
 xvii
ζ  The ratio of the buyer’s estimated future non-breakdown rate to the 
current rate 
η The ratio of the buyer’s estimated belief of the acceptance of its future 
offer pt+1(xt+1*) with respect to the belief of the acceptance of its current 
offer pt(xt*) 
λ  The ratio of the buyer’s estimated future expected payoff after delay to 
that without delay 
 
Various agent types according to their myopia: 
Myopic-0 agents Agents who only consider the current state in generating their 
offers 
Myopic-1 agents Agents who consider both the current and one-period-ahead state 
in generating their offers 
Myopic-N agents Agents who consider the current state and all less-than-N-period-
ahead states in generating their offers 
 
 
Various agent types according to their evaluation function: 
EvalF-0 agents Agents who accept their opponent’s offer if it exceeds a fixed 
threshold, e.g. their valuation, thus generating a positive surplus; 
otherwise, counter offer or withdraw 
 xviii
EvalF-I agents Agents who accept their opponent’s offer if it generates a higher 
surplus than that from their about-to-submit counter-offers; 
otherwise, counter offer or withdraw 
EvalF-II agents Agents who accept their opponent’s offer if it is 
perceived/predicted as the best offer that can be provided by their 
opponent (the ‘best’ in the sense of generating the highest surplus); 
otherwise, counter offer or withdraw 
1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A multi-agent system (MAS) is commonly defined as a system composed of 
multiple autonomous agents, characterized by incomplete capabilities of each agent, 
decentralized data, asynchronous computation, and no global system control [Jennings et 
al., 1998]. Even though there is no strict definition for an autonomous agent, it is 
commonly accepted that it could be one of the following three categories: biological 
agents (human or animal), and artificial agents, which can be robotic agents, and 
computational agents (software agents or artificial-life agents) [Franklin and Graesser, 
1997]. Since the context of this thesis is automated negotiation, in the rest of this thesis 
the term ‘agent’ will be used to represent a software agent (i.e. an artificial computational 
agent) and the negotiation is between such an agent and human or another such agent.  
To date, various kinds of agents have been created for various purposes; for 
example, personal-assistant agents, problem-solving agents, entertainment agents, trading 
agents, Internet-search agents, etc. During interaction among agents, conflict of interest 
happens naturally and negotiation is an indispensable solution. For example, several 
personal agents negotiate a meeting schedule for their users, trading agents negotiate the 
transaction of an item, etc. For an effective negotiation, all negotiators should follow an 
agreed negotiation protocol in finding a resolution. While the protocol is publicly known 
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for regulating the type of messages and their passing method in the negotiation process, 
the strategy for generating the messages is privately owned by each negotiator.  
In the early 1990s, the role of automated negotiation in a multi-agent system was 
to solve conflicts of interest among benevolent agents during task and resource allocation 
[Parsons and Wooldridge, 2002]. With the rapid growth of e-commerce in the mid 1990s, 
the study of automated negotiation became broader, especially the study of open 
electronic marketplaces where humans can delegate their software agents to negotiate 
with other agents, e.g. Kasbah [Chavez and Maes, 1996], Fishmarket [Rodriguez-Aguilar 
et al., 1998], Tete-a-Tete [Guttman et al., 1998], AuctionBot [Wurman et al., 1998], 
Shopbots and Pricebots [Greenwald and Kephart, 1999], eMediator [Sandholm, 2002b], 
AMELI [Esteva et al., 2004], iBundler [Giovannucci et al., 2004], etc.  
When any agent can join a system at any time and negotiate with any agent, the 
MAS is called “open”; for example, an open electronic marketplace. In contrast, a closed 
MAS is one where there is a fixed set of agents. In an open MAS the degree of 
uncertainty is higher than that in a closed one, because agents can be more selfish (do not 
necessarily care about the interests of other agents), may not trust each other, may not 
know the negotiation strategy used by their opponents, and would not reveal their private 
information (e.g. their valuations of negotiated items, or reservation price) unless it can 
benefit them. Consequently, the goal and characteristics of the negotiation in open and 
closed MAS are different. 
In a closed MAS, usually the negotiation protocol is designed so that the system 
can maintain a fair negotiation outcome that maximizes the total benefit of all agents. For 
example, if there are several users jointly using a number of printers within a department, 
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then their personal-assistant agents will manage all printing jobs by means of negotiation 
with other agents so that the total waiting time is minimized and all urgent jobs can be 
finished on schedule. However, in an open MAS, a negotiation strategy is chosen by an 
agent for maximizing its own benefit regardless of the other agent’s benefit; and the 
protocol is determined so that most (if not all) agents are willing to participate in the 
negotiation [Dastani et al., 2003].  In this case, the participation rate becomes the crucial 
indicator of the success of the system. The focus of my thesis is to study a particular 
negotiation protocol, i.e. alternating offers bargaining protocol, in open systems by 
proposing several modifications in order to gain a better negotiation outcome for all 
participating agents. 
1.1 Some Economics Concepts and Terminology 
 
Throughout this thesis we will use several terms from economics and game 
theory. These terms are briefly introduced here. 
The first term is dominant strategy that represents a unique strategy played by an 
agent which always generates the best payoff in response to any moves by its opponents 
in a game [Mas-Colell et al., 1995]. Dominant strategy may not always exist. Frequently, 
the best response to two different moves by the agent’s opponent in the same game may 
not be the same. Another term that is more commonly used in game theory is a Nash 
equilibrium strategy --- an agent’s strategy that is the best response to all others’ 
strategies assuming they are all playing a Nash equilibrium strategy. This assumption, 
then, will require rational behavior of all agents and that this be common knowledge. 
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When all players play a Nash equilibrium strategy, then the game will end up in a Nash 
equilibrium state.  
The next term is mechanism design --- a process of designing a market (or other 
games) to achieve a specific outcome. Some examples of market mechanisms are auction, 
bargaining, etc. A mechanism consists of all agents’ strategy sets (e.g. all allowed agent 
actions in a market) and rules governing the procedure for making the collective choice 
among agents (e.g. how to distribute the item(s) in the market for any given combination 
of agent actions). Some economists (and also some MAS researchers) are interested in 
designing a market mechanism that can achieve a fair allocation, maximize the total 
utility, and be immune from deceitful strategies [Ephrati and Rosenschein, 1991; Mas-
Colell et al., 1995; Kfir-Dahav et al., 2000].  
To achieve a fair allocation in a market, it is desirable to know the agents’ 
preference or valuations to each item. Since the agents’ valuation is privately known, 
they may have incentive to strategically misreport their valuation in order to manipulate 
the final outcomes in their favor. However, if truth-telling is a dominant strategy for all 
agents in a market mechanism, then we say this mechanism is incentive compatible. 
Sometimes, we say the mechanism is strategy-proof, because no strategy other than truth-
telling should be used by the agents.  
In some mechanisms, we need external funds in order to maintain the incentive-
compatible property. In this case, the budget is not balanced, e.g. the amount received by 
a seller is more than the amount paid by the buyer. Usually, the discrepancy is paid by an 
authority (e.g. government). A mechanism is called budget-balanced if it does not need 
additional incentives in order to maintain an incentive-compatible property. 
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An allocation is called Pareto efficient or Pareto optimal when we cannot make 
any agent better off without making other(s) worse off. Nash equilibrium is not 
necessarily a Pareto optimal allocation. A social optimum is defined to be the situation 
where the total joint utilities of all agents are maximized. Generally, in the absence of 
economic externalities and when the utility of solutions is convex, then Pareto optimum 
is also social optimum. 
Rationality and bounded rationality are used as usual to represent the agents’ 
ability to choose the best/optimal choice without or with limited computation, 
respectively. 
At last, we need to differentiate between a negotiation mechanism and a 
negotiation protocol. Broadly speaking, a mechanism consists of agents’ strategy sets and 
rules governing the procedure for making the collective choice among those agents, 
which includes the negotiation protocol. Hence, a negotiation protocol deals with the 
implementation of a negotiation mechanism, specifically on the rules of agent 
interactions. However, since not all agents are rational or can communicate effectively in 
the real world, the protocol design problem needs to consider other issues beyond those 
considered in the mechanism design in game theory, such as the possibility of irrational 
agent behaviors, the standard of negotiation language, the presence of time delay or other 
communication costs, etc.  
1.2 Research Background  
Ideally, the negotiation protocol in open MAS should ensure that agents can earn 
fair profits and that the negotiation is efficient in order to increase the agents’ 
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participation rate. Here, efficiency can be measured by the cost of the negotiation (a time 
delay or other computational cost), the total surplus attained by both parties from the 
negotiation, and/or economic (allocation) efficiency, such as Pareto efficiency. Therefore 
the “ideal” protocol shall satisfy incentive compatibility. However, this is not considered 
a priority since such an ideal protocol is not always possible and for some users fairness 
of the outcome may not be the major factor of their participation. For instance, if the 
protocol is too complex, then the required negotiation strategy may become very complex 
too; thus, fewer agents will be able to participate in the system. Besides, if the protocol 
cannot help the agents to make transactions on a satisfactory level (e.g. at the price they 
are willing to sell/buy, and before their time deadline), then they may not participate in 
the market too. Finally, it is also not desirable to adopt a strict protocol that imposes 
several requirements before the negotiation takes place. Consequently, developing a 
negotiation protocol that can both accommodate the agent’s need and be used easily in an 
open MAS is very important.  
At present, a lot of literature in automated negotiation emphasizes theoretical 
analysis rather than empirical study, and game-theoretic analysis is the dominant 
approach. In general, game-theoretic research focuses on equilibrium analysis. If the 
equilibrium solution(s) exists and all agents satisfy the assumptions used in the analysis, 
then they will eventually solve the negotiation problem at that equilibrium. Hence, game-
theoretic analysis can be used by a system designer to predict the outcome of a 
negotiation under a particular protocol.  
However, there are serious limitations of the game-theoretic approach which 
come mainly from its strict assumptions [Jennings et al., 2001]. Hence, many MAS 
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researchers have attempted to relax the assumptions and find solution(s) under these 
relaxed assumptions. Some of these alternative assumptions include computationally 
limited agents [Kfir-Dahav et al., 2000; Larson and Sandholm, 2001], the possibility of 
irrational behavior [Parkes and Ungar, 2000], asymmetric information [Fatima et al., 
2001], etc. As a result, most negotiation problems become computational problems, such 
as finding optimal algorithms for bounded rational agents, designing negotiation 
protocols under computationally limited resources, etc. In more uncertain situations with 
dynamic, time-constrained, and unpredictable environments, normally artificial 
intelligence approaches are considered for the agent’s negotiation strategy or finding the 
negotiation solution, for example using Bayesian learning [Zeng and Sycara, 1998], case-
based reasoning [Gimenez-Funes et al., 1998], influence diagram [Mudgal and Vassileva, 
2000], neural networks [Azoulay-Schwartz and Kraus, 2000], fuzzy logic [Faratin et al., 
2000; Sim and Wang, 2004], heuristic search [Greenwald and Boyan, 2001; Fatima et al., 
2001; Winoto and Tang, 2002; Byde et al., 2002], reinforcement learning [Tran and 
Cohen, 2002], etc.  
Under uncertain conditions, the assurance of finding an optimal bargaining 
solution also decreases. As a result, modifications of existing bargaining protocols may 
be helpful to increase the chance of finding bargaining solution(s). This motivates the 
work described in this thesis. 
1.3 Thesis Objective and Contributions 
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the properties of extended alternating 
offers bargaining protocols. The domain is restricted to the bargaining between a buyer 
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and a seller for a single attribute (e.g. price). However, the results can be applied in many 
open MAS, such as e-commerce systems, distributed systems (grid or peer-to-peer), 
wireless ad-hoc networks, etc. 
As argued before, in the relevance to a higher uncertainty and the openness of 
MAS, we will not only focus on the study of protocol(s) that can generate highest benefit 
(low cost) or can maintain the fairness of a negotiation outcome; we will also focus on 
another criterion: participant preference to use the protocol, as postulated in the following 
statement. 
Assumption 1-1. An agent prefers one protocol over others if it believes that the 
protocol is more helpful in attaining the agent’s goal, which could be a highest expected 
utility, a highest success (agreement) rate, or a combination of both. 
The first proposed modification is to allow arbitrary revisions (not just converging 
ones) of the negotiators’ offers before agreement is reached, i.e. non-monotonic offers. 
The second proposed modification of the standard alternating offers protocol is to allow 
negotiators to use strategic delay --- a deliberative delay for achieving an agent’s goal. 
The third modification is to allow negotiators to avoid argumentation (e.g. ignoring 
opponent’s persuasion or avoiding certain argumentation). In particular, the contributions 
of each modification are as follows: 
1. Allowing any revisions of the offer before agreement is reached (non-monotonic 
offers). In most literature, it is assumed that the sequence of offers of each negotiation 
converges monotonically to the agreement, for examples in [Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 
1994; Chaves and Maes, 1996; Faratin et al., 2000; Fatima et al., 2001; Sim and 
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Wang, 2004]. Illustratively, the offers in a negotiation between a seller S and a buyer 
B may look like this: 
 
It is uncommon that sellers will revise their offer to be higher than the last offer. 
However, imposing a monotonic-offers protocol may not be always beneficial in an 
open MAS. The study of the cost and benefit of non-monotonic offers bargaining 
protocol becomes the first goal of this thesis.  
2. Allowing negotiators to use strategic delay. Economics studies suggest that strategic 
delay is especially important at the beginning of the bargaining session. In fact, a 
great majority of agreements in human bargaining are concluded near the bargaining 
deadline (commonly known as the “deadline effect”), both in laboratory experiments 
[Roth et al., 1988] and in real bargaining [Craver, 2005]. In human bargaining, the 
purpose of delay is mainly for screening, signaling and attrition [Kennan and Wilson, 
1990]. In addition, a strategic delay is also used to get more information, such as 
during holdouts in wage bargaining [Gu and Kuhn, 1998]. The second goal of this 
thesis is to propose an agent’s decision structure when using a delaying strategy and 
demonstrate the costs and benefits of delay by naïve agents.  
3. Allowing negotiators to avoid argumentation. Many real bargaining situations do not 
involve price, and in fact often implicitly or explicitly involve the change of attitudes. 
For example, a broker agent will persuade a customer to believe that the agent can 
help him/her to manage his/her money safely, or a seller may persuade a buyer that 
S: $500 
B: $400 
S: $450  
B: $425 
S: $425    (agreement).  
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his selling price is the lowest price in the city, etc. Some literature in MAS has 
addressed the issue of argumentation-based negotiation protocol [Sierra et al., 1998; 
McBurney et al., 2002], modeling of argumentation-based negotiation [Kraus et al., 
1998; Amgoud et al., 2000; Ramchurn et al., 2003; Amgoud and Prade, 2005], 
applications of argumentation-based negotiation [Jung et al., 2001; Brito and Neves, 
2002], and the benefit of argumentation in negotiation [Karunatillake and Jennings, 
2005]. Argumentation can also be used for revealing information that speeds up the 
bargaining under time constraints, which is useful for both bargainers [Rahwan et al., 
2004]. However, very few works analyze the disadvantages of allowing 
argumentation in bargaining, or under which condition the argumentation-based 
protocol is beneficial. A notable work is by Karunatillake and Jennings [2005]. 
Therefore, the final goal of this thesis is to analyze the condition(s) in which avoiding 
argumentation will be beneficial in bargaining model(s). 
Finally, it is our expectation that this thesis will contribute not only to the fields of 
MAS, AI and computer science in general, but also to the fields of economics modeling, 
social science, management and other relevant fields of studies.   
1.4 Thesis Organization 
The organization of the thesis is as follows. In the next chapter, we outline some 
related work on automated negotiation based on various aspects: who is interested in 
automated negotiation (section 2.1), negotiation mechanisms (section 2.2 and 2.3), and 
the research methodology (section 2.4). The alternating offers bargaining protocol and 
the proposed model are provided in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, we show the result of the 
 11
theoretical analysis of the non-monotonic offers bargaining protocol (4.1), strategic delay 
(4.2), and strategic ignorance in argumentation-based negotiation (4.3). In Chapter 5, we 
show the experimental analysis of proposed protocols. In Chapter 6, we discuss the 
implication of our findings and the limitations of current work. Finally, Chapter 7 
concludes this thesis and points out some future work. 
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CHAPTER 2 
AUTOMATED NEGOTIATION: A REVIEW 
2.1 Automated Negotiation: An Interdisciplinary Study  
Automated negotiation is a complex interdisciplinary study [Jennings et al., 2001; 
Kraus, 1997, 2001]. Figure 2-1 shows some of the major contributors to the study of 
automated negotiation. They span from economics and political science to mathematics 
and computer science. Generally, they tackle three different problems: mechanism design, 
protocol design, and negotiation strategies.  
 
 
 
Figure 2-1. Automated negotiation and its major contributors 
Mathematical-based 
Economic Analysis 
and Game Theory 
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Broadly speaking, the study of mechanism design is to find a mechanism (an 
institution with rules governing the procedure for making collective choice) so that the 
objectives of the designer can be attained in the equilibrium state [Mas-Colell et al., 
1995]. The common objectives are to maximize social welfare for all agents, to maximize 
revenue for specific agent(s) (e.g. auctioneer), to attain fair allocation of goods/services, 
etc. Usually, the approach assumes agents’ rationality and unlimited computation, which 
may not always be available in MAS. Consequently, MAS researchers have initiated the 
design of negotiation protocols consisting of several negotiation rules, which can be 
followed by computationally limited agents and satisfies several negotiation criteria such 
as computationally tractability, fairness (symmetric treatment), etc. [Rosenschein and 
Zlotkin, 1995].   
Given a negotiation protocol, implementing agents’ negotiation strategies, 
including their reasoning engines, becomes another major problem in automated 
negotiation. The following sub-sections describe several fields that contribute to the 
development of automated negotiation. 
2.1.1 Mathematical-based Economic Analysis and Game Theory  
The major contribution of mathematical-based economic analysis and game 
theory is the development of several analytical tools, such as equilibrium analysis (e.g. 
Nash equilibrium, sequential Nash equilibrium, Bayesian Nash equilibrium), utility 
theory (e.g. von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility), mechanism design (e.g. 
Vickrey auction), etc. In fact, much foundational work in negotiation theory was done by 
economists/mathematicians a long time ago, for example [Nash, 1950; Vickrey, 1961; 
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Harsanyi and Selten, 1972; Roth, 1979; Myerson, 1979, 1981; Milgrom and Weber, 1982; 
Rubinstein, 1982, 1985].  
2.1.2 Experimental Economics  
One of the major issues in the implementation of automated negotiation is user 
preference elicitation. For instance, how much a buyer is willing to pay if the seller offers 
an additional feature such as an extended warranty, or will the buyer take a risk by 
buying from a less reputable seller, or whether an earlier transaction matters for a buyer, 
etc. While many psychologists [Metzler et al., 1991; Yamagishi and Miyamoto, 1996; 
Roelofsma and van der Pligt, 2001] and AI researchers [Boutilier et al., 1997, 2006; Ha 
and Haddawy, 1998; Blum et al., 2004] have worked on this issue, experimental 
economists have also contributed a lot, e.g. [Karni and Safra, 1987; Johnson and Schkade, 
1989; Camerer and Weber, 1992]. Moreover, experimental economists have led research 
on market design, which has become an important research topic in MAS recently; for 
example, research in double auctions [Smith, 1962, 1964] and combinatorial auction 
[Grether et al., 1981; Rassenti et al., 1982].  
2.1.3 Business Management and E-commerce 
The emergence of e-commerce provides a wider application area for automated 
negotiation, such as agent-human negotiation or agent-agent negotiation via the Internet. 
The main concerns of people from management and business are the impact of automated 
negotiation on the long-term development of e-commerce and how to deploy automated 
negotiation to facilitate e-commerce [Dworman et al., 1996; Segev and Beam, 1999; Goh 
et al., 2000].  
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2.1.4 Political Science, Philosophy and Linguistics 
While game theorists and economists study numerical negotiation, such as 
determining the best bidding price in an auction, the study of qualitative negotiation is 
studied by political scientists, lawyers, linguists, etc., i.e., how to persuade others using 
argumentation. It is the most difficult issue because of the involvement of many aspects: 
natural language, cognitive style, belief, evidence, reputation, etc. Some of the 
contributions of political scientists, philosophers and linguists to automated negotiation 
are the study of argument structure [Toulmin, 1958], analysis and design of dialogue 
games [Mann, 1988; Carletta et al., 1997], formalization of argumentation [Pollock, 1992, 
1994; Prakken and Sartor, 1997; Chesnevar et al., 2000], and application of automated 
negotiation in solving international crises [Wilkenfeld et al., 1995]. 
2.1.5 Artificial Intelligence and Multi-agent Systems 
Currently, MAS researchers are heavily involved in research on automated 
negotiation. Some important contributions from AI and MAS are applying automated 
negotiation in various domains, extending traditional negotiation theory to fit 
computationally limited agents and finding better negotiation protocols, providing 
infrastructure such as standard MAS platforms, e.g. FIPA-OS [FIPA-OS, 2001], KQML 
[Finin et al., 1997], and designing artificial negotiators, equipped with various AI 
techniques, for example [Faratin et al., 1998; Mudgal and Vassileva, 2000; Greenwald 
and Boyan, 2001; Tran and Cohen, 2002; Keller et al., 2004]. 
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2.2 Bargaining and Other Negotiation Types 
A negotiation can be classified in many ways, for example, based on the items 
being negotiated, the character of the negotiators, the negotiation protocol, the 
characteristics of information (completeness and symmetry), the negotiation period 
(continuous, one-step, multiple stage), and many other factors (openness, with penalty, 
etc). Based on the negotiated items, negotiation can be differentiated into negotiation of 
single-attribute items or multiple-attribute items. An example of a multiple-attribute item 
is when negotiators consider price, quantity, quality, delivery time, and payment methods 
as a bundle. Moreover, negotiation can be categorized into one-to-one, one-to-many, or 
many-to-many negotiations. An English auction for antiques is a one-to-many negotiation 
(one auctioneer and many bidders), for example.  
Depending on the character of the negotiators, a negotiation can be classified as 
cooperative or competitive. Cooperative negotiation is characterized by aiming for 
mutual social benefit (maximizing joint utility) for the negotiators. Competitive 
negotiation is characterized by seeking individual benefit for the negotiators (maximizing 
individual utility). Negotiation among agents in distributed problem solving usually falls 
into the former category, while negotiation in e-commerce falls into the latter.  
Based on the protocol type, a negotiation can be categorized as an auction, a 
contract-net protocol, voting or bargaining. A brief description of these categories of 
negotiation is provided below.  
2.2.1 Bargaining 
Bargaining is among the oldest negotiation mechanisms in human history, even 
before the emergence of markets or money as a means of finding a resolution among 
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interested parties in the presence of conflicts of interest (cooperative behavior in a 
competitive situation). We can divide bargaining theory into two main categories: 
axiomatic bargaining theory and strategic bargaining theory [Rubinstein, 1982; Kraus, 
2001].  
Axiomatic bargaining first sets several axioms (such as all bargainers are 
individually rational, the solution is invariant to independent changes of utility units, the 
solution is Pareto optimal, bargainers are symmetric and independent of irrelevant 
alternatives). It then finds unique bargaining solution(s) based on these axioms [Mas-
Colell et al., 1995]. One of the applications of axiomatic bargaining is in labor arbitration, 
where union and company submit their proposals to an arbitrator (e.g. judge) who decides 
the final result. We may also have two salespersons who bargain on splitting their 
commission fee from their cooperative work in selling the same item (e.g. a used car or a 
house) where the final decision is made by their sales manager. The decision could be an 
egalitarian solution, e.g. split the commission fee such that both salespersons are equally 
happy in terms of their utility. Or, the decision could be a utilitarian solution, which splits 
their commission fee such that it maximizes the total utility of both; or, other solutions, 
such as Nash solution, Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, or Kalai-Rosenthal solution [Nash, 
1950; Kalai and Rosenthal, 1978; Mas-Colell et al., 1995].  
In contrast, strategic bargaining theory does not assume a centralized decision 
maker (arbitrator), but allows the bargainers to solve the dispute by offer and/or counter-
offer proposals. A simple example of strategic bargaining is ultimatum (bargaining) game. 
In an ultimatum game, a bargainer A determines his/her demand (e.g. a proposal or offer 
on how to split a pie with his/her opponent B) which can either be accepted or rejected by 
 18
B. If B rejects A’s offer, then the bargaining breakdowns and both get nothing. If B 
accepts it, then both will split the result according to A’s offer. This bargaining method 
has been studied in both human domain [Davis and Holt, 1993] and agent domain [Todd 
and Borges, 1997; Katz and Kraus, 2006]. 
Alternating offers bargaining is another example. Here, a bargainer A starts the 
negotiation by sending a proposal to his/her opponent B, who chooses either to accept or 
reject the proposal. If B accepts it, then the negotiation terminates. If B rejects it, then 
he/she must send back a counter-proposal to specify his/her preferences to A. Now A will 
evaluate the proposal and choose either to accept or reject it. The process continues until 
agreement is reached or any party walks out resulting in a breakdown. Currently, there 
are many variants of alternating offers bargaining, such as a model with a time deadline 
[Sandholm and Vulkan, 1999], with various information levels (complete/incomplete, 
symmetric/ asymmetric) [Rubinstein, 1985; Kraus et al., 1995], with risk of breakdown 
(one party walks out before negotiation ends) [Debenham, 2004], with risk-averse agents 
[Harrington, 1990], etc. One of the seminal works in strategic bargaining theory is 
Rubinstein’s dividing pie problem [Rubinstein, 1982, 1985], where two agents offer and 
counter-offer proposals about how to divide a pie in the presence of waiting cost.1  
Rubinstein uses backward induction to solve the problem and shows that the bargaining 
process only takes one step, i.e., an agent will send only one proposal that is accepted 
immediately by another agent. The outcome is based on some strict assumptions such as 
every agent is perfectly rational and has perfect foresight. 
                                                 
1 Some people use a melting (ice cream) cake rather than a pie to illustrate the waiting cost.  
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2.2.2 Other Negotiation Types 
2.2.2.1 Auctions 
English auction, Dutch auction and double auction are categories of negotiation 
characterized by sequential decision making and open-bidding. First-price sealed-bid 
auction and Vickrey auction are characterized by simultaneous decision-making and 
sealed-bidding [McAfee and McMillan, 1987; Davis and Holt, 1993].  
In English auction, an auctioneer opens the auction, and all bidders bid openly 
(known by others) and sequentially until one active bidder remains (the winner). The 
winner pays the highest bid he/she submitted. The best strategy for bidders in an English 
auction is to increase the bid from zero until their private valuation. A bidder’s valuation 
here means the minimum or maximum acceptable price depending on whether her/his 
position is as a buyer or a seller, respectively. A study by Roth and Ockenfels [2002] 
reports on the sniping strategy (bid near the end of auction) in English-type online 
auction (e.g. eBay.com).  
Buyers in a Dutch auction do not propose a price, but a single seller will lower the 
price sequentially until a buyer (the winner) stops it.  The strategy used in Dutch auction 
is fairly similar to that used in first-price sealed-bid auction, because bidders in a first-
price sealed-bid auction submit their bids simultaneously. The winner is the bidder who 
submits the highest bid, and he/she pays the first highest bid (i.e. his/her own bid). First-
price sealed-bid auctions in MASs have been studied in [David et al., 2002; Leyton-
Brown et al., 2002; Zhu and Wurman, 2002].  
Just like in a first-price sealed-bid auction, bidders in a Vickrey auction (or 
second-price sealed-bid auction) submit their bids simultaneously. The winner is the 
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bidder who submits the highest bid, but he/she pays the second highest bid. The best 
strategy for bidders in a Vickrey auction is to bid their true valuation [Vickrey, 1961].  
The double auction was introduced by Smith [1962, 1964]. Under double-auction 
rules, sellers/bidders announce their offers/bids sequentially, i.e. bids are raised and 
offers are lowered sequentially. In other words, sellers will compete to lower their offers 
and buyers will compete to raise their bids. Some papers investigating this auction are 
[Das et al., 2001], [Tesauro and Das, 2001], [Tesauro and Bredin, 2002],  [Huang et al., 
2002], [Grossklags and Schmidt, 2003], and [Lochner and Wellman, 2004]. 
In a combinatorial auction (CA) bidders can bid over bundles of items [Rassenti 
et al., 1982; Rothkopf et al., 1998]. For example, in an auction for an airport time slot, an 
airline company can submit the bid: <{Monday 8:00-9:30, Saturday 8:00-9:30}, $0.5 
million> XOR <{Monday 10:00-11:30, Friday 8:00-9:30}, $0.4 million>, which means 
they are willing to pay either $0.5 million for time slot {Monday 8:00-9:30, Saturday 
8:00-9:30} or $0.4 million for time slot {Monday 10:00-11:30, Friday 8:00-9:30} but not 
both. After all bidders submit their bids, the seller will determine the optimal allocation to 
the bidders so as to maximize his profit (optimal winner determination problem).  
The optimal winner determination problem in combinatorial auction is NP-hard 
[Rothkopf et al., 1998], which makes it one of the most challenging problems in MAS 
[Sandholm, 2002a]. For example, Nisan [2000] and Tennenholtz [2000] attempt to find a 
class of combinatorial auctions with tractable (solvable by a polynomial time algorithm) 
optimal allocation. Gonen and Lehmann [2000] use branch and bound search, Sandholm 
and his colleagues [Sandholm et al., 2001] use heuristic search, Holland and O’Sullivan 
[2005] use weighted super solutions framework, etc. 
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2.2.2.2 Contract-net Protocol 
Another approach, the contract-net protocol [Smith, 1980], on the other hand, 
provides a simple but powerful negotiation mechanism for solving a complex task by 
means of distributed problem solving. The common way to assign a task is to announce it 
to other agents (e.g. open an auction/bargaining) and assign the task to the winner. 
Moreover, every agent can sub-contract/re-contract its (previous) tasks to others who are 
willing to accept them. Theoretically, an agent will accept a contract if its marginal cost 
is less than its marginal benefit [Sandholm, 1993]. For example, if an agent already has 
many tasks to do, then any additional task will generate high marginal cost (e.g., cause 
slower computation). Theoretically, using this self-organizing mechanism, the system 
would perform task allocation, which is Pareto optimal when all agents are sincere in 
reporting their marginal cost and able to swap their tasks with others [Sandholm, 1999a].  
Another important issue in the contract-net protocol is whether the agent can de-
commit from a contract or not. Leveled commitment contract [Sandholm and Lesser, 
1995; Sandholm et al., 1999], i.e. a contract where both parties can de-commit by paying 
a certain penalty, becomes a crucial mechanism in improving the social welfare of the 
contract-net. Some work with respect to the application of the contract-net protocol 
includes [Dellarocas and Klein, 2000; Tran and Cohen, 2002].  
2.2.2.3 Voting 
Another approach to resolving conflicts is through voting. Voting is a social 
choice mechanism in selecting social preferences over a set of alternatives, e.g. what is 
the society mostly prefer from available alternatives. One of the applications of voting in 
a MAS is resource allocation by means of majority voting. For example, in order to use a 
common resource (e.g. a supercomputer), an agent can broadcast a request to all other 
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agents to collect access keys from these agents. If two agents compete to use the same 
resource, then the first who gets the majority votes (>50% of access keys) will be able to 
access the resource.  
Some examples of the application of voting in MAS are [Ephrati and Rosenschein, 
1991, 1993; Hunsberger and Zancanaro, 2000]. The voting mechanism is primarily used 
in making group decisions, in which the choice is simple such as ‘agree’ or ‘disagree’. 
However, in other approaches, voting can be very complex, because the voting result can 
be manipulated [Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975]. For example if the preference of an 
agent to three alternatives {A, B, C} is A ≻ B ≻ C,2  and this agent knows that the 
chance of A to win is very small, but the chances of B and C are the same, then its best 
strategy is to vote B, not A. Some examples of current study in a voting protocol are 
[Guttmann and Zukerman, 2005] in finding better voting policies in the presence of 
unreliable agents (e.g. lazy, corrupt, selfish, or conservative agents), [Conitzer and 
Sandholm, 2005] in correcting noisy votes (e.g. irrational votes) by using maximum 
likelihood estimators, [Pitt et al., 2005] in formalizing the voting protocol using event 
calculus, and many others.  
2.3 Alternating-offers Bargaining Protocol 
This thesis focuses on alternating offer bargaining protocol, which is a kind of 
strategic bargaining. We do not focus on axiomatic bargaining because we want to 
explore inherently decentralized systems where negotiation can be conducted with a 
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higher flexibility. Recall that the final decision in axiomatic bargaining is made by the 
arbitrator (third party) and enforced to both conflicting parties (bargainers). In this case, it 
may happen that the final decision by the arbitrator is actually a non-favorable one for 
either or both sides. Therefore, bargainers in axiomatic bargaining are less freely in 
obtaining what they want and they need an arbitrator which reduces the flexibility of the 
systems. 
For similar reasons, we do not explore other negotiation mechanism. For instance, 
even when the auction mechanism is highly efficient, i.e., in terms of the trading surplus 
extracted [Davis and Holt, 1993; Gode and Sunder, 1993; Kagel, 1995; Gjerstad and 
Dickhaut, 1998; Das et al., 2001], there are still many limitations on auctions [Winoto et 
al., 2002]: 
1. Auctions usually are scheduled in advance and with time restrictions, e.g. some 
online auctions range from 1 hour to 1 week and the schedule is announced a few 
days before it opens. Intrinsically, auctions need multiple buyers or sellers in order to 
work well, therefore needing some time for gathering participants. Some 
buyers/sellers may not want to wait until an auction opens or finalizes. Also, some 
may not like to attend auction with a lot of other bidders, because it will lessen the 
winning chance or end with “the winner’s curse” (i.e. a bid higher than the real 
valuation, because everybody thought the item is really demanded, thus very 
valuable). Thorough discussions on the effects of the number of bidders on bidder’s 
behavior can be found in [Kagel and Levin, 1993; Kagel, 1995; Kagel et al., 1995]. 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 Throughout this thesis, the binary operator ≿ refers to weak preference “at least as good as”, 
and ≻ refers to strict preference “strictly preferred over”, ∼ refers to the indifference relation “as 
preferred as”. 
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2. In some circumstances, non-attribute factors are important, e.g., trusteeships, 
friendships, etc. Auctions may not accommodate these factors because it may affect 
the participation of other bidders due to unequal treatment. In fact, some regulations 
prevent auctioneers from discriminating bidders on these bases. For example, the 
Directive 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament states that public 
contracts (e.g. in procurement auctions) are on the basis of transparency, non-
discrimination and equal treatment, which guarantee that tenders are assessed based 
on “the lowest price” and “the most economically advantageous tender” only.  
“In order to guarantee compliance with the principle of transparency, only 
the elements suitable for automatic evaluation by electronic means, without 
any intervention and/or appreciation by the contracting authority, may be 
the object of electronic auctions, that is, only the elements which are 
quantifiable so that they can be expressed in figures or percentages. On the 
other hand, those aspects of the tenders which imply an appreciation of 
nonquantifiable elements should not be the object of electronic auctions.”  
[Directive 2004/17/EC] 
The contract-net protocol is useful for the transaction of compound items (e.g. a 
set of trading items/tasks). For a single item, the mechanism is equivalent to an auction, 
in which the announcer (initiator) agent acts as an auctioneer and all interested 
participants act as bidders. Again, the weakness of this approach lies on the time 
constraint and the number of participants. However, if we relax the negotiation in the 
contract-net protocol into a bilateral one, i.e. the negotiation is conducted between an 
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initiator and a single participant, then the result is nothing but a bargaining mechanism. 
Therefore, our study here can also be applied in a contract-net protocol. 
Finally, voting is more appropriate for resource allocation or social choice, not for 
trading items between two parties, which is our focus here. Considering these limitations, 
bargaining mechanisms still play an important role in automated negotiations. However, 
as stated before, in many actual bargaining situations, agents only have minimal or no 
information about their opponents and are only concerned about their own individual 
goal(s). This limitation may reduce the efficiency of strategic bargaining mechanisms in 
terms of a failure in finding a favorable solution for both parties. Thus, we should modify 
existing bargaining protocols to increase the chance of finding bargaining solution(s), 
which is the objective of this thesis.  
Specifically, we concentrate on strategic bargaining in an alternating-offer setting 
in open system, which complies with the following assumption: 
 
Assumption 2-1. The system is open in the sense that  
1. agents may join or leave the system anytime; 
2. agents may be created by different designers and represent different owners; and 
3. bargaining may be done simultaneously and asynchronously among agents. 
 
How negotiation factors are influenced by the degree of system openness is 
illustrated in Figure 2-2. The left column in Figure 2-2 represents an extreme situation 
where we have a highly closed MAS, while the right column represents another extreme 
for a highly open MAS. Certainly, we may have a relatively closed MAS where agents 
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are created by multiple designers, hence with various predetermined (known) negotiation 
strategies, but all agents are benevolent and they cannot freely enter or exit the system.  
 
Figure 2-2. The openness of MAS for automated negotiation 
As MASs become more open, they become more flexible and less controllable. 
Several issues arise, such as how to design a safe negotiation protocol, how to preserve 
negotiators’ privacy, how to prevent unfair ratings, etc. [Dellarocas, 2000; Parkes and 
Ungar, 2000; Jennings et al., 2001; Leyton-Brown et al., 2002; Sandholm and Wang, 
2002].  
Since we focus on an open system in our bargaining model, we assume that 
agents may be irrational and may enter or exit the system at their will. For example, they 
may use any bargaining strategy, including cheating, offering a random price, imitating 
their opponent’s behaviors, etc. and they may open or leave a negotiation with other 
agents at any time. Moreover, we also want to study the bargaining protocol that allow 
persuasive argumentation, which is very common in human-human bargaining such as in 
used-car bargaining. We assume that our bilateral bargaining protocol allows persuasive 
argumentation among both parties. The next subsection will discuss the recent 
development of argumentation-based negotiation and its relation with other negotiation 
protocol.  
 Highly Closed MAS: 
Single designer 
Predetermined strategy 
Benevolent (honestly share all info.) 
No entry and exit 
Highly Open MAS: 
Multiple designers 
Any strategy 
Malevolent (cheating may happen) 
Free entry and exit 
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2.3.1 Argumentation-based Negotiation (ABN) 
Recently, one of the very active research areas in automated negotiation is 
argumentation-based negotiation. Indeed, argumentation-based negotiation has long been 
proposed for solving conflict of interest among artificial agents [Sycara, 1990; Kraus et 
al., 1998; Parsons et al., 1998; McBurney et al., 2003]. The common functions of 
argumentation are to inform, persuade, threaten, appeal to, or promise an opponent 
[Kraus et al., 1998; Rahwan et al., 2004]. For instance, an argument can be used to 
influence the opponent’s stance, or, to justify the proponent’s refusal [Rahwan et al., 
2004]. The final purposes are to speed up the negotiation, attain a higher success rate, and 
increase the market efficiency.  
Argumentation is mostly bidirectional in the form of a dialogue among conflicting 
agents. It can be blended into any negotiation protocol or executed separately.  For 
example, [Sierra et al., 1998] propose an argumentation-based negotiation framework, 
which can be used in a contract net protocol, so that the proposed task allocation can be 
supported by persuasion. However, argumentation among bidders in an auction is not as 
useful as argumentation between a buyer and a seller in alternating-offer bargaining, 
because argumentation is naturally a useful tool in bargaining, i.e. to persuade other party 
to concede, while it is less effective for a bidder in an auction to persuade/threaten other 
bidders to quit.  
Generally, research in argumentation-based negotiation follows from early 
research in dialogue games. Current topics in argumentation-based negotiation include:  
- Argumentative reasoning, e.g. [Kraus et al., 1998; Parsons et al., 1998; Wooldridge et 
al., 2005]. This research is concerned with the evaluation, generation, and selection of 
arguments. Planning [Kraus et al., 1998; Parsons et al., 1998] and utility evaluation 
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[Sierra et al., 1998] are commonly used in the evaluation and selection of arguments. 
Rules and heuristics are commonly used for the selection. For example, “if trust is 
low and utility of the proposal is high, then send a strong argument” [Ramchurn et al., 
2003]. In [Kraus et al., 1998], threat is the strongest argument, followed by a promise 
of future reward, and others. 
- Communication language and negotiation protocols, e.g. [Sierra et al., 1998; 
McBurney et al., 2003; Amgoud and Prade, 2005]. So far, the majority of research in 
this direction is concerned with the design of (i) a better communication language to 
facilitate complex arguments; and (ii) a better protocol to govern the argumentation, 
such as maintaining rule consistency, avoiding disruption, assuring termination 
(success), etc.  
Kraus et al. [1998] have proposed a BDI (“belief, desire, intention”) framework 
that could be used as the foundation of an agent’s reasoning in arguing and counter-
arguing during a negotiation. In their setting, arguments can be in the form of appeal, 
threat, or promise, which are selected by the agent according to its goal, belief, desire, 
and intention. Argumentation is meant to be the only negotiation tool in finding a 
resolution, and all agents are benevolent and must respond to their opponent’s argument. 
Implicitly, they assume that all agents can understand all arguments. McBurney et al. 
[2003] studied another ABN framework where agents could benefit from arguing in 
addition to offering a price in the context of purchasing a service or product. In their 
setting, a limited number of arguments are used by agents to interchange relevant 
information, such as their expectation as to the quality of the product/service. Again, they 
implicitly assume that all agents can understand all arguments. Most prior work, 
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including [Sycara, 1990; Parsons et al., 1998] and many others mentioned in [Rahwan et 
al., 2004], assume that agents will automatically use arguments to solve the conflict. 
Even if the weight (importance) of each argument is not the same, which affects the 
selection of the argument, a frequent assumption is that agents will respond to their 
opponent’s arguments. However, this may not be true in an open MAS because agents 
may not understand all arguments. For example, a naive buyer may join the system even 
if it is not able to understand or to generate most of the argument. This issue has not been 
studied yet, which becomes one of the motivations of this thesis.  
2.3.2 The Application Areas 
Figure 2-3 shows several application areas of general automated negotiation. In its 
early stages, automated negotiation was primarily used for task and resource allocation. 
Some examples of early work in automated negotiation for solving task/resource 
allocation are Smith’s contract net protocol [Smith, 1980; Smith and Davis, 1983], 
Lesser’s multistage negotiation [Conry, Meyer and Lesser, 1988; Kuwabara and Lesser, 
1991], Durfee and Lesser’s Partial Global Plan [Durfee and Lesser, 1987, 1989]. 
Generally, many early papers implicitly assumed that an agent is benevolent and is 
designed to achieve common goals (the designer’s goals). However, with the emergence 
of e-commerce the primary goal of an automated negotiator has shifted to accomplishing 
individual goals and MASs have become more open; thus, the agent may become self-
interested and may use nasty strategies to achieve its individual goals. 
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Figure 2-3. Applications of automated negotiation 
Another interesting application area is to use automated negotiation in facilitating 
education or training, such as agent-agent negotiation in I-Help [Vassileva et al., 1999; 
Mudgal and Vassileva, 2000] and human-agent negotiation in Genie, a decision support 
system used for training U.S. foreign office personnel and German police [Wilkenfeld et 
al., 1995; Kraus, 2001]. TAC (Trading Agent Competition) is another facility used to 
help researchers in developing better trading agents [TAC, 2006]. TAC also has been 
used as a class project in many universities in the US and Europe [Wellman et al., 2002]. 
2.4 Research Methodology Used in the Study of Automated Negotiation 
Figure 2-4 shows the main research methods used in the study of automated 
negotiation up to now. The theoretical analysis of negotiation falls into three main 
categories: game-theoretic analysis, computational analysis, and decision-theoretic 
analysis. The empirical study of negotiation can be divided into three main categories: 
simulation with artificial agents, experimentation with humans in the loop, and 
competition events. These categories are discussed in the next section. 
Task  
Allocation 
Electronic 
Commerce 
Education and 
training 
Automated 
Negotiation
Resource 
Allocation 
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Figure 2-4. Research methodology used in the study of automated negotiation  
 
2.4.1 Game-theoretic Approach 
Some work in automated negotiation is based on game theoretic analysis [Parsons 
and Wooldridge, 2002], which is concerned with equilibrium analysis and finding 
optimal strategies. It is commonly used to prove the properties of a market mechanism. 
The main reasons are: 
1. if all agents in a MAS follow the assumptions used in the analysis, then the MAS falls 
into an equilibrium state eventually; 
2. the strategy that leads to the equilibrium becomes the candidate solution of the system; 
3. if the equilibrium is not Pareto (or social) optimal, then it is important to find a way to 
approach the Pareto (or social) optimal frontier, either by changing the negotiation 
mechanism or by increasing central control (e.g., imposing a levy and redistributing 
it).   
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However, some limitations of the game-theoretic approach for direct application 
to MAS come from its strict assumptions [Jennings et al., 1998; Jennings et al., 2001]: 
1. All agents are assumed to be perfectly rational;  
2. Agents know the payoffs of each action and can predict their opponents’ actions 
perfectly (perfect foresight); 
3. Agents can search for the solution in exhaustive fashion and are able to consider all 
possible states of a game (computationally unlimited);  
4. If there are game theoretic equilibrium strategies, such as the Nash equilibrium 
strategy or the dominant strategy, then all agents will eventually choose one of them; 
5. Agents do not recall past experiences, and therefore no learning mechanism is 
involved. 
Realizing that those assumptions are less applicable in the real world, many MAS 
researchers have attempted to relax them and find solution(s) under relaxed assumptions. 
Some alternative assumptions include computationally-limited agents, the possibility of 
irrational behavior, etc. However, some research, even under alternative assumptions, 
still uses game-theoretic analysis in finding solutions. For example, Monderer and 
Tennenholtz [1999] try to bridge the mechanism design problem with the protocol design 
problem using a game theoretic approach. Two main differences between game-theoretic 
results (mechanisms) and application-oriented designs (protocols) are considered, i.e. the 
issue of communication network and the structure of a message, which are ignored in 
game theory. Another example is the work by Larson and Sandholm [2001], which 
considers the limitation of agents’ computational ability in the negotiation. They extend 
the study of bargaining so that all agents use anytime algorithms in their decision, and use 
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deliberation control (performance profile) to stop the algorithm. However, they use a 
game-theoretic approach to perform equilibrium analysis (e.g. perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium), while they vary several factors, e.g. time constraints (who moves last), 
available information (complete/incomplete), character of performance profile 
(deterministic/stochastic), etc. The drawbacks of equilibrium analysis are on its 
applicability, because not many games are really played until reaching their equilibrium 
state, especially when the system is open. For instance, stock prices are fluctuated over 
time due to the dynamism of the stock values and the openness of the market (investment 
may flow in or out anytime from or to other market). 
2.4.2 Beyond Classical Game Theory: What can Computational Analysis Do? 
As more assumptions are relaxed, most negotiation problems become 
computational problems, such as finding optimal algorithms for bounded rational agents, 
finding optimal algorithms for winner determination in combinatorial auctions, designing 
negotiation protocols under computationally limited resources, etc. Two important topics 
that use computational analysis extensively are optimal winner determination in 
combinatorial auctions [Rothkopf et al., 1998; Hoos and Boutilier, 2000; Sandholm et al., 
2001] and mechanism design [Lehmann et al., 1999; Kfir-Dahav et al., 2000; Mu’alem 
and Nisan, 2002]. As explained before, the mechanism design problem deals with the 
finding of efficient markets (to produce the highest social welfare), which satisfy 
incentive compatibility and budget balance. And the optimal winner determination 
problem deals with the finding of optimal allocation of goods (or services) by an 
auctioneer to all bidders in order to maximize the auctioneer’s revenue or social welfare 
(depending on the aims of the auction).  
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In combinatorial auctions, a bidder can submit a bid for a combination of 
goods/services. After receiving all bids from bidders, an auctioneer allocates the 
goods/services to maximize total revenue, which is an NP-complete problem [Rothkopf 
et al., 1998]. Consequently, a tractable computational approach is needed to find the 
solution. For example, Gonen and Lehmann [2000] use the weighted multi-set packing 
problem as an analogy of the winner determination problem, and show that the problem 
is NP-hard and hard to approximate. Tennenholtz [2000] uses a b-matching technique to 
solve a specific class of combinatorial auction problems. Hoos and Boutilier [2000] 
introduce Casanova to solve optimal winner determination. Casanova is a stochastic local 
search algorithm that resembles Novelty+, which is used to solve SAT problems [Hoos, 
1999]. Sandholm and his colleagues introduce CABOB, which uses decomposition 
techniques and heuristic search to solve the winner determination problem [Sandholm et 
al., 2001]. Holland and O’Sullivan [2005] use a weighted super solutions framework, 
which is borrowed from the field of constraint programming, to find a robust solution of 
combinatorial auctions.  
On the mechanism design problem, Kfir-Dahav, Monderer and Tennenholtz 
[2000] introduce a heuristic Clarke’s mechanism (a well-known efficient mechanism, 
after Clarke [1971]). It is based on a standard Clarke’s mechanism, whose solution (i.e. 
finding optimal social welfare) is NP-hard, but agents are resource bounded. They prove 
that if agents follow specific heuristics, then the incentive compatibility and budget 
balance properties of Clarke’s mechanism still hold. Lehmann et al. [1999] and Mu’alem 
and Nisan [2002] try to find a class of combinatorial auctions that satisfy both the 
property of VCG mechanism (after Vickrey [1961], Clarke [1971], and Groves [1973]), 
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which ensure incentive compatibility and computational efficiency (tractability). Note 
that it is known from early studies that approximation methods for the winner 
determination problem in a combinatorial auction can destroy the incentive compatibility 
property, i.e. all agents will bid truthfully their valuation [Lehmann et al. 1999; Nisan and 
Ronen, 2000]. In other words, it is hard to find an efficient algorithm that maintains the 
incentive compatibility property at the same time, or, it is hard to find an incentive-
compatible mechanism for which an efficient algorithm is sufficient. Lehmann et al. 
[1999] show that the combination of a greedy allocation and greedy payment scheme can 
maintain both incentive compatibility and computational efficiency. However, the 
method is correct if all agents are single-minded (only bid a set of items)3 and if the 
method is applied to Generalized Vickrey Auctions (GVA). Later, Mu’alem and Nisan 
[2002] extended the method and applied it to a general combinatorial auction and multi 
unit combinatorial auction by adding linear programming and partial exhaustive search 
algorithms. Again, their method is correct if all agents are single-minded.  
In the future, computational analysis will gain more popularity because:  
1. pure game-theoretic analysis cannot solve most of the complex problems, especially 
combinatorial problems that inherently exist in some negotiation mechanisms; 
2. in real application(s) many assumptions must be relaxed, which in turn makes pure 
game-theoretic analysis inappropriate; 
3. more and more studies have adopted computational analysis, which will stimulate 
more  research using computational analysis. 
                                                 
3 In a general combinatorial auction, a bidder can submit multiple bids simultaneously. For 
instance, s/he can bid <item X, $10>, <item X and item Y, $15> and <item Y and item Z, $12> at 
the same time. If a bidder is single-minded, then s/he only bids on one bundle, e.g. <item X and 
item Y, $15>. 
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2.4.3 When Everything Becomes Uncertain: The Decision-theoretic Approach 
Most of the theoretical work in decision-theoretic approaches addresses the issue 
of design and complexity analysis of the agent’s decision making algorithms, which are 
mostly supported by empirical study. This is not surprising since most of them assume an 
uncertain situation in which game-theoretic analysis cannot be used, and their main 
objective is to apply an existing AI technique or negotiation mechanism/protocol.  
The decision-theoretic-based algorithms used in automated negotiation can be 
divided into three categories: i.e., static (off-line), dynamic (on-line), and long-term 
algorithms. Static algorithms are based on off-line analysis (a priori), i.e. to find the best 
strategy before the negotiation begins, e.g. using game-theoretic analysis. For example, 
Fatima et al. [2001] can determine the optimal bargaining strategies of an agent if the 
agent knows the probability value of its opponent’s deadline and valuation. The strategies 
are based on a specific family of negotiation decision functions proposed in [Faratin et al., 
1998], which satisfy strict monotonicity and are continuously differentiable. Therefore, 
after an agent knows the information, e.g. its opponent’s type, it will pick a 
corresponding negotiation strategy and execute it until an agreement is reached or the 
negotiation ends. This strategy works efficiently if the information is known before the 
negotiation begins and the environment does not change during the negotiation. However, 
in many cases the agent may face a dynamic environment, e.g., where opponents switch 
their strategy. Thus, a dynamic strategy is needed to adapt to a new market condition. 
When the environment changes, the agent will utilize current and/or past information for 
its future decision. For example, Tesauro and Bredin [2002] use a dynamic programming 
(DP) method to update an agent’s bidding strategy (GDX) when attending a sequential 
auction (i.e. Continuous Double Auction). First, their agent will estimate the future-
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clearing price and the number of remaining bidding opportunities. Then, the agent will 
decide how much it should bid in order to maximize its expected profit. They argue that 
the DP algorithm is quite feasible when the variation of commodities is very small, and 
the complexity increases exponentially when more types of commodities are introduced 
into the market.  
An important factor in the DP algorithm and also other dynamic negotiation 
algorithms [e.g. Boutilier et al., 1999; Byde et al., 2002; Tesauro and Bredin, 2002; 
Greenwald and Boyan, 2004] is the availability of past information. For example, GDX 
[Tesauro and Bredin, 2002] uses information about 5 past periods to estimate the future 
price within a session. However, their agents do not retain past information for their 
future encounter, i.e. they will re-initialize everything on a new session. Indeed, in some 
situations past experiences may be useful for future negotiation (long-term memory), for 
example, by maintaining all information about its opponents [Zeng and Sycara, 1998; 
Mudgal and Vassileva, 2000; Tran and Cohen, 2002, 2004], or by memorizing the best 
strategy from its experiences [Dworman et al., 1996; Winoto and Tang, 2002]. Knowing 
that it encounters the same opponent, an agent may predict its opponent’s behavior more 
accurately, which may lead to a better payoff.  
2.4.4 Empirical Study: Problems and Promises 
The three main purposes of conducting empirical studies in automated negotiation 
are:  
1. Increasing the credibility of theoretical analysis or the proposed method [e.g., 
Andersson et al., 2000; Hoos and Boutilier, 2000; Tesauro and Bredin, 2002; Zhu and 
Wurman, 2002; Tran and Cohen, 2004]; 
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2. Analyzing the characteristics of the proposed method [e.g., Faratin et al., 2000; 
Hunsberger and Grosz, 2000; Zhang and Lesser, 2002; Holland and O’Sullivan, 
2005]; 
3. Searching for new phenomena [e.g., Dworman et al., 1996; Wurman et al., 1998; 
Wellman, 2002; TAC, 2006]. 
Empirical studies can also be categorized into several types, such as comparison 
of a proposed method with a benchmark (purpose 1), simulation by adjusting control 
variables (purposes 1 and 2), simulation by introducing uncontrolled variables/shocks 
(purposes 2 and 3), competition events (purpose 1 and 3), and experiments with human 
subject(s) (purposes 1, 2, and 3). 
Comparing one method to other method(s) is the most common empirical study. 
For example, Andersson et al. [2000] compare their algorithm for optimal winner 
determination with those in Sandholm [1999b] and Fujishima et al. [1999]. Hoos and 
Boutilier [2000] compare their algorithm, i.e. Casanova, with CASS [Fujishima et al., 
1999]. Tesauro and Bredin [2002] compare their algorithm for continuous double auction 
(i.e. GDX strategy) with the ZIP (zero intelligence plus) strategy [Cliff, 1997]4 and the 
Gjerstad and Dickhaut’s strategy [Gjerstad and Dickhaut, 1998].  
A simulation is sometimes used in the sensitivity analysis, either by adjusting 
control variables (e.g. Hunsberger and Grosz [2000], and Holland and O’Sullivan [2005]) 
or introducing shocks in order to understand the behavior of a MAS (e.g. Azoulay-
Schwartz and Kraus [2002]). Simulation is very important, especially when we assume an 
uncertain environment. For instance, what happens if the opponent of an agent behaves 
                                                 
4 ZIP is an extension of ZI (zero intelligence) strategy proposed by Gode and Sunder [1993]. 
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irrationally in a negotiation? Will they destroy the equilibrium structure? In game-
theoretic analysis, Bayesian Nash Equilibrium or Trembling Hand Perfect Nash 
Equilibrium analysis can be used to represent this situation, i.e., by assigning a 
probability of encountering an irrational agent (probability to deviate from equilibrium). 
However, the analysis is valid if all agents know that probability value, which is not 
likely to happen in the real world. Hence, a simulation, consisting of learning agents, is 
more desirable, because some emergent behaviors of agents may happen unpredictably.  
Competition events and experimentation with human subjects are two other rarely 
studied issues in automated negotiation. TAC (Trading Agent Competition) and Santa Fe 
Double Auction Tournament [Rust et al., 1994] are two examples of competition events 
held to find better trading strategies. TACs have been held annually since July 2000 
[TAC, 2006]. In the past, the task of agents in the TAC is to arrange a trip for a vacation, 
e.g., bid on air ticket, bid on hotel accommodation and buy/sell an entertainment ticket. 
Three different types of auction are used, i.e. continuous clearing auction, ascending 
multi-unit auction, and continuous double auction. Since 2003, TAC Supply-Chain 
Management is also held annually in conjunction with classical TAC [Sadeh et al., 2003]. 
To date, some research approaches have been reported with regard to the agents’ 
capability in TAC, for example [Stone et al., 2001; Benisch et al., 2004; He and Jennings, 
2004]. 
In order to build a smart negotiator we need to understand and solve many 
problems, such as how to build a (human) opponent model, how to collect information 
from the opponent, how to predict his/her behavior, how to argue using natural language, 
how to persuade people, etc. Unfortunately, only a small amount of literature reports 
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experiments conducted with human player(s) in automated negotiation. One example is 
the study by Hoz-Weiss et al. [2002] who conducted experiments in which humans 
negotiate with an agent to solve an international crisis (modeled on a fishery dispute 
between Canada and Spain). They provide heuristics to help the agent in making its 
decision, such as when to send an offer, how to update a counter-offer, what 
argument/counter-argument is sent, etc. An agent uses backtracking to find the 
equilibrium strategy. They assume that the valuations/utilities of both parties are common 
knowledge. And the agent only maintains one parameter of the human model, i.e. risk 
attitude. Results show that agent-human negotiation outperforms human-human 
negotiation in terms of total utility gained.  
Another example of human-agent experimentation is [Das et al., 2001], in which 
six humans and six agents are involved in a continuous double auction. Agents use the 
ZIP strategy [Cliff, 1997] and the Gjerstad and Dickhaut’s strategy [Gjerstad and 
Dickhaut, 1998], in which no user model is needed. Results show that agents outperform 
humans by approximately 20% in terms of total trading surplus gained.  The superiority 
of agents over humans decreases as the trading goes on, because humans are capable of 
learning from their experiences. However, agents still outperform humans by 5%-7% at 
the end of trading period (total 16 trading periods and 3 minutes each period).  
2.5 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter we have shown several contributions made toward automated 
negotiation, and also its classifications, applications, research problems, and some active 
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research areas.  Our research in this thesis is only concerned with a branch of automated 
negotiation: bargaining.  
 
 
Figure 2-5. Context of this thesis in automated negotiation and some of its related work 
Another purpose of this chapter is to show the context of this thesis among 
existing research in terms of three major dimensions (protocol design, application areas, 
problem solving approaches including theoretical and empirical analysis). As we will see 
later in the next chapters, it is concerned with bargaining protocol design supported by 
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both theoretical and empirical analysis. Figure 2-5 shows the topics and approach used in 
this thesis and its relation to other work in automated negotiation. 
The topics and approaches concerned are highlighted in Figure 2-5. The closest 
work to this thesis is Faratin’s work on building an agent’s decision function in an 
uncertain environment (assuming the agent does not know information about its 
opponents). Later, his approach is elaborated in [Fatima et al., 2001] and [Sim and Wang, 
2004]. Our agent’s decision function in the non-monotonic bargaining case is also 
derived from Faratin’s work, with further extension to the strategic delay and strategic 
ignorance cases. The framework will be described in Chapter 3. 
Sandholm and his colleagues [1999, 2002] use a game theoretic approach to 
analyze bargaining with a deadline. The results show the benefit of strategic delay, which 
is similar to our work. However, they did not verify the benefit empirically due to a 
restrictive domain of their study. Sim and Wang also propose a strategic delay under a 
specific condition, which is tested empirically. However, they did not provide a general 
agent decision framework using strategic delay. This thesis provides a general agent 
decision framework on deciding a delay and empirical results in terms of cost and benefit 
of using strategic delay in bargaining. 
Karunatillake and Jennings [2005] briefly analyze the cost of argumentation by 
means of empirical study. They suggest a withdrawal by an agent from a negotiation 
when the argumentation in that negotiation is costly. Our work is different in the sense 
that we do not suggest a withdrawal, but rather to employ strategic ignorance on costly 
topics. In addition, we also propose a decision function for invoking strategic ignorance 
among agents and using simulator to show the benefit of it. 
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Finally, since this thesis discusses three different modifications to bargaining 
protocols, most related work for each modified protocol will be discussed separately in 
Chapter 4 when the modifications are introduced. Some other related work, which is 
relevant to the general framework of our agent’s decision model, will be provided in 
Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MODELLING AGENTS AND THEIR BARGAINING STRATEGIES 
 
The strategy used by an agent in bargaining depends on the information and 
computational capacity of the agent. Without considering any information, the simplest 
strategy of a buyer is to submit consecutive offers based on a predefined sequence, e.g. 
<$100, $110, $125,  …, $200>. Using this sequence, the buyer starts with an initial offer  
of $100, which then is revised to $110, $125, and so on until it is either accepted by the 
seller or reaches the ceiling $200. Since the sequence is set by the user and the agent only 
executes it regardless of the negotiation situation, we classify it as a static strategy. This 
method was commonly used in early systems, such as Kasbah [Chavez and Maes, 1996]. 
The advantage of this strategy lies in its simplicity and transparency for the user. 
However, it restricts the agents from taking advantage of relevant information including 
their opponent’s behavior. Consequently, it tends to work well only when the bargaining 
information is known by the user, or when uncertain factors are not important in 
determining the success of the negotiation. For example, if the buyer knows that the seller 
will accept a $200 offer and it does not have a time deadline, then the aforementioned 
sequence can certainly be used by the buyer, even though it does not guarantee a 
maximum surplus.  
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In more sophisticated strategies, agents may have a higher autonomy to decide 
their offers, as long as they are not exceeding the limit set by the user. This is more likely 
to be used when the bargaining involves many uncertain factors. In these strategies, the 
offers may change according to the information sensed by the agents; thus, they are 
referred to as dynamic strategies. In this chapter, several dynamic strategies are discussed 
that may be implemented in bargaining under uncertainty. The structure of the discussion 
of these strategies presented in this chapter is shown in Figure 3-1. 
 
Figure 3-1. Topics covered in Chapter 3 
First, we briefly discuss the characteristics of the bargaining problem and solution 
under uncertainty. Then we look at agents’ behaviors, starting with their evaluation 
criteria in making a decision (section 3.2.1), followed by a description of agents 
according to their negotiation strategy (section 3.2.2). Then, we propose a model of agent 
belief and its revision mechanism, which is an important part of myopic agents, i.e. 
agents that only consider a few periods ahead in their decision making. More attention is 
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given to myopic agents and their belief construct because they are used as the basis of the 
theoretical analysis, which makes this analysis different from traditional game-theoretic 
analysis that assumes a perfect forecast. After describing the model, we discuss the 
implication of the model in section 3.4. Finally, the summary of Chapter 3 is provided in 
section 3.5. All concepts described in this chapter will be used as the basis for the 
analysis of the modified bargaining protocols proposed in the next chapter.  
3.1 Description of the Bargaining Problem and Solution 
We consider the bargaining problem in which a buyer wants to buy an item from 
a seller where each party has some private bargaining attributes, e.g. price, quality, 
delivery time, warranty, etc. The following assumption is applied throughout this thesis. 
Assumption 3-1. Both the buyer and the seller have limited information and 
computational resources, and they are constrained by bargaining attributes and/or 
environmental factors, such as time deadlines, access to other buyers/sellers, etc., and all 
of those aspects are not necessarily symmetric for both of them. 
Assumption 3-1 assures the heterogeneity of our agents’ characteristics and their 
environment. It makes our analysis more realistic for agents that represent contending 
users who enter an open market from a different time and/or place. Our analysis excludes 
situations where conflicts can be resolved analytically by game theory.  
Assumption 3-2. Both the buyer and the seller are bounded rational and selfish. 
Assumption 3-2 further declares the limitation of our agents’ reasoning and 
assures their self-interest which reflects their owner’s interest. We assume bounded 
rationality because it is more realistic than perfect rationality [Russell, 1997]. However, a 
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bounded rational property does not guarantee that agents can make an optimal decision in 
bargaining, especially if the decision is not computable. Intuitively, for finding an 
optimal decision, agents should be able to choose the best choice among all possible 
options. Thus, we further restrict our agents such that they have capability to order all 
available options in terms of computable utility value, and then derive the optimal 
decision by maximizing the utility value. We state this feature in Assumption 3-3. 
Assumption 3-3. (Zermelo’s Axiom of Choice) Given limited information, limited 
computational resources, a time deadline, and other environmental constraints, both the 
buyer and the seller have totally ordered choices that can be expressed using utility 
functions, and both the buyer and the seller are utility maximizers. 
This assumption restricts our analysis to those agents with preference orders 
expressible in utility functions. In other words, they have the capability to choose the 
optimal choice by means of computation. Our approach here presumes an uncertain 
environment, in which deliberation and meta-reasoning is needed by the agent in 
maximizing their expected utility.  
Without loss of generality, suppose that the negotiated issue is only for the item 
price, and both parties may persuade/threaten their opponent to accept their offer or to 
justify their refusal of their opponent’s proposal. For the more general case of multiple-
issues negotiation, we can combine those issues into a single utility function to represent 
agent choices as in multi-attribute utility theory/MAUT [Keeney and Raiffa, 1976].  
In order to produce a bargaining solution, the valuations of seller and buyer 
should intercept or overlap (creating a feasible set). Figure 3-2 shows feasible sets in the 
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bargaining of a single continuous attribute item (unit price) and an item with two 
continuous attributes (unit price and quality).  
 
Figure 3-2. Bargaining solution in (a) one-dimensional attribute and (b) two-dimensional 
attributes 
In Figure 3-2(a), the seller’s valuation is the minimum price at which it is willing 
to sell, and its acceptable set is the range of prices at which it is willing to sell; similarly 
for the buyer, the valuation is the maximum price it is willing to pay. The feasible set is 
the overlapping region of both acceptable prices. In Figure 3-2(b), the seller’s private 
valuation is a straight line representing the minimum selling price (reservation price) at 
Feasible set 
Unit price Seller’s valuation Buyer’s valuation 
Buyer’s acceptable set 
0 
Seller’s acceptable set 
(a) 
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different levels of quality. An upward sloping of that line means the minimum acceptable 
price increases as the quality increases. The seller’s acceptable set is all acceptable 
bargaining points from the seller’s view, in which the higher point (higher price for the 
same quality) is strictly preferred. Conversely, the buyer’s private valuation is the buyer’s 
maximum buying price (reservation price) at different qualities. The buyer’s acceptable 
set is all acceptable bargaining points from the buyer’s view, in which a lower point 
(lower price for the same quality) is strictly preferred. Conclusively, any point in the 
acceptable set farther down from the private valuation line is strictly preferred. The 
intersection between the two acceptable sets is a feasible set, where the result of 
bargaining will fall. 
3.1.1 Formal Description of Bargaining Problem 
Formally, suppose there are only two agents i ∈ {b, s} bargaining over N-
attributes, where b denotes the buyer agent and s the seller agent. An alternative region X 
is defined as all possible points in the bargaining space of N-dimensional attributes. For 
instance, in a bargaining of a used car the dimensions and their range could be price (in 
dollars) = {0, 1, 2, …, 20000}, dealer’s warranty (in months) = {0, 1, 2, …, 12}, 
payment method = {cash, installment}, and other bonus such as new tires, a new CD 
player, etc. In case of trade-in, the price of the buyer’s car will be another attribute.  
Further, both agents have their own preference order ≿i over X (≿i is a total 
order in the bounded rationality sense) and private valuation set Vi ⊆ X, where vm, vn ∈ Vi 
⇒ vm ∼i vn (agent i is indifferent in its preference over all its valuations). For instance, if 
we only consider price and dealer’s warranty from previous example, then a buyer may 
 50
strictly prefer ($12000, 3 months warranty) than ($12000, 0 month warranty). If the buyer 
is not willing to pay more than $12500 provided 3 months warranty, or more than $12000 
without warranty, then we say it is indifferent between ($12500, 3 months warranty) and 
($12000, 0 months warranty), which are its private valuations. Thus, the collection of all 
maximum prices that the buyer is willing to pay for various periods of extended warranty 
constitute its private valuation set Vb. Then, for any buyer b, if an alternative x ≻b Vb (x 
is strictly preferred than Vb), then x generates a positive surplus for it, denoted by Surb(x) 
> 0; similarly for the seller we have Surs(x) > 0 if x ≻s Vs. In the previous example, we 
could derive that ($12000, 3 months warranty) generates $500 surplus, because the 
buyer’s valuation for the same warranty period is ($12500, 3 months warranty). Note 
here, sometimes we cannot measure surplus in term of money, especially in multi-
attribute negotiation where the user’s preference may not always be quantifiable or even 
unknown (preference elicitation problem). However, in this thesis, we assume all 
alternatives are comparable in term of price. 
In some bargaining, agents’ valuations dynamically change over time. In this 
thesis, we assume that the agents’ valuations are dynamic. In one-dimensional bargaining 
in Figure 3-2(a), if we denote Vb with Bt and Vs with St at time t then the surplus 
functions are Surbt(x) = Bt – x and Surst(x) = x – St, where x is an alternative and Surbt(x) 
and Surst(x) are time-dependent surpluses made by the buyer and the seller, respectively. 
In multidimensional bargaining, the surplus can be calculated using a weighted sum of 
the differences between vector V and x. For example, in our previous example the buyer 
may value each 3 months extended warranty as $500. Given one of its valuations is 
($12500, 3 months warranty), the surplus from x = ($12000, 6 months warranty) can be 
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calculated as: Surb(x) = ($12500 – $12000) + (6 months – 3 months) × $500/3 months = 
$1000. 
Definition 3-1. An acceptable set Acci ⊆ X of agent i is a set such that ∀x ∈ Acci 
we have Suri(x) > 0. In other words, ∀x ∈ Acci ⇒ x ≿i Vi. 
Definition 3-2. A feasible set F ⊆ X is a compact set (closed and bounded) such 
that ∀x ∈ F we have both Surb(x) > 0 and Surs(x) > 0.  
Definition 3-3. A disagreement set is D = X \ F. 
In Figure 3-2, the disagreement set is all points outside the feasible set. Now, it is 
the time to determine the basic protocol used in our bargaining analysis. 
Assumption 3-4. An alternating offer protocol is used as the basis of the 
bargaining, where the seller always starts by submitting a proposal/offer at time t = 0, 
and after receiving it the buyer will either accept the seller’s proposal/offer or submit a 
counter proposal/offer at time t = 0 too. After that the virtual clock moves to t = 1 (next 
round) and it is then the seller’s turn to evaluate the buyer’s counteroffer. The process 
continues until a bargaining solution is found (all negotiated issues are solved) or a 
breakdown occurs (either or both parties left the negotiation without a solution).  
We assume here that the virtual clock represents the turn-taking of the bargaining; 
so it does not necessarily match the real time of the bargaining. However, in Chapter 4 
we will slightly override this assumption and consider a real clock in the bargaining, 
especially in the study of strategic delay. Nevertheless we will use Assumption 3-4 in our 
analysis unless otherwise specified. 
 52
3.1.2 The Existence of Bargaining Solution  
The existence of a feasible set does not guarantee the existence of bargaining 
solution, but it is a necessary condition for the existence of a solution. The existence of a 
bargaining solution also depends on the agents’ strategies, i.e. whether their offers will 
converge to a solution or not. In real human negotiation the valuation is not necessarily 
fixed or known in advance, because new information is added over time, the market 
situation changes during the bargaining, or the utility of the bargained item also changes.  
Example 3-1. After a road test a human buyer may value a used car for $5,000, 
but finding an oil leak afterwards will change the buyer’s valuation. Similarly, recent 
news of a 20% discount offered by another dealer will also affect the buyer’s past 
valuation.  
In fact, most real human bargaining is conducted under uncertainty. Since agents 
are used to represent humans in automated negotiations, the agent’s ability to perceive 
complex information is required in order to increase its effectiveness in the bargaining. 
For example, the agent may be able to check the market price from multiple fixed-price 
sellers, to assess the quality of the item and the seller’s reputation, or to wait for other 
opportunities/sellers with better offers, etc. In this thesis, we assume that agent valuation 
is not always fixed, but may increase or decrease over time. 
In the multiple-attribute bargaining between two bounded rational agents, the 
bargaining process can be illustrated as picking some initial pairs of alternative points 
and then repeatedly changing those points such that they become closer until one or more 
of them reaches a solution, as shown by the direction of the arrows in Figure 3-3.  
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Figure 3-3. Multiple-attribute bargaining 
Example 3-2. During a bargaining over chemical goods a buyer might say “I am 
willing to increase my offer by $1 if you could increase the purity to 99.5%”, where the 
new offer is both increasing the price and the quality. Similarly, a store manager may 
also ask for a lower price for canned foods with closer expiry date. 
The action of lowering a score in one attribute and demanding a higher score in 
another attribute is known as making trade-offs [Faratin et al., 2000]. 
In a single-attribute negotiation, the process is less complicated; each agent only 
picks one point (e.g. price) and changes it over time (see Figure 3-4). In Figure 3-4, the 
seller’s valuation (minimum price it is willing to sell) is fixed over time, but the buyer’s 
valuation (maximum price it is willing to buy) is decreasing over time (horizontal axis). 
Since the agent only concentrates on a single attribute (issue) at any time, the 
computation is less complex compared to that in multiple-attribute cases. Following this 
argument, several researchers have reduced multiple-attribute negotiation into a 
sequential issue-by-issue negotiation [Bac, 2002; Fatima et al., 2004].  
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Figure 3-4. Single-attribute bargaining over time 
Similarly, in this thesis, we will only consider single-attribute bargaining. 
Without loss of generality, we assume that the bargaining attribute is price. Therefore, X 
is finite and a subset of integer ℤ, or could be converted to it depending on the precision 
and the unit currency being used. Conversely, if the range of X is large enough, we can 
also transform it into a finite set of ‘pseudo’ real number ℝ+ (e.g. a single precision float 
number).  
Example 3-3. A set of prices with a precision 2 decimals X = {$0.00, $0.01, …, 
$10,000.00} can be transformed into integer set X = {¢0, ¢1, …, ¢1,000,000}. Further we 
can scale-down X = {¢0, ¢1, …, ¢1,000,000} into a finite set X = [0, 1] with a precision 
of 6 decimals.  
In this thesis we assume that the price can be approximated using real numbers 
(with continuous and differentiable properties). However, we will also analyze the case 
Buyer’s valuation 
time 
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Seller’s offers  
Seller’s valuation 
Buyer’s offers  
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when it cannot be approximated, for example due to a small size of cardinality |X| or a 
large increment, e.g. $100 for each increment. And since the bargainer’s decisions are 
symmetric for the buyer and the seller, we will analyze them from the buyer’s perspective 
only.  
Assumption 3-5. Unless otherwise specified, the theoretical analysis in this thesis 
is from the buyer’s perspective and the offers and counteroffers are for the price only, 
which is in a continuous domain.  
Given Assumption 3-5, we can drop the superscript b in the notation of the 
buyer’s surplus; for examples, the notations Sur(x) and Surt(x) are used to denote time-
independent and time-dependent surplus functions, respectively. For the sake of 
consistency, we measure the buyer’s surplus in the same unit as Bt and x, e.g. in currency 
unit (cu.) or dollar ($).   
3.1.3 Surplus and Utility 
As stated previously, if the transaction price of an item, e.g. x, is lower than the 
buyer’s valuation, then the buyer will make a positive surplus which can be calculated by 
the surplus function Surt (x) = Bt – x. In economics, the ordering of human preference 
over a set of items is often represented by a continuous utility function, such that the 
preferred item will get higher utility value. Table 3-1 shows some common utility 
functions in economics, which some of them are also used in automated negotiation 
literature, e.g. quasi-linear function [MacKie-Mason and Wellman, 2006], time-
dependent function [Kraus et al., 1995; Sandholm and Vulkan, 1999], and Von 
Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function [Parson and Wooldridge, 2002; Sim and 
Wang, 2004; Cheng et al., 2005]. In addition, exponential utility function, which is part 
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of constant absolute risk aversion family (not shown in Table 3-1) has also been used in 
designing risk-averse agents [Liu et al., 2003]. In the future, we believe that more 
complex utility functions will be adopted in designing agents, especially when the 
negotiation involves risk.  
Table 3-1 Common utility functions [Mas-Colell et al., 1995] 
Properties Sample Utility Function Descriptions 
Perfect 
substitution 
U(v1, v2) = v1 + v2  This is the simplest utility function. 
It is a special case of a quasi-linear 
utility function. 
Quasi-linear U(v1, v2) = u(v1) + v2 
e.g. U(v1, v2) = v1 0.5 + v2 
This is a common consumer’s utility 
function. 
The most representative 
interpretation: v1 is the consumption 
good, and v2 is the money paid for v1. 
Diminishing 
marginal rate of 
substitution 
Cobb-Douglas: 
U(v1, v2) = v1a v2(1-a)  a∈(0, 1) 
e.g. U(v1, v2) = v1 0.3 v2 0.7 
This function is commonly used to 
describe the “saturation” of 
consuming the same goods after a 
certain level. 
Time dependent 
(discounting 
utility) 
U(v, t)  = δ t u(v)  This utility function is used to 
represent the future consumption in 
current value. This is commonly 
used in a sequential game (e.g. in 
bargaining game). 
δ ∈ (0, 1] is the discount factor and t 
is the time interval.  
Von Neumann-
Morgenstern 
expected utility 
EU = ∑ pi u(vi) This is the most representative utility 
function of a risky asset with various 
outcomes. 
pi is the probability of outcome vi. 
Constant 
Relative Risk 
Aversion 
(CRRA) 
Utility function such that 
–vU’’(v) / U’(v) = constant 
This family of utility functions is 
commonly used in a risky asset 
market (e.g. stock market). U’(v) and 
U’’(v) are the first and second-order 
derivative, and v is a risky asset. 
 
If the agent’s utility function is irrelevant from the negotiation time (discount 
factor = 1), then we can consider the surplus as the utility value. Indeed, a time-
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independent surplus function Sur (x) = B – x is a quasi-linear utility function, where Sur 
(x) → U(v1, v2), B → u(v1) and –x → v2. However, if the utility function is time 
dependent, then we cannot use a time-independent surplus function.  
Example 3-4. Suppose the buyer’s utility function is 0.5 t ⋅ ($200 – x); then a 
transaction of $150 at time t = 0 and a transaction of $100 at time t = 1 will generate the 
same unit of utility (0.50 ⋅ ($200 – $150) = 50 units and 0.51 ⋅ ($200 –$100) = 50 units, 
respectively), while their surplus values are different ($200 – $150 = $50 and $200 –
$100 = $100, respectively).  
If various utility functions are used in the negotiation literature, why do we only 
use surplus in this thesis? The first reason is for the sake of clarity. Many prior analytical 
studies have used various types of time-dependent utility functions to represent different 
user models, e.g. constant discount rate, constant cost of delay, etc. [Kraus et al., 1995; 
Sandholm and Vulkan, 1999]. Adopting a complex function for analytical purposes is 
context-dependent. Therefore, rather than analyzing a list of complex utility functions, we 
choose a simpler one, i.e. surplus.  
The second reason is due to the difficulty of preference elicitation and utility 
construction [Boutilier et al., 2006]. For instance, it is not easy to set a user’s time-
dependent utility function when it has high disparity/discontinuity. Depending on the 
negotiated item, our preference may change in hourly or daily basis rather than 
continuously in milliseconds. Also, our preference may not change a lot for a transaction 
made between 1 a.m. midnight and 6 a.m. morning at the same day, but it may change a 
lot for the transaction made between 8 a.m. and 1 p.m. at the same day; for instance, 
when the negotiated item is the analysis of the stock market.  
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Example 3-5. Suppose an agent allows its owner to enter her valuation in discrete 
form, such as ((3, $1000), (7, $900), (10, $850), (30, $700)), which means their valuation 
is constant $1000 for the first three days, $900 for the next seven days, $850 for the next 
ten days, and $700 for the next 30 days. Then the agent will set its valuation as follows: 
B1 = B2 = B3 = 1000, B4 = … = B10 = 900, etc. From the user’s perspective, using this 
method may be easier than using a discount rate function, where the system will ask the 
user to set two parameters B0 and β and set the agent’s valuation in the form of 
Bt=B0(1+β)– t. 
3.2 Decision under Uncertainty and Evaluation Functions 
In this section we will discuss three typical bargainer actions in alternating-offers 
bargaining, i.e. withdraw, accept, and counter-offer. The evaluation criteria for each 
action depend on the bargainer’s strategy. For instance, a buyer will accept an offer from 
the seller if the offer is better than the buyer’s expectation; otherwise it will counter-offer 
or withdraw from the negotiation. Let’s say a buyer expects to accept any price less than 
$500 while the seller’s offer happens to be $450, thus, the buyer accepts it. Usually, the 
bargainer withdraws from a negotiation if the time deadline is passed, or further 
negotiation will generate negative surplus, or a better agreement has been made. Any 
withdrawal by any bargainer is considered as the failure (breakdown) of the negotiation.  
We will first introduce two evaluation criteria (for withdrawing, accepting and 
counter-offering) used in this thesis (section 3.2.1). Then we will discuss the process to 
generate counteroffers by bounded rational agents (section 3.2.2). Under uncertainty, the 
agent’s rationality is commonly defined as the behavior of an agent who only offers the 
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price yielding the highest expected utility and accepts an opponent’s offer if it maximizes 
the agent’s utility.  
3.2.1 Evaluation Criteria 
In Assumption 3-1, we assume that the buyer is constrained by time deadline. We 
further assume here that when the deadline passes, the negotiation failed and the buyer 
must withdraw from the negotiation without penalty (zero surplus).   
Three types of evaluation criteria (evaluation functions or EvalF for short) are 
discussed here, i.e. EvalF-0, EvalF-I, and EvalF-II. But only EvalF-I and EvalF-II are 
considered in our analysis. Under some conditions those two types are identical, but not 
under other conditions. Therefore, we will analyze them separately here. Let’s start with 
EvalF-0 agent. 
3.2.1.1 EvalF-0 agent 
An EvalF-0 agent uses the simplest evaluation function in accepting an offer by 
its opponent, i.e., accept an offer if it generates positive surplus regardless of the amount 
of the surplus.  
Example 3-6. Suppose the buyer’s deadline has not passed and its current 
valuation is $100 and the seller’s current offer is $99; thus, the buyer will accept the 
seller’s offer because it will generate $100 – $99 = $1 surplus. However, if the seller’s 
offer is $105, then the buyer should not accept it but will counter offer, let say $95. But if 
the deadline has passed while the seller’s last offer is $105, then the buyer can only 
withdraw from the negotiation.   
The evaluation criteria of EvalF-0 agents can be formulated in the following 
definition. 
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Definition 3-4. Suppose it is the turn of an EvalF-0 buyer at time t. Then it uses 
the following evaluation function in making its decision: 
 Withdraw   iff t > Td 
It  =    Accept yt  iff Surt(yt) > 0 and t ≤ Td  
 Counter offer xt otherwise     (3-1) 
where It is the buyer’s decision function at time t, Td is the buyer’s time deadline, yt is the 
offer by the seller at time t, xt is the buyer’s offer that will be proposed, Surt(yt) is the 
surplus if yt is accepted by the buyer at time t. 
The goal of EvalF-0 agents is to make a deal as soon as the resolution is 
acceptable regardless of the surplus, e.g. in [Tesauro, 2002]. It implicitly assumes that the 
user/owner does not care about the extent of the surplus.  
3.2.1.2 EvalF-I agent 
EvalF-I agents accept an offer if it generates a surplus that is greater than or equal 
to that of the counteroffer that will be sent by the agent in the next round as illustrated by 
Example 3-7.  
Example 3-7. Suppose the buyer’s deadline has not passed and its current 
valuation is $100 and the seller’s current offer is $80; thus, by accepting the seller’s 
current offer the buyer will generate $20 surplus. If the buyer’s next valuation is the same 
$100 and it believes by certainty that the seller can actually sell the item for $75 in the 
next round, then it is better for the buyer to refuse seller’s current offer but ask for $75 in 
the next round, because the surplus will be $25 which is higher than $20 if it accepts the 
seller’s current offer. But if the buyer’s valuation is $80 in the next round, then it is better 
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for the buyer to accept seller’s offer now, because it will only generate $5 surplus in the 
next round. 
Under this rationale, the acceptance criterion for the buyer is to accept the seller’s 
offer if it generates higher surplus than that by sending a counter offer in the next round. 
The evaluation criteria of EvalF-I agents can be formulated in the following definition. 
Definition 3-5. Suppose it is the turn of an EvalF-I buyer at time t. Then it uses 
the following evaluation function in making its decision: 
 Withdraw   iff t > Td or (Surte(xt) ≤ 0 and Surt(yt) ≤ 0) 
It  =    Accept yt  iff Surt(yt) > 0 and Surt(yt) ≥ Surte(xt) and t ≤ Td  
 Counter offer xt otherwise     (3-2) 
where xt is the buyer’s offer that will be proposed, Surte(xt) is the estimated surplus at 
time t if xt is accepted by the seller in the next bargaining round, i.e. at time t+1. 
In the context of Example 3-7, we have Surt(yt) = Surt($80) = $100 – $80 = $20, 
and two possible estimated surpluses: Surte(xt) = Surte($75) = $100 – $75 = $25 when the 
buyer’s valuation does not change, or Surte($75) = $80 – $75 = $5 if it decreases to $80 
at the next period. Here, the buyer estimated surplus is trivially calculated as the 
difference between the buyer’s valuation and its offer, because the buyer is certain that xt 
will be accepted by the seller. For instance, if both agents made similar deals at prices 
above xt in the past encounters, then the buyer may believe that the seller will certainly 
accept xt. Similarly, if the buyer can predict the concession that will be made by the seller 
(e.g. the seller always concede at a constant rate), then at a certain point the buyer may 
also believe that the seller will certainly accept xt. For example, suppose the seller’s and 
the buyer’s last offers are < $500, $490, $480, $470, $460> and < $400, $410, $420, 
 62
$430, $440 >, respectively, where the seller moves first by offering $500. Since the seller 
always concedes at a rate of $10, then the buyer may believe that the seller will certainly 
accept $450. When the agent is certain that xt will be accepted, then we have Surte(xt) = 
Surt+1(xt); for instance, Surte(xt) = Surt+1(xt) = Bt – xt for the buyer.  
When the buyer is uncertain whether xt will be accepted or not, then it may use 
Surte(xt) = pt(xt) Surt+1(xt) + (1 – pt(xt)) Rt+1(xt), where pt(xt) is its belief (subjective 
probability) that xt will be accepted at time t+1 , Surt+1(xt) is the surplus made if xt is 
accepted by the seller at time t+1, and Rt+1(xt) is the estimated future surplus (residue) if 
xt is not accepted. The discussion on Rt+1(xt) and pt(xt) will be provided later in this 
chapter. 
The evaluation function in equation (3-2) is also used in other automated 
negotiation literature [Faratin et al., 1998; Fatima et al., 2004; Li et al., 2006]. Sim and 
Wang [2004] have adopted fuzzy rules to modify the acceptance criteria of EvalF-I 
agents. Under their fuzzy criterion, an agent may accept an offer even if it is slightly 
worse than its next counteroffer. 
3.2.1.3 EvalF-II agent 
In addition to the evaluation criterion used by an EvalF-I agent, an EvalF-II agent 
uses an additional evaluation function in accepting an offer by its opponent, i.e., accept 
an offer if it is perceived to generate an optimal surplus.  
Example 3-8. Suppose a buyer’s current valuation is $100 and the seller’s 
current offer is $90, then the buyer will accept the offer if it predicts that the seller will 
not offer any better price until the end of the bargaining.  
The rationale is that some agents may be myopic and risk-averse towards 
breakdown in the future. Therefore, they may make a secure-yet-perceived-as-optimal 
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offer even when a better one may exist in the future. While they also behave as EvalF-I 
agents, this additional evaluation criterion makes EvalF-II agents more ‘vulnerable’ to 
their opponent’s strategy. For instance, a seller may stand on its offer because it believes 
that the buyer will be more likely to accept it. If the buyer thinks that the offer is 
acceptable and perceives it as the ‘best’ offer that it will ever get, then it will accept it, 
even when the seller may have offered a better one in the future. Later in sub-section 
3.3.1 we will discuss how a buyer perceives a ‘best’ offer that it will ever get. Right now 
we will formalize the evaluation criterion of EvalF-II agents. 
Definition 3-6. Suppose it is the turn of an EvalF-II buyer at time t. Then it uses 
the following evaluation function in making its decision: 
 Withdraw  iff t > Td or (Surte(xt) ≤ 0 and Surt(yt) ≤ 0) 
 
It  =    Accept yt iff [Surt(yt) ≥ Surte(xt) ∨ ∧j(Surt(yt) ≥ Surte(yj))] and  
Surt(yt) > 0 and t ≤ Td  
 Counter offer xt otherwise     (3-3) 
where Surte(yj) is the estimated value of Surt(yj) and j ∈ {t+1, t+2, …, Td} are the turns of 
the buyer in the future until its time deadline Td. 
3.2.1.4 A brief discussion 
EvalF-0 and EvalF-I agents are more common in the automated negotiation 
literature, e.g. in [Faratin et al., 1998; Tesauro, 2002; Fatima et al., 2004; Li et al., 2006], 
while EvalF-II agents have rarely been discussed. In this thesis, we introduce the EvalF-II 
agent to facilitate the analysis of non-monotonic-offers bargaining, because its 
acceptance criteria are more flexible than that of EvalF-I agents. Not all agents are 
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surplus maximizers and able to counteroffer a price that maximizes their expected 
surplus. Intuitively, humans also use similar heuristics in negotiations, because we may 
accept an offer if we predict that it is already the best that our opponent can make and it 
generates positive surplus for us. Some experimental results in Chapter 5 indicate that 
EvalF-II agents may be better than EvalF-I agents in terms of success rate. Finally, 
Definitions 3-4, 3-5 and 3-6 are not only for the buyer but also apply for the seller’s 
decision. 
In addition to EvalF-I and EvalF-II agents, there are several other evaluation 
criteria which are not considered in this thesis. For example, an agent that will never 
accept any offer before its deadline but will accept any offer at its time deadline 
(deadline-driven), or an agent that will never accept their opponent’s offer but will 
persuade their opponent to accept the proponent’s offer (Boulwarism) [Raiffa, 1982]. We 
do not consider these acceptance criteria. 
So far, we have defined the evaluation criteria of withdrawing, accepting and 
counter-offering by two different types of agents, i.e. EvalF-I and EvalF-II agents. But 
we have not described the generation of agents’ offers. Unlike game-theoretic analysis, 
we cannot assume that agents have perfect foresight and are capable of generating offers 
that maximize their expected utility which directly generate the equilibrium solution (e.g. 
Rubinstein’s bargaining solution [1982]). Instead, we will consider myopic agents that 
are able to generate a perceived optimal offer after considering partially observable 
information. These agents represent the decision-theoretic agents, who seek an optimal 
solution that maximizes their expected utility under uncertainty.  
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3.2.2 Myopic Agents that Maximize Expected Gain 
Depending on the algorithm used, agents may consider different levels of future 
outcomes in their decisions to generate an offer. For instance, at time t the most myopic 
agent (namely myopic-0) will only consider all possible outcomes at time t regardless of 
whether or not the negotiation proceeds to the next round t+1. On the other hand, 
myopic-1 agents will consider all possible outcomes at time t and t+1 (one round in the 
future), which may happen if the negotiation at time t did not conclude with any result. 
Moreover, a myopic-K agent will take into account the situation when the negotiation 
does not yield any result until the K-th round. In open systems, agents are bounded 
rational and myopic to different degrees, and can never assume that their opponents will 
be the same type as them. For the sake of clarity and simplicity, in this thesis we will only 
consider myopic-0 and myopic-1 agents.  
3.2.2.1 Myopic-0 agents 
As a bounded rational agent, the buyer will never offer a price that generates 
negative surplus. Suppose that Sur(x) = Bt – x, where Bt is the buyer valuation at time t. 
Since the buyer only considers the immediate situation (myopic-0) and ignores the past 
and future situation, then its optimal decision depends only on the expected gain EGt 
which is a function of the offer x defined as follows: 
Definition 3-7. EGt(x) ≡ (1 – qt) pt(x) (Bt – x) + qt Bφ   (3-4) 
where qt∈[0, 1] is the buyer’s belief of the likelihood of negotiation breakdown caused by 
the seller at time t which is independent of x, Bφ is the buyer’s valuation if the negotiation 
breaks down, and pt(x)∈[0, 1] is the buyer’s belief (subjective probability) function that 
price x will be accepted by the seller (acceptance rate) at time t.  
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We assume that qt is independent of x, e.g. the seller has approached its deadline 
or has made a deal with another buyer, etc. And we use φ to denote the time of 
breakdown. If the negotiation does not break down, which the agent believes may happen 
with probability (1 – qt), then two possible states may happen. The first state is that the 
bargaining succeeds immediately (with subjective probability pt(xt) where xt is the price 
offered by the buyer), which gives the buyer positive surplus (Bt – xt). The other state is 
that the bargaining proceeds to the next round, which is ignored by the buyer since it is of 
myopic-0 type. Let us assume that no surplus is generated from a breakdown (Bφ = 0), 
and due to the independence of x from qt, then the optimization problem is to maximize 
EGt(x) in equation (3-4) which becomes  
Maxx EGt(x) = Maxx [ pt(x)(Bt – x)]        (3-5) 
Assumption 3-6. A myopic-0 buyer will offer an optimum price xt* that yields the 
highest expected surplus at the present time t, i.e., Maxx [ pt(x) × Surt(x)]. 
For example, let the buyer’s valuation Bt = $100 and it believes that offering $100 
or above will be certainly accepted by the seller and offering $x will have the probability 
pt(x) = x/100 for 0 ≤ x ≤ 100. By equation (3-5) it is easily calculated that the optimum 
price xt* = $50, i.e. with 0.5 chance of being accepted. 
3.2.2.2 Myopic-1 agents 
In our model, we define a myopic-1 buyer as an agent that will offer a price that 
yields the highest weighted sum of expected surplus at the present time t and the next 
round t+1.  The buyer’s problem can be stated as Maxx EGt(x) where 
Definition 3-8. EGt(x) ≡ (1 – qt) [pt(x)(Bt – x) + γ(1 – pt(x))EG’t+1(x)] + qt Bφ  
(3-6) 
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where γ ∈ [0, 1] is the weight of the expected gain in the next round t+1, EG’t+1(x) is the 
estimation of the expected gain in the next round which is made by the buyer at the 
current round t, and the rest of parameters are as defined in Definition 3-7. 
We assume that γ ≤ 1, because the agent is always averse toward uncertainty in 
the future and γEG’t+1(x) is the estimated future surplus or residue Rt+1(xt). It is also 
important here to differentiate between EG’t+1(x) and the function EGt+1(x), because both 
of them may not be the same function given that the buyer may revise its beliefs at time 
t+1 (a more detailed discussion is provided later in sub-section 3.2.2.3 and 3.3.6). Similar 
to the analysis of myopic-0 buyers, if we assume that no surplus is generated from a 
breakdown and x is independent of qt, then equation (3-6) becomes  
Maxx EGt(x) = Maxx [pt(x)(Bt – x) + γ(1 – pt(x))EG’t+1(x)]    (3-7) 
Assumption 3-7. A myopic-1 buyer will offer a price xt* that yields the highest 
expected gain of the combination of positive surplus at time t and expected gain at time 
t+1, i.e. Maxx [pt(x) × Surt(x) + γ(1 – pt(x))EG’t+1(x)] subject to Surt(x) > 0. 
For example, let the buyer’s valuation Bt = $100 and it believes that offering $100 
or above will be certainly accepted by the seller and offering $x will have the probability 
pt(x) = x/100 for 0 ≤ x ≤ 100. By equation (3-5) it is easily calculated that the optimum 
price xt* = $50, i.e. with 0.5 chance of being accepted. 
3.2.2.3 Remarks  
Depending on the agent’s computation, EG’t+1(x) may or may not depend on x. In 
human negotiation, if a high offer xh is rejected, then the expected gain in the future may 
be lower than it would be if a low offer xl is rejected.  
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Example 3-9. Suppose the buyer’s valuation is constant over time, say $100. If a 
buyer offered $90 and was rejected, then his/her expected gain in the future may not be 
more than $10, because the buyer now believes that the seller may only accept a price 
above $90. On the other hand, if the buyer offered $80 and was rejected, then his/her 
expected gain in the future may be more than $10, because there is no reason for him/her 
to believe that the seller will not accept a price below $90. Thus, in this case EG’t+1(x) is 
a decreasing function with respect to x, i.e. EG’t+1($80) > EG’t+1($90). However, this is 
correct only if the buyer believes that the seller will react identically in both cases, for 
example by counter-offering the same price $100, which may not be true in some cases. 
For example, if the buyer conceded more by offering $90, then it is more likely that a 
cooperative (benevolent) seller will also concede more by offering a closer price, say 
$95, which may increase the expected gain of the buyer due to a higher belief function 
pt+1(x) in estimating EG’t+1(x).  
Conclusively, in human negotiation, our estimation of our future gain varies 
according to the interaction and observation of our opponent’s behavior. However, in 
artificial agents the situation may not be exactly the same as in human negotiation, 
because the agent’s behavior depends on the algorithm used. We will discuss this issue in 
more detail in subsection 3.3.6 after describing the belief mechanism.  
Another issue is both equations (3-5) and (3-7) may not be solved analytically if 
pt(x) is a discrete, discontinuos or piecewise function. However, we assume that they can 
be solved numerically by the agents. If there are two or more values of x (offers) 
maximizing the equations, i.e. more than one xt*, then we assume that the buyer will 
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choose the one with higher pt(xt*). Another constraint that must be considered in solving 
the equation is Surt(x), which must be positive.  
In both equations, the function pt(x) is crucial in determining the buyer’s correct 
decision that maximizes its surplus and results in a high success rate of negotiation. If 
pt(x) is generated incorrectly in the sense of mistaken belief, then it may affect the 
buyer’s offer and may lead to a lower success rate or surplus. Since pt(x) is very 
important in determining the agent’s offer, we will discuss it separately in section 3.3. 
For the purpose of analysis, we will use a simplified model of pt(x) and EG’t+1(x) in order 
to derive our propositions.  
3.3 Agent’s Belief 
As stated before, the agent’s belief has an important role in deciding the 
negotiation outcomes, especially in myopic agents. Fundamentally, the agent’s belief has 
been considered as one of the characteristics of intelligent agents, commonly denoted as 
BDI agents (agents with belief, desire, and intention) [Bratman, 1987; Wooldridge, 
2000]. In much early work, the BDI architecture has been used for various purposes, 
including cooperation among agents and their interaction with the environment; for 
instances, Procedural Reasoning System (PRS) [Georgeff and Lansky, 1987], dMARS 
[d’Inverno et al., 1998], JADEX [Pokahr et al., 2005], etc. In this section, we will 
describe various belief functions and their revision mechanism that will be used in both 
the analytical and empirical study of our proposed bargaining protocols.  
Specifically, there are several factors in agents’ decision-making that involve 
belief. For example, EvalF-II agents must believe that Surt(yt) ≥ Surte(yj) for all j∈{t+1, 
t+2, …, Td} in order to accept yt. In this case, agents must have the capability to estimate 
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all future outcomes and believe that they are correctly estimated and will not generate 
higher surplus than the current one. Another example is that myopic agents must assign 
belief (in term of subjective probability) over the acceptance rate of their offer, i.e. pt(x). 
Moreover, myopic agents must also have beliefs regarding the breakdown rate qt. Finally, 
in a more complex interaction that involves argumentation, which will be explained later, 
agents must also assess the truthfulness of their opponent’s arguments. In this case, trust 
and argument verification are two important factors. In this section, we will describe 
those beliefs which will be used in our analysis. Certainly, this is not an exhaustive list of 
all possible agents’ beliefs, but a list representing some commonsense beliefs that may be 
used by bargaining agents and are adopted in our study. 
3.3.1 Belief toward Maximum Surplus in EvalF-II Agents 
Suppose the seller’s offers in the first six rounds are as follows < $125, $100, $95, 
$90, $90, $90>. Then as a human buyer, we may predict that it is likely the seller will not 
sell it at a price lower than $90. So, if our valuation is a constant $100 and we are not 
willing to wait for a longer time, then we will accept this price, which generates $10 
surplus. Our decision here has reflected the characteristics of EvalF-II agents, who must 
decide whether or not the current offer from their opponent has generated the highest 
possible surplus.  
Since agents do not have perfect foresight, then they must rely on limited 
information to estimate their future surplus, which may not be correct. Suppose that the 
past and future surplus is defined consistently as Sur(yt) = Bt – yt, t∈{0, 1, …, Td}. If Bt 
is constant, say equal to B, then agents may observe the past surplus values and use the 
first order derivative condition to decide whether the current surplus is maximum or not, 
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i.e. ∂(B – yt)/∂t = 0 and ∂2(B – yt)/∂t2 < 0. In a discrete domain it can be accomplished by 
first deriving the continuous function of y(t), e.g. by using regression analysis. However, 
this task is not easy, especially if the data is inconsistent (no regularity in their opponent’s 
offers) and agents do not know the strategy used by their opponent. If the opponent’s 
offer is asymptotic (e.g. follows a logarithmic function), then the first order condition 
would never be met.  
Adopting a more flexible condition, such as ∂(B – yt)/∂t ≈ 0 and ∂2(B – yt)/∂t2 < 0, 
may help, but not always. For example, if the seller uses a random strategy, then the 
standard error of the regression will be high and the confidence level will be low, which 
in turn cannot convince the buyer to believe the regression function. Thus, in the absence 
of consistent data and with low certainty of other factors (e.g. agents’ valuation is not 
constant or unknown), then the accuracy of this method will be low.  
Alternatively, the agents can adopt another statistical method; for example by 
comparing the current surplus with the surplus they have made in the past and predicting 
the likelihood that the current surplus is the highest one. Or, the agents may use a more 
complex method by predicting the characteristics of their opponent, a research area 
known as agent modeling [Carmel and Markovitch, 1996; Riley and Veloso, 2000; 
Denzinger and Hamdan, 2004]. For example, the agents may predict whether its 
oppoinent is a deceiver or not, or predicting its valuation by looking at its history if any 
historic data is available. However, these methods may not be accurate if there are not 
many experiences or information gathered by the agent.  
Since there are several methods that can be adopted by the agents, we will not use 
all of them in our analysis; rather, we will use a more general one based on our 
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commonsense, which tells us that the likelihood of maximum surplus is low if our 
opponent’s offers are steeply changed. For example, consider the following two 
sequences of offer by two sellers: <$91, $90, $90> and <$99, $99, $90>. In the absence 
of any other information about sellers’ valuation, it is more convincing that the first seller 
has reached its limit (e.g. its valuation), while it is less convincing that the second seller 
has. The reason is that the first seller has only made a small amount of concession during 
the three offers, while the second seller made a relatively large amount of concession; 
thus, it is very likely that the second seller may still be willing to concede more. Thus, we 
can derive a conclusion that if an agent’s consecutive offers are close, then it is more 
likely that it has reach a limit; thus, the surplus is maximized. Using this heuristic we will 
analyze EvalF-II agents in this thesis. 
3.3.2 Belief Function pt(x) if the Opponent is EvalF-I Agent 
3.3.2.1 Belief function 
Suppose that the buyer knows that the seller is an EvalF-I agent. Then the buyer 
knows that the seller will accept its offer iff its offer is greater than or the same as the 
seller’s next offer. Under uncertainty, the seller’s next offer is unknown by the buyer, but 
it could be predicted to follow a subjective probabilistic distribution function (subjective 
because it depends on the buyer’s algorithm). Then if the buyer offers a price, the 
likelihood that it will be accepted by the seller is the cumulative distribution value of the 
seller’s next offer. Then offering a higher price will have a higher chance of exceeding 
the seller’s next offer. Thus, pt(x) is an increasing function of x (i.e., an accumulative 
distribution function of the seller’s next offer). 
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Proposition 3-1. Suppose the buyer knows that the seller is EvalF-I. Then the 
buyer’s belief function that its offer at time t will be accepted by a seller, pt(x) is an 
increasing function of x, where for any x we have pt(x)∈[0, 1].  
Another characteristic is pt(x) = 1 for x ≥ yt, where yt is the seller’s current offer; 
and pt(x) = 0 for x < z, where z is the buyer’s estimation of the seller’s valuation. Thus, 
the shape of pt(x) will be from the family of step functions, linear functions, logarithmic 
functions or logistic functions, depending on the initial program, the value of yt and z, and 
the updating method (belief revision).  
 
Figure 3-5. Various agents’ belief functions pt(x) 
Figure 3-5 shows four different belief functions that satisfy Proposition 3-1. A 
step function represents a two-state belief, i.e. the buyer believes that the seller will only 
accept a price higher than or equal to x0 (x0 is the seller’s next offer with certainty). If the 
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agent is more risk averse, then it may choose a higher value of x0. A linear function 
represents a uniform probability that the seller’s next offer will appear between xa and xb. 
A logarithm function represents an agent characteristics with a high indecisiveness on a 
wide range of offers (a range between xa and xb in Figure 3-5), which means the seller’s 
next offer is not likely greater than xa. Which belief function and what parameters should 
be chosen by an agent depend on the designer and the user characteristics (if the users can 
set their agent’s parameter explicitly). However, in this thesis our goal is not seeking the 
best belief function or their characteristics, but finding a better protocol that can help 
those agents to find a better resolution.  
3.3.2.2 Belief revision 
When an agent receives new information, then it may update its belief function. 
Intuitively, a buyer will reduce pt(xt*) if its optimal offer, xt* has not been accepted by 
the seller, or increase pt(xt*) if the seller’s counteroffer, yt is very close to xt*. Figure 3-
6(a) shows an example of a buyer’s belief function at time t and t+1, i.e., after the seller 
drops its offer from $200 to $190.  
Example 3-10. Suppose the buyer’s valuation is $180 and its previous offer xt* = 
$160, with pt($160) = 0.5. If the seller reduces its offer from $200 to $190, then the buyer 
may change its belief function from pt(x) to pt+1(x). The new beliefs are higher for prices 
above $175, and lower for prices below $175 (the intersection of pt(x) and pt+1(x)). Thus, 
the buyer now believes that the acceptance rate of offering $160 is 0.3, which may force 
the buyer to raise its offer. However, if the seller insists on its current price, the buyer’s 
belief will shift to the right, because by now, the buyer may think that the seller will not 
be able to concede (Figure 3-6(b)). In this case, pt(x) is first order stochastic dominant 
over pt+1(x) in Figure 3-6(b). More seriously, if the seller increases the price rather than 
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conceding, then the buyer may think that the seller cannot even insist on its previous 
offer; thus, the buyer’s belief will reduce more and becomes steeper (Figure 3-6(c)). In 
this case, pt+1(x) in Figure 3-6(c) is first order stochastic dominant over p t+1(x) in Figure 
3-6(b). 
 
Figure 3-6. An example of the shifting of a buyer’s belief towards the seller’s acceptance 
rate after (a) seller concedes, (b) seller insists, and (c) seller increases its price 
Surely, the magnitude and frequency of update depends on the buyer’s 
characteristics. For example, a skeptical buyer may not update its belief frequently even 
after the seller rejected its offer several times, and if an update occurs the magnitude may 
not be large. In contrast, a believing buyer may update its belief more frequently with 
higher magnitude. Regardless of the agent’s characteristics, we may come up with the 
following assumption that is applied in our model for the updating mechanism of the 
buyer’s belief when facing a EvalF-I seller. 
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Assumption 3-8. Suppose that the buyer knows that the seller is EvalF-I. (i) If the 
buyer’s optimal offer xt* is rejected, then the buyer will reduce pt(x) for all x∈Acc and x 
≤ xt*, where a price smaller than xt* is reduced faster; thus yielding a steeper function 
pt+1(x) at x ≤ xt*. (ii) If the seller concedes such that yt+1 < yt, then the buyer will increase 
its belief such that pt+1(x) = 1 for all x ≥ yt+1, and may also increase pt(x) for x that is 
slightly lower than yt+1. (iii) If the seller’s offer is unchanged or raised to yt+1 > yt, then 
the buyer will decrease all belief of x < yt+1, i.e. pt+1(x) becomes a steeper function. 
In Assumption 3-8(ii) an imprecise concept “slightly lower than yt+1” is used to 
represent the increase of belief between $175 and $190 in Figure 3-6(a), i.e. pt+1(x) > 
pt(x) for x ∈ [$175, $190], where $175 is the intersection point between pt+1(x) and pt(x), 
and $190 is yt+1. In this case the phrase “slightly lower” represents prices lower than $190 
until $175. Depending on the updating algorithm and the belief functions, the intersection 
point in Figure 3-6(a) may be closer to yt+1 or further from it. Combining Assumption 3-
8(i) and 3-8(ii), pt+1(xt*) will decrease if yt+1 is significantly higher than xt*, and may 
increase if yt+1 is only slightly higher than xt*.  
Example 3-11. Suppose the buyer’s offer at time t is $100 with prior belief 
pt($100) = 0.8. If the seller refuses to accept the offer but counter-offers $200, then the 
buyer’s posterior belief pt+1($100) may drop to 0.7. However, if the seller’s counteroffer 
is $101, then the buyer’s posterior belief pt+1($100) may increase to 0.95. 
Proposition 3-2. If an optimal offer xt* is rejected by an EvalF-I seller, who does 
not concede significantly from its previous offer yt, then the buyer’s posterior belief will 
be steeper at x ≤ xt*.  
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Again, in Proposition 3-2 an imprecise concept “concede significantly” should be 
interpreted at an algorithm level which may vary for different type of buyers. 
3.3.3 Belief Function pt(x) if the Opponent is EvalF-II Agent 
3.3.3.1 Belief function 
Suppose the seller is EvalF-II and the buyer knows it. To avoid confusion, in this 
section we will use pt(x) to represent the buyer’s belief function if the seller is EvalF-I, 
and use πt(x) if the seller is EvalF-II. When the seller’s type is unknown or unimportant, 
we will use pt(x) for the sake of consistency. Suppose at time t the buyer has a 
monotonically increasing belief function πt(x) as shown in Figure 3-7(a) and offers a 
price xt*. Also, let xt* be rejected so the bargaining goes to the next round t+1. 
Knowing that the seller is EvalF-II, the buyer realizes that the seller may accept 
any price if the price falls in the feasible set and is perceived by the seller as the best offer 
from the buyer; thus, πt+1(x) may not be an increasing function. Instead, πt+1(x) is the sum 
of the revised πt(x) according to Assumption 3-8, namely pt+1(x) (dashed curve in Figure 
3-7(b)), and a belief function kt+1(x) that represents the likelihood of x being accepted by 
the seller because it is perceived as the best offer from the buyer at time t+1 (top curve in 
Figure 3-7(b)). Or,  
Definition 3-9. πt+1(x) = min(pt+1(x) + kt+1(x), 1).     (3-8) 
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Figure 3-7. Belief revision of EvalF-II agents when (a) before rejection, (b) after first 
rejection, (c) after second rejection 
The belief function k(x) can be regarded as the tendency of the buyer to deceive 
the seller by insisting on its previous offer. Using the rationale of the buyer’s belief 
toward the maximum surplus that it can get from the seller as explained in section 3.3.1, 
we can derive that the highest value of kt+1(x) is around xt* for the following reasons.  
1. If the buyer offers a price xt+1* that is much higher than xt*, then the seller will learn 
that the buyer may concede more in the future; thus, for the seller xt+1* is not the best 
offer from the buyer, or kt+1(xt+1*) = 0 for xt+1* >> xt*. This is one of the reasons why 
human bargainers rarely concede quickly especially at the beginning of the 
bargaining, i.e. to avoid sending a signal that s/he will easily concede. Again, the 
degree of “much higher” depends on the algorithm used by the buyers. 
2. If the buyer offers a price xt+1* slightly higher or lower than xt* (say a price within a 
range [xt*–δ, xt*+δ]), then the seller will perceive that the buyer has reached its limit 
of conceding; thus, xt+1* may be perceived as the best offer from the buyer.  
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3. If the buyer offers a price xt+1* much lower than xt*, then the seller realizes that the 
buyer may not offer a higher price in the future, or xt+1* is the best offer, but xt+1* 
may not be in the feasible set that can be accepted by the seller, or kt+1(xt+1*) = 0 for 
xt+1* << xt*. 
3.3.3.2 Belief revision 
As stated in Definition 3-9, πt+1(x) = min(pt+1(x) + kt+1(x), 1). If the peak of kt+1(x) 
is high enough, the buyer has incentive to offer xt+1∈[xt*–δ, xt*+δ] (stay close to its 
previous offer) to deceive the seller to accept it (as if it is the best offer that could be 
made by the buyer). In response, the seller may accept it (because the seller believes that 
xt+1 is the best) or reject it (because the seller is skeptical or xt+1 is lower than its 
valuation), and counter offer yt+1. Receiving counteroffer yt+1, the buyer will update 
kt+1(x) and pt+1(x) separately.  
First, the buyer will reduce kt+1(x) to kt+2(x) (the top of Figure 3-7(c)), because it 
realizes that xt+1 is less likely within the feasible set. The reduction rate reflects the 
buyer’s belief assigned to the reason for the seller’s refusal, i.e. whether the seller is 
skeptical or has valuation higher than xt+1. If the buyer believes that the refusal is very 
likely due to the seller’s skepticism, then the reduction of kt+1(x) is small. Conversely, if 
the buyer believes that the refusal is due to the seller’s high valuation, then the reduction 
is bigger.  
Second, the buyer will update pt+1(x) to pt+2(x) following Assumption 3-8 (as if 
the seller is an EvalF-I agent). After updating kt+2(x) and pt+2(x), the buyer can compose a 
new πt+2(x) = min(pt+2(x) + kt+2(x), 1). If under new belief πt+2(x) the buyer’s optimal 
offer xt+2*, which is less than xt*+δ,  is still rejected by the seller, then the buyer will use 
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the same updating method as described before. Thus, if within n rounds the buyer 
submits offers xt+1*,…, xt+n* which are less than xt*+δ and all are rejected by the seller, 
then eventually kt+n(x) will equal to zero, which leaves πt+n(x) = pt+n(x); thus, πt+n(x) is a 
monotonically increasing function again. However, if at any round t+j < t+n the buyer’s 
offer xt+j is higher than xt*+δ and it is rejected by the seller, then the buyer will only 
update pt+j(x) to pt+j+1(x) and generate a new kt+j+1(x) with a peak at around xt+j, because 
the rejection of xt+j is not relevant to the update of kt+j(x). In other words, kt+j(x) will be 
updated only if xt+j is lower than xt*+δ.  
Assumption 3-9. Suppose the buyer knows that the seller is an EvalF-II agent and 
the buyer’s offer xt* is rejected by the seller. Then the buyer will update πt(x) by 
decomposing it into pt(x) and kt(x), and update them separately. pt(x) will be updated 
according to Assumption 3-8, and kt(x) will be  updated according to the following rules:  
(i) If xt* is less than or equal to xt–1*+δ, then kt(x) will be reduced to kt+1(x), 
where the reduction rate depends on the buyer’s belief about the reason for the seller’s 
refusal, either due to the seller’s skepticism or the seller’s high valuation. 
(ii) If xt* is greater than xt–1*+δ, then kt(x) will not be updated. Instead, a new 
kt+1(x) will be generated whose a peak is around xt*. 
Assumption 3-10. There exists n and δ such that if the buyer’s consecutive offers 
xt+1*,…, xt+n* are less than xt*+δ and all are rejected by the seller, then kt+n(x) = 0 and 
πt+n(x) = pt+n(x). 
Depending on the characteristics of k(x) and n (the speed of reducing k(x) to 
zero), we can characterize a buyer as a skeptical/believing and deceitful/benevolent one. 
If both the peak of k(x) is high (e.g. causing πt+1(xt*) > πt (xt*)) and n is large (e.g. 
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greater than 5), then the buyer is a deceitful and skeptical one because it insists on its 
offer for several rounds (e.g. 5 or more rounds) just to mislead the seller to accept it. If 
the peak of k(x) is high but n = 1, then the buyer is deceitful but believing because it will 
try to insist on its previous offer only in order to mislead the seller to accept its offer. If 
k(x) = 0 for any x, then the buyer is a benevolent one because it never misleads the seller, 
even if it knows that the seller is EvalF-II.  
Proposition 3-3. Suppose that the buyer knows that the seller is EvalF-II. If the 
buyer’s consecutive offers which are lower than xt*+δ were rejected for n rounds and the 
seller concedes insignificantly during these rounds, then the buyer’s posterior belief 
πt+n(x) will be steeper than that of πt(x) for all x ≤ xt*. 
In addition to the above characteristic, πt(x) = 1 for x ≥ yt, where yt is the seller’s 
current offer; and πt(x) = 0 for x < z, where z is the buyer’s estimation of the seller’s 
valuation. Here, z may be assigned using a simple heuristic, e.g. as a fraction of the 
buyer’s valuation z = 0.7 B0, or predicted according to the seller’s type and its initial offer 
y0, e.g. z = 0.3 y0, if the seller is a total stranger, or z = 0.7 y0, if the seller is a well-known 
one. Facing an EvalF-II seller, the buyer’s belief πt(x) may not be an increasing function. 
However, the buyer does not need to consider all prices in order to find an optimal offer. 
Intuitively, if there are several prices with the same probability of being accepted by the 
opponent (see Figure 3-8(a)), then the lowest price will be selected by the buyer because 
it will generate higher surplus than the higher price, unless the expected gain is indirectly 
related to the price (e.g. choosing a higher price will invoke the seller to concede more in 
the future). Thus, the search space of the buyer (effective belief function) is always an 
increasing function πt+1(x), as shown in Figure 3-8(b).   
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Proposition 3-4. Suppose the buyer knows that the seller is EvalF-II. Then the 
effective buyer’s belief that its offer at time t be accepted by a seller, πt(x), is an 
increasing function with respect to its offer x, where πt(x)∈[0, 1] for all x. However, 
πt(x) may not be a continuous function.  
 
Figure 3-8. Belief of EvalF-II agents that is (a) stored and (b) effectively considered 
3.3.3.3 Remarks 
If the buyer does not know whether or not the seller is EvalF-II, then kt+1(x) 
depends on both x and the estimated ratio of sellers who perceived it as the signal of the 
best offer from the buyer. Thus, the buyer may consider the seller as an EvalF-II seller 
and Assumption 3-9 and 3-10 apply, but with a lower value of k+1(x) as stated in the 
following assumption. 
Assumption 3-11. If the buyer agent does not know the type of the seller, then it 
will assign a probability that the seller is EvalF-I and EvalF-II of κ and 1 – κ, 
respectively; and consider the seller as an EvalF-II seller with k+1(x) = (1 – κ) k+1(x)’, 
where k+1(x)’ is the value if the buyer certainly believes that the seller is EvalF-II. 
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As mentioned before, some buyers may be skeptical while others are not. The 
reason for a buyer to be skeptical is because the seller may be skeptical as illustrated in 
the following example.  
Example 3-12. Suppose the buyer’s current offer is $100 and the buyer knows 
that the seller may accept it if it is above the seller’s valuation and the buyer also knows 
that the seller is skeptical. Consequently, the buyer must insist on that price in order to 
convince the seller. However, insisting on the price in one or two rounds may not be so 
convincing, because the seller is skeptical. Suppose the seller refuses  to sell at that price, 
then the buyer cannot differentiate whether the refusal is due to the skepticism of the 
seller or the non-feasibility of the price ($100 is lower than seller’s valuation). If it is due 
to the non-feasibility of the price, then there is no reason for the buyer to stand on its 
offer. However, if it is due to the skepticism of the seller, then it is better for the buyer to 
stand on its offer. Thus, the buyer will insist on its offer for several rounds before 
believing that the rejection is due to the non-feasibility of the price.  
If both parties are highly skeptical, then it will cause a deadlock (both insist on 
their offer). If one party is more skeptical than the other, then the more skeptical one may 
get a higher surplus (this is analogous to the agent’s patience in Rubinstein’s bargaining 
solution [1982], in which the more patient agent gets more surplus). However, it is 
unwise to always use a skeptical agent, because it may prolong the negotiation and thus 
increase the breakdown rate as will be explained in the next section. Again, we are not 
seeking the best belief construct and are not explicitly studying skepticism in this thesis. 
Rather, we include them in our analysis for representing a wider range of BDI agents that 
may use the bargaining protocols that will be proposed in the thesis. 
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3.3.4 Belief toward Probability of Breakdown 
When no information regarding the opponents’ time deadline is revealed, then 
agents can only predict the probability of breakdown (e.g. qt in Definition 3-7 and 3-8). 
The time deadline could come from two sources --- statically set by the user or system or 
dynamically influenced by the market. 
Example 3-13. (Static deadline) A user may instruct her/his agent to buy an item 
before 18:30. In another case, the server may set a rule such that any negotiation session 
should be done within 3 hours or it will be terminated by the server.  
(Dynamic deadline) A seller may terminate its negotiation with a buyer if the item 
has been sold to another buyer. In other cases, the buyer may terminate a negotiation 
session, because it found another seller with a lower price than its current offer.  
Usually, the buyer’s static deadline is known by the agent itself, but the 
opponent’s static deadline is unknown. To predict this, the agent can generate a 
cumulative distribution function of the likelihood of the deadline: as the negotiation 
proceeds, the likelihood of the deadline gets higher. The dynamic deadline, on the other 
hand, depends on market conditions. If there are many buyers looking for the same item 
at the same time (high demand), then the buyer will estimate that the dynamic time 
deadline is shorter, because the likelihood of the seller to sell the item to another buyer is 
higher.  
 Any breakdown caused by the time deadline is denoted as a time-dependent 
breakdown. Intuitively, as time goes by, the likelihood that agents are approaching their 
deadline is higher; thus, the probability of breakdown is higher too, or qt is an increasing 
function of t. For example, it may be a logistic function, as in Figure 3-9(a). 
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Figure 3-9. An agent’s belief toward the probability of breakdown from (a) time-
deadline, (b) loss-of-interest, (c) amplification of time-deadline and loss-of-interest, and 
(d) reduction of time-deadline and loss-of-interest 
Another factor that commonly causes a breakdown is the loss of interest toward 
the negotiation (e.g. believing that the negotiation outcome may not generate positive 
surplus, or distrusting the credibility of the seller in delivering the contract). If not much 
information can be gathered such as in the early stage of the negotiation, then agents will 
not trust each other and will assign a moderate probability of breakdown. Depending on 
the information collected, agents may update their trust toward their opponent (e.g. the 
seller is very likely a deceitful one and the negotiation should be terminated promptly), 
moving lower or higher, which increases or decreases the probability of breakdown. 
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Similarly, as the negotiation proceeds, agents may predict more confidently the surplus 
they may get from the negotiation (as their belief function pt(x) becomes steeper, see 
Figure 3-6(a)), which may either be a positive surplus (decrease the probability of 
breakdown) or negative surplus (increase the probability of breakdown). Thus, from this 
factor the trend of the probability of breakdown is ambiguous. However, the effect of this 
factor toward probability of breakdown may not be longer than the effect of the time 
deadline (compare Figure 3-9(a) and (b)), because after several rounds both parties may 
eventually know the credibility of their opponents or conclude whether it is worthy to 
continue the negotiation or not. Thus, in the long run, qt is an increasing function of time 
t, as shown in Figure 3-9(c) and (d). 
Proposition 3-5. In the long run qt is an increasing function of time t.  
3.3.5 Belief toward Opponent’s Argument 
In human bargaining, argumentation (persuasion, threat, or appeal) is commonly 
used. Recent studies in MAS have also paid more attention to dialog-based or 
argumentation-based negotiation (ABN) [Rahwan et al., 2004]. However, little attention 
has been directed to study the disadvantages of the protocol. As stated in Chapter 1, this 
thesis also includes the study of the ABN protocol, especially the need to use ignorance 
in ABN. In our setting we would assume that the environment is uncertain and agents 
have limited capability to assess the credibility of their opponent’s arguments. 
Similar to the offer/counter-offer setting, agents may also believe or not believe 
the arguments provided by their opponent. The framework of agent belief toward 
argumentation actually is almost the same as that toward prices. For example, suppose 
the seller promises “I will deliver the item on schedule.” Then the buyer must assign a 
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belief (or trust) value toward the credibility of the seller in executing its promise. If no 
information is available, then the buyer may use a default value (base) and look for more 
resources such as the reputation of the seller, or the past experience of other buyers, etc. 
in order to update its trust. After receiving two or more arguments, the buyer may build 
its trust toward the seller by verifying those arguments. If all arguments are checked and 
verified to be true, then the buyer can assign a higher trust toward the seller. If the seller 
is trustworthy, then the buyer may assign a higher belief value to the arguments from the 
seller in the future, even without verification.  
Example 3-14. Suppose a seller claims “My price is the lowest price in this 
market,” and the buyer verifies it by checking the transaction price(s) in the market. 
Suppose the buyer finds that all the past transaction prices for that good from other 
sellers are higher than the seller’s offer, so the buyer asserts a high belief toward the 
seller’s statement and updates pt(x) and its trust towards the seller, accordingly. Since 
the seller is deemed trustworthy now (e.g. with a higher reputation), then the seller’s 
threat such as “There is another buyer who is willing to pay $100, so your offer must be 
higher than that or I will terminate the negotiation” is credible, even without further 
verification.  
The order of arguments matters here. For the seller, it is better to provide 
arguments that can be verified by the buyer in order to convince the buyer to trust the 
seller. Only after the seller believes that the buyer trusts it can the seller send arguments 
that are non-verifiable.  
Practically, agents can use machine learning techniques to update their trust 
toward their opponent, e.g. reinforcement learning or Bayesian updating [Tran and 
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Cohen, 2002]. In such a case, skeptical agents may use a lower learning rate while 
believing agents use a higher one. In order to understand the arguments used in the 
negotiation, all agents must agree to use the same ontology (i.e. a vocabulary used to 
represent concepts in the arguments) or otherwise some arguments cannot be interpreted 
correctly. However, in this thesis, the verification techniques and the ontology of the 
arguments are not our main concern. The focus will be on the assessment of the cost of 
using the ABN protocol by assuming that it will take some efforts for the agents to 
understand/generate an argument. 
Persuasive arguments and threats are the most common arguments used in 
negotiation. We discuss several factors that may be influenced by argumentation: the 
belief toward the opponent’s acceptable offer, the private valuation, and the likelihood of 
breakdown.  
Example 3-15. A buyer of a used car may say “I must replace those tires, and it 
will cost at least $500” in order to convince the seller that the buyer’s valuation is not as 
high as the seller’s expectation. In reply, the seller may say “They are still in a good 
condition, at least for half a year.” If the buyer successfully convinces the seller that the 
tires must be replaced, then the seller may reduce its valuation by a value up to $500 and 
the buyer will update pt(x) to a higher value. In another situation the seller may threaten 
the buyer by using the statement “Take my offer now, or I will sell it to another buyer.” If 
the buyer believes the statement, then it will assign the probability of breakdown to one; 
thus there will be no expected gain from a counter-offer.  
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The other parameters that may be affected by argumentation are the expected gain 
in the future, trust toward the opponent, and also information about the negotiation 
strategy used by agents, which will not be studied in this thesis. 
3.3.6 EG’t+1(x) and Belief Update: Revisited 
When a myopic-1 buyer considers the expected gain from its offer xt, it will 
consider the future expected gain EG’t+1(x) if xt is rejected by the seller. In section 3.2.2.3 
we have argued by an example that EG’t+1(x) may increase or decrease over the x 
submitted at time t.  
Proposition 3-6. (Ambiguity of EG’t+1(x) with respect to x) EG’t+1(x) may 
increase or decrease with respect to x submitted at time t.  
Indeed, the situation in artificial agents may not be exactly the same as that in 
human negotiation, because agents’ behavior depends on the algorithm used. For 
example, the buyer may calculate EG’t+1 either independently of x, or as a function of x, 
or as a fraction of EGt(x), or recursively as if xt has been rejected, etc. Certainly, the 
easiest way is to choose a constant value that is independent of x. The buyer can also use 
an estimated surplus from accepting the seller’s offer, e.g. EG’t+1 = Bt+1 – yt. A more 
complex way is to predict it recursively using the following formula.  
Definition 3-10. The estimation of EG’t+1(x) by recursive method is calculated by  
])]())(())(()[[()( φ B q' xEG'xp'γxB'xp'q' MaxxEG' tttttt
x
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           (3-9) 
where all parameters except γ and Bφ must be predicted or calculated iteratively by 
assuming that xt has been rejected, and p’t+1(x) is the buyer’s estimation of its revised 
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belief if xt has been rejected. And for a myopic-1 buyer with no payoff from breakdown 
(Bφ =0) the estimation becomes 
)])(()[()( xB'xp'q' MaxxEG' ttt
x
t −−≡ ++++ 1111 1     (3-10) 
If x’t+1* solves the above equation, then we have 
EG’t+1(x’t+1*) = (1 – q’t+1) p’t+1(x’t+1*)(B’t+1 – x’t+1*)   (3-11) 
 Note here that the actual revised belief function at time t+1, i.e. pt+1(x), may not 
be the same as its estimated value p’t+1(x). In addition, if the buyer is facing a time 
pressure in the long run, e.g. a strictly increasing probability of breakdown, or q’t+1 – qt > 
0, and a decreasing valuation over time, or B’t+1 – Bt ≤ 0, then EG’t+1(x) may be a 
decreasing function over time.  
Proposition 3-7. If a myopic-1 buyer is facing time pressure in the long run such 
that its belief at time t+1 satisfies B’t+1 – Bt ≤ 0 and (q’t+1 – qt) ≥ (1 – (1 + ω)pt(xt*))(1 – 
qt),where  
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and its estimated optimal offer x’t+1* > xt* + B’t+1 – Bt, then its expected future gain will 
be lower than its current expected gain, i.e. EG’t+1(x’t+1*) < EGt(xt*).  
Proof. (a detail proof is provided in the appendix) First, we use EG’t+1(x’t+1*) < 
EGt(xt*) to find the conditions under which the inequality holds. The condition should be  
(1–qt)pt(xt*)(∆B–∆x)(1+ω)+[(1–qt)(∆p–pt(xt*)ω) – ∆q p’t+1(x’t+1*)](B’t+1–x’t+1*) < 0 (3-13) 
Where ∆B = B’t+1 – Bt, ∆x = x’t+1* – xt*, ∆q = q’t+1 – qt and ∆p = p’t+1(x’t+1*) – pt(xt*). 
Then we use the characteristics of those parameters such as qt ∈ [0, 1], γ ∈ [0, 1], pt(xt*) 
> 0, ∆q > 0 and ∆B ≤ 0, etc. to derive a simplified condition: 
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 ∆x > ∆B and ∆q ≥ [1 – pt(xt*)(1 + ω)](1 – qt)    (3-14) 
This condition (3-14) is exactly the premise in the proposition that 
x’t+1* > xt* + B’t+1 – Bt and (q’t+1 – qt) ≥ [1 – pt(xt*)(1 + ω)](1 – qt).   ■ 
Intuitively, the sufficient condition in inequality (3-14) holds when the time 
pressure is intense and either pt(xt*)(1 + ω) and qt, or both, are high (close to 1).  
Example 3-16. Suppose pt(xt*) = 0.9, qt = 0.5, and γ = 0.5, then pt(xt*)(1 + ω) = 
pt(xt*) / (1 – γ(1 – qt)(1 – pt(xt*))) = .9/(1-.5(.5)(.1)) = .9/(1-.025) = .9/.975, or [1 – 
pt(xt*)(1 + ω)](1 – qt) = (1 - .9/.975)(1 - .5) = .0385; hence, ∆q ≥ .0385 is sufficient. 
However, if pt(xt*) = 0.5 with other values are the same, then pt(xt*) / (1 – γ(1 – qt)(1 – 
pt(xt*))) = .5/(1-.5(.5)(.5)) = .5/(1-.125) = .5/.875, and [1 – pt(xt*)(1 + ω)](1 – qt) = (1-
.5/.875)(1-.5) = .2143, or ∆q < .2143 is not sufficient.  
Bear in mind that this condition is only a sufficient one, which is not a necessary 
condition for EG’t+1(x’t+1*) < EGt(xt*). In this thesis we will consider three possibilities: 
EG’t+1(x’t+1*) is a constant value over xt, a decreasing function over t, or iteratively 
calculated according to equation (3-10). 
3.4 Discussion 
3.4.1 Commonsense Reasoning 
As shown in section 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, our model is based on commonsense 
reasoning --- the agent’s decision is not designed to follow directly the rules of inference 
or any of the well known solutions of mathematical logic or game theory, but are rather a 
set of conjectures to find the best available solutions. The agent’s decisions depend 
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heavily on its observation of its ill-defined world and do not necessarily follow the 
monotonicity property often used in knowledge and reasoning. For instance, the buyer’s 
belief function pt(x) can be updated abruptly after receiving new information as long as it 
preserves commonsense properties, such as pt(x)  = 1 for all x > yt. However, a refusal of 
the buyer’s offer xt* by the seller does not necessarily make the buyer infer that pt(xt*) = 
0. Instead, depending on the buyer’s belief about the seller’s skepticism (or bluffing 
behavior) the buyer may increase/decrease pt(xt*). In the next chapter we will show that it 
is even plausible for the buyer to decrease its next offer, or xt+1* < xt*. We believe that 
the agent’s ambivalent/ contradictory decision does not violate agent rationality; rather, it 
represents our commonsense reasoning which often conforms to nonmonotonic 
reasoning.  
Our model may also serve as an abstraction of symbolic reasoning. For example, 
the buyer may assume (by default) that the seller is an EvalF-I agent and then implement 
a circumscription (“jumping to a certain conclusion in commonsense reasoning” 
[McCarthy, 1986]) that the seller may be an EvalF-II agent. Then, the buyer may infer 
that a price x should be accepted by the seller after asserting other conditions; thus, all 
prices below it will be rejected. When a binary choice (T/F or Accept/Reject) is the only 
available option, we may represent the output using a step function (cf. Figure 3-5). 
Alternatively, we can use a preferential system [Kraus et al., 1990] or modal logic to 
represent our agent’s knowledge and decision procedures. The reason for not using a 
symbolic approach in our analysis is to avoid a complex representation, especially in the 
belief revision and deliberation to find an optimal offer. Beside, Dubois et al. [2004] have 
shown the compatibility of probabilistic and logical representation of accepted belief. 
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Therefore, in this thesis we will not investigate symbolic representation unless 
quantitative representation is inappropriate.  
Earlier we have assumed bounded rationality (optimality) of agents. This suggests 
a prescriptive model of our agents, where a utility maximizer in terms of myopic-0 and 
myopic-1 are used. Certainly, it creates some deviations between our model and human 
behavior. However, the objective of this thesis is not to analyze human behavior or to 
build a normative standard for an agent’s reasoning in bargaining. In fact, our model is 
aimed at solving real world problems that arise in some artificial intelligent systems. But 
we cannot ignore human intervention with their agents. Thus, several commonly 
observed strategies used in human society (sub-optimal from the perspective of a 
prescriptive standard) should also be considered. For example, tit-for-tat and random 
strategy, which are common strategies in human society, will be used in our experimental 
study to analyze the cost and benefit of our proposed bargaining protocols in Chapter 5. 
In conclusion, most of the properties of the agent’s negotiation model in this thesis are 
based on our commonsense knowledge, and those that cannot be analyzed theoretically 
will be tested by using experimentation. 
3.4.2 Iterative Belief 
Other important phenomena in agents’ interactions are iterative belief and 
common knowledge. For example, suppose the buyer knows its own type as EvalF-II 
(represented as a level 0 belief, i.e. knowing the fact P). If the seller knows that the buyer 
is EvalF-II (or it has level-1 belief: bel(s, P)), then the seller will stand on its offer in 
order to mislead the buyer to accept it. If however, the buyer believes that the seller 
knows that it is an EvalF-II agent (it has level-2 belief: bel(b, bel(s, P))), then the buyer 
 94
will be more skeptical when the seller stands on its offer. Now, if the seller believes that 
the buyer believes the above fact and becomes skeptical (it has level-3 belief: bel(s, bel(b, 
bel(s, P)))), then there is no reason for the seller to mislead the buyer because it will only 
waste its time.  
This iteration of belief may continue to higher levels, thus requiring more 
complex iterative reasoning. In this thesis we do not address complex iterative reasoning, 
going up to two levels only. The reason is that the higher levels of iterative belief cannot 
be known easily due to asymmetric and private information. In addition, there are 
increasing costs and decreasing returns on considering a high level of reciprocal 
modeling and bias toward the desired solution [Durfee et al., 1993]. Thus, no agent is 
certain that it knows more than its opponent, unless the fact is declared explicitly such as 
“I am an EvalF-II agent” which makes it common knowledge – this is unlikely to happen.   
3.4.3 Unpredictable Bargaining Rounds 
Usually agents are facing a time deadline, e.g. 10 minutes from now or tomorrow 
afternoon at 17:30. Given this, the opportunity to (counter) offer may depend on the 
communication speed between agents. For instance, if a buyer believes that the likelihood 
of breakdown of a session is 0.9 after 10 minutes, and the communication speed is 3 
seconds per offer, then with probability 0.1 the buyer can make up to 100 counter offers 
before a breakdown occurs. However, if due to some reason the communication speed 
slows down to 30 seconds per offer then with the same probability the buyer can make up 
to 10 counter offers only. 
Assuming that the speed is constant and known by the agents, they can easily 
predict the number of opportunities to counter-offer before hitting the deadline. 
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Sometimes a deliberate delay is needed while collecting or assessing opponent’s 
information or arguments, or, agents may change the speed of response and bargaining 
rounds. In addition, unpredictable network bottlenecks may also affect the 
communication speed. Therefore, planning in advance may not be suitable for negotiating 
agents in our model. If planning is involved, then it can be only for a few rounds ahead, 
such as building trust using few consecutive arguments or standing on its offer for few 
rounds. However, in most situations agents would react according to the partially 
observed information. 
3.4.4 Preference over a Longer Bargaining Opportunity 
Given the expected gain in equation (3-5) and (3-7), we can derive the next 
proposition regarding the agent’s preference to make an additional offer during a series of 
consecutive offers. 
Proposition 3-8. A series of consecutive offers <x1, x2 , …, xt-1, xt, φ> is preferred 
to <x1, x2 , …, xt-1, φ > for 0 ≤ xt < Bt. 
Proposition 3-8 basically states that an additional opportunity to submit an offer is 
always preferred to ending up with a breakdown, no matter what the value of the last 
offer is. In fact, this proposition applies not only for myopic-0 and myopic-1 agents, but 
also for myopic-K agents. By the transitivity of preference and iteration that <x1, x2 , …, 
xt+i, φ> is preferred to <x1, x2 , …, xt+i-1, φ >, we can derive that a longer bargaining 
opportunity is preferred to a shorter one, or <x1, x2 , …, xt+i, φ> is preferred to <x1, x2 , 
…, xt, φ >, for any i > 0.  
Certainly, this proposition is only valid if a longer negotiation incurs the same 
cost as the shorter one, which means the buyer can negotiate with multiple sellers 
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simultaneously and extending its offers will not affect the computation on other 
negotiation threads (negotiation with other sellers). Later, Proposition 3-8 will be used to 
prove Theorem 4-1 and 4-2. 
3.4.5 Examples of Agents’ Decision Model 
Integrating an agent’s evaluation function and an agent’s strategy in generating 
offers will give us a decision model for the agent. For instance, if a buyer is an EvalF-II 
agent, then its decision activity after receiving the seller’s counteroffer can be illustrated 
in Figure 3-10. If the buyer is myopic-0, then generating its counteroffer xt* can be 
decomposed into several processes as in Figure 3-11(a). If the buyer uses tit-for-tat, then 
the process is illustrated in Figure 3-11(b). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-10. Activity of an EvalF-II buyer after receiving a seller’s offer 
Receive seller’s offer yt 
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Counteroffer xt* Withdraw 
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and yt 
[Sure(xt*) ≤ 0 
and Sur(yt) ≤ 0] 
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or Sur(yt) > 0] 
[Sur(yt) ≥ Sure(xt*) 
and Sur(yt) > 0] 
[∀j Sur(yt) ≥ Sure(yt+j)  
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Figure 3-11. Process of generating a counteroffer for (a) a myopic-0 buyer and (b) a 
buyer using tit-for-tat strategy 
Combining Figure 3-10 and 3-11 will give the decision model of an EvalF-II-
myopic-0 buyer and an EvalF-II-tit-for-tat buyer. In the example, the buyer can use its 
expected gain to evaluate Sure(xt*), or Sure(xt*) = pt(xt*) (Bt - xt*). 
3.4.6 Convergence of Offers 
When two agents use two reactive (irrational) strategies, it may happen that their 
offers never converge because of deadlock. However, if both of them are utility 
maximizer (myopic) agents, then their offers will converge to a resolution. For 
converging to a resolution, the offers of both myopic agents must be eventually in the 
feasible set and at least one of the agents concedes to the resolution. Therefore, we will 
discuss two conditions here. First, the feasible set must exist at the time when the 
Ready to derive xt* 
Update Belief 
pt(x) 
xt* returned 
Pick the highest xt* 
that generates highest 
 pt(x) (Bt - x) 
Ready to derive xt* 
Evaluate 
seller’s move 
Choose xt*=xt-1* 
(no conceding) 
xt* returned
Concede by c,  
xt* = min(Bt, xt-1*+c)
 [not concede]  [concede] 
(a) (b) 
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resolution will be made. Second, agents must eventually concede due to a higher 
expected gain to be achieved by conceding than not conceding.  
3.4.6.1 Facilitating feasible set 
If the feasible set does not exist, then no resolution can be made regardless what 
bargaining protocol is used. Therefore, we will not consider this case. If the feasible set 
exists in certain periods of the negotiation, then the protocol must accommodate the 
agents to make a resolution within those periods. Moreover, if the existence of the 
feasible set depends on the agent’s belief, e.g. the existence can be altered by altering the 
agent’s belief through persuasive arguments, then the protocol must facilitate the 
negotiation so that the agent can alter its own and the opponent’s belief. In the next 
chapter we will show how protocols that allow strategic delay and argumentation can be 
used to accommodate the existence of a feasible set, especially by increasing the buyer’s 
valuation over time.  
3.4.6.2 Higher expected gain from conceding 
Three factors affect the agent’s expected gain by conceding. First, a lower surplus 
compared to without conceding; second, higher pt(xt*) due to the increasing function of 
effective belief (cf. Figure 3-8(b)) as stated in Proposition 3-1 and Proposition 3-4; and 
third, ambiguous change of expected future gain depending on the predicted future 
condition (applied to myopic-1 agents). For a myopic buyer, if it knows that the seller is 
EvalF-I, then Assumption 3-8 applies. If it knows that the seller is EvalF-II or does not 
know the type of seller, then Assumption 3-9 applies. Nevertheless, by Proposition 3-2 
and Proposition 3-3 that follow Assumption 3-8 and 3-9 respectively, if an offer xt* is not 
accepted after one or n rounds by the seller who only concedes insignificantly, then 
pt+n(x) and πt+n(x) become steeper for x ≤ xt*. If we ignore the process when kt(x) is 
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updated, then Proposition 3-2 becomes the special case of Proposition 3-3 with n = 1. If 
the bargaining round is large enough, then we may use Proposition 3-2 in our analysis by 
ignoring the updating of kt(x).  
These propositions have implications for bargaining in the long run. For example, 
if the valuations of both agents are temporarily constant and the seller concedes 
insignificantly, then the buyer’s offers will eventually converge to the seller’s offer if the 
agents’ expected future gain satisfies specific criteria such as it is a non-increasing value 
over time and non-decreasing over x as stated in the following proposition. 
Proposition 3-9. Suppose both bargainers are myopic agents and their valuations 
are constant within a long period, and x, pt(x), and EG’t+1(x) are continuous and 
differentiable. If the seller does not concede significantly within that period so that the 
buyer will update its belief pt(x) to a steeper one for all x ≤ xt*, then the buyer concedes 
provided 
(a) the buyer is myopic-0, or 
(b) the buyer is myopic-1 with convex belief pt(x) at x ≤ xt*, i.e. ∂ pt(x)/∂ x > 0 and  
∂ 2pt(x)/∂ x2 ≤ 0, and with expected future gain EG’t+2(x) that satisfies:  
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Proof. (A detailed proof is provided in the appendix) We first establish πt+n(x) = 
pt+n(x). If before time t+n the buyer concedes, then the proposition is proven. If the buyer 
does not concede, then by Assumption 3-9 eventually kt+n(x) = 0, and πt+n(x) = pt+n(x). 
So, we can ignore the intermediate transition state between t and t+n and only consider 
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πt(x) = pt(x) and πt+n(x) = pt+n(x), where pt(x) and pt+n(x) are continuous and 
differentiable. 
(a) Since in this case the buyer is a myopic-0 agent, then it will offer optimal price 
xt* that maximizes its expected gain, i.e. Maxx [pt(x)(Bt - x)], which can be illustrated by 
the largest area of the rectangle bounded by belief pt(x), x-axis and buyer’s valuation Bt 
in Figure 3-12.  
Since the seller rejects xt* and the counter offer is insignificantly different, then 
by Proposition 3-2 the slope ∂pt(x)/∂x becomes steeper for x ≤ xt*, or ∂(pt(x) - pt+1(x))/∂x 
≤ 0 for x ≤ xt* and pt+1(x) > 0. Proof by contradiction: suppose the buyer’s optimal offer 
is not a concession but still generates a positive expected gain, or xt+1* ≤ xt* and 
pt+1(xt+1*) > 0. Then by integrating ∂(pt(x) - pt+1(x))/∂x ≤ 0 from xt+1* to xt*, we have  
[pt(x) - pt+1(x)] xt* – [pt(x) - pt+1(x)] xt+1* ≤ 0 
⇔ pt(xt*)(B - xt+1*) - pt+1(xt)(B - xt+1*) ≤ pt(xt+1*)(B - xt+1*) - pt+1(xt+1*)(B - xt+1*)  
(3-15) 
Since xt+1* ≤ xt*, then (B - xt*) ≤ (B - xt+1*), or 
⇔ pt(xt*)(B - xt*) - pt+1(xt*)(B - xt*) ≤ pt(xt+1*)(B - xt+1*) - pt+1(xt+1*)(B - xt+1*) 
          (3-16) 
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Figure 3-12. The expected surplus of myopic-0 agents 
However, pt(xt*)(B – xt*) is the maximum expected gain at time t, or pt(xt*)(B – xt*) > 
pt(xt+1*) (B – xt+1*); or, pt(xt*)(B – xt*) = pt(xt+1*) (B – xt+1*) + d+, where d+ is some 
positive value. Hence, by substituting pt(xt*)(B – xt*) = pt(xt+1*) (B – xt+1*) + d+ into (3-
16) we get  
pt(xt+1*) (B - xt+1*) + d+ - pt+1(xt*)(B - xt*) ≤ pt(xt+1*)(B - xt+1*) - pt+1(xt+1*)(B - xt+1*) 
⇔ pt+1(xt*)(B - xt*) ≥ pt+1(xt+1*)(B - xt+1*) + d+    (3-17) 
But at time t+1, pt+1(xt+1*)(B - xt+1*) is the maximum gain, or pt+1(xt+1*)(B - xt+1*) 
> pt+1(xt*)(B - xt*); thus pt+1(xt*)(B - xt*) > pt+1(xt*)(B - xt*) + d+, which is a 
contradiction. Thus, xt+1* > xt* or a myopic-0 buyer concedes. 
(b) Since the buyer in this case is a myopic-1 agent, then it will offer the optimal 
price xt* that maximizes its expected gain, i.e. Maxx [pt(x)(Bt - x) + γ(1 - pt(x))EG’t+1(x)]. 
If xt* is an optimal offer, then the necessary condition is that xt* be a critical point which 
satisfies  
pt(x) (Bt - x) = 
0.7×(200-150) = 
$35 
p(x) 
1 
$150 $200 x 
pt(x) 
0.7 
Bt = $200 
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∂[pt(x)(B - x) + γ(1 - pt(x))EG’t+1(x)] /∂x = 0 at xt* (first order derivative test), or 
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Similarly, for the optimal offer xt+1* at time t+1, we also have:1 
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Since the seller rejects xt* and concedes insignificantly in its counter-offer, then 
by Proposition 3-2 the slope ∂pt(x)/∂x becomes steeper for all x ≤ xt*, or ∂pt(x)/∂x ≤ 
∂pt+1(x)/∂x for x ≤ xt*. If the buyer does not concede, or xt+1* ≤ xt*, then we 
have
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1 For the sake of brevity, we will use “ |xt ” instead of “ |x=xt ” to represent the condition in which 
the formula hold. 
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The inequality condition above tells us that if xt+1* is an optimal offer at time t+1 
that satisfies xt+1* ≤ xt*, then the inequality holds. If the inequality does not hold, then by 
modus tollens, we can conclude that xt+1* is not an optimal offer, or a contradiction. 
Thus, we come out with a sufficient condition for xt+1* > xt*, which is the negation of the 
inequality above, i.e. 
(∀ x’ ≤ xt*) 
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which leads to two joint conditions: 
(∀ x’ ≤ xt*)  
( ) ( )
'*
)('
)'()'(
)('
)*()*(
x
t
tt
x
t
tttt x
xEG
xpxp
x
xEG
xpxp
t
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂−−>⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂−− ++++ 2111 11 γγ  
( ) ( ))'(''*)('* xEGxBxEGxB tttt 21 ++ −−≤−−∧ γγ  
Or, 
(∀ x’ ≤ xt*) 
( ) ( )
*
1
'
2
11
)('
)*(1
)('
)'(1)'()*(
tx
t
tt
x
t
tttt x
xEG
xp
x
xEG
xpxpxp ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂−>⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂−+− ++++ γγ
 *)()'(*)(')'(' 12 tttt xBxBxEGxEG −−−+≤∧ ++ γγ  
Since x’ ≤ xt*, then (B – xt*) ≤ (B – x’) and pt(xt*) ≥ pt(x’) > pt+1(x’), or pt(xt*) > 
pt+1(x’). Given pt(xt*) – pt+1(x’) > 0 and (B – x’) – (B –  xt*) ≥ 0, then the joint condition 
above holds if 
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And since (1 – pt(xt*)) < (1 – pt+1(x’)), then the sufficient condition becomes 
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Which is the premise in the proposition, the buyer’s optimal offer xt+1* > xt*.  ■ 
The condition of Proposition 3-9(a) is straightforward, but not for Proposition 3-
9(b), which will be explained here. First, the convexity of belief function pt(x) in 
Proposition 3-9(b) represents the diminishing of the increasing rate of belief value over x. 
Or, the left tail of the belief function in Figure 3-12 cannot exist. Proposition 3-9(b) 
applies for linear, logarithmic, and step belief functions, but not for logistic functions. 
Second, the sufficient condition in (3-20) is related to the buyer’s expected gain in the 
future after an offer x’ ≤ xt* is rejected by the seller.  If we interpret them separately, then 
the first condition restricts our expected future gain function at time t+1 so that the slope 
of all x’ ≤ xt* must be greater than the slope of the expected future gain of xt*. If 
EG’t+1(x) and EG’t+2(x) are decreasing functions over x, then all x’ ≤ xt* EG’t+2(x’) must 
decrease slower than EG’t+1(xt*). If both are constant values, then the second condition 
alone is enough. The second condition states that if any offer x’ ≤ xt* is rejected by the 
seller, then the buyer’s expected future gain must be lower than when xt* is rejected. 
Intuitively, if the buyer’s expected future gain is much higher than what it had expected 
previously, then there is an incentive for the buyer to delay the bargaining by submitting 
a lower offer than its previous offer (a strategic delay that will be discussed in the next 
chapter).  
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However, this condition is only a sufficient condition, which means the buyer 
may also concede even without satisfying this condition. 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
The decision model described in this chapter is the general framework that will be 
used in our theoretical analysis. Based on agent bargaining strategy we have classified 
our model into two large groups: myopic-0 and myopic-1 agents that maximize expected 
gain. According to their evaluation criteria, we have EvalF-I and EvalF-II agents which 
may affect their belief updating mechanism as shown in sections 3.3.2.2 and 3.3.3.2 
respectively.   
Certainly, the model described here is not a general model that represents all 
possible agent behaviors. As explained before, the scope of our current bargaining model 
is bounded to single attribute item (i.e. price), and the decision model only represents a 
specific set of agents. For instance, the decision model excludes myopic-N agents, where 
N > 1 and it does not consider other evaluation criteria, as mentioned in section 3.2.1.4. 
However, as argued in section 3.4.1, the model is based on commonsense reasoning with 
various belief updating mechanisms. Hence, the model has represented a partial model of 
bargaining strategies under uncertainty. As our purpose is not to analyze the bargaining 
strategy but the bargaining protocol, we believe that our model is sufficiently 
representative of bounded-rational agents as discussed in current literature. 
In the next chapter, we will analyze three different protocols, which have specific 
advantages/disadvantages within our model. First, we will use a modified model with 
time pressure, such as decreasing valuation for the buyer, increasing likelihood of 
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breakdown over time, and decreasing expected future gain for myopic agents. In fact, this 
modified model is the most common one in alternating offers bargaining, e.g. when the 
bargaining incurs some cost over time [Rubinstein, 1982; Kraus et al., 1995; Sandholm 
and Vulkan, 1999]. Then, we will analyze the effect of unconstrained agent valuation of 
their expected future gain, but still with some pressure from the likelihood of breakdown. 
The reason is to represent the uncertainty of agent valuation, which is also very common 
in an ill-informed bargaining. For instance, when the buyer is not certain about the 
quality of the item, then its valuation and expected future gain may increase or decrease 
over time. Therefore, agents may need some time to observe their environment and 
update their beliefs. Finally, instead of using a standard belief updating mechanism of 
pt(x), qt, etc., we will allow agents to control their updating mechanism by generating 
trust toward their opponents. Intuitively, this approach needs more sophisticated agent 
reasoning than what we have described here. For example, we will allow a skeptical 
agent to switch to a believing one and vice versa, or allow it to switch its belief that its 
opponent is EvalF-I instead of EvalF-II, etc. The dynamism comes from the agent’s 
richer interaction --- by argumentation. Hence, our theoretical analysis will focus on the 
implication of communication/argumentation and its cost in belief-updating speed. We 
will prove that in some situations agents may ignore argumentation, thus suggesting a 
more flexible argumentation-based negotiation protocol. 
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CHAPTER 4 
AGENT DECISIONS AND NEGOTIATION PROTOCOLS 
 
In this chapter we analyze separately three modifications made to the traditional 
alternating-offers (with argumentation) bargaining protocol.  For each modification, we 
first illustrate its motivation and necessity. Then, we analyze buyer behavior under the 
modifications, including any deviated behavior that may occur due to selfishness and 
rationality. We start the analysis with the non-monotonic-offers bargaining protocol.  
4.1 Non-monotonic-offers Bargaining Protocol 
4.1.1 Motivation 
In human bargaining, one of the agreed upon properties in alternating-offer 
bargaining is the (weak) monotonic (counter-) offer by bargainers, i.e. human 
buyers/sellers may only insist on their previous offers or concede monotonically until an 
agreement is reached. In other words, changing their offers arbitrarily is normally 
avoided.  
The reasons for the monotonic-offers property could be either human rationality 
or social norms, or both. For instance, our mental models may satisfy the monotonicity of 
pt(x), the belief updating mechanism stated in Proposition 3-2 and 3-3, and also the 
buyer’s conceding mechanism in Proposition 3-9. Hence, if we are convinced that our 
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current offer would not be accepted by our opponent, then very likely we also believe that 
other non-conceding offers would not be accepted either, which pushes us to concede. 
Yet, even if a human buyer realizes that a non-conceding action is often better, e.g. after 
receiving new information, reducing his/her offers may be interpreted as an absurdity or 
insincere behavior; thus, it is not acceptable.  
Unlike humans, agents are not constrained by norms or emotions. As long as the 
protocol is announced and understandable, their designer will provide them with a 
relevant bargaining strategy. [Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994] were the first to propose a 
monotonic concession protocol in multi-agent systems, in which agents monotonically 
increase or decrease their offers. Their most important assumption is that agents are 
selfish with private information and negotiation is the only option to reach a solution. The 
work of many others also uses the same assumption, e.g. [Faratin et al., 1998; Fatima et 
al., 2004; Sim and Wang, 2004]. In this section we will show that imposing a non-
monotonic-offers protocol (N-protocol, for short) in agents’ bargaining may be better 
than imposing a monotonic-offers protocol (M-protocol). Let us first look at an 
illustrative example in Example 4-1. 
Example 4-1. Suppose a buyer wants to buy a service (e.g. predicting the future 
price of stocks), which it would like within a specific time (e.g., before the stock market 
opens). However, if it cannot get the service during that period, its preference towards 
the service reduces over time, and becomes zero if it got the service after a time deadline 
(e.g., after the market closes). Thus, its valuation towards the service will be high when 
the market opens, and will decrease until the market closes. Suppose the seller’s 
valuation is constant over time. Since both parties may hold their valuations privately, 
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the initial spread will be relatively big. The initial spread will decrease as the bargaining 
proceeds (see Figure 4-1(a)). However, under M-protocol, the bargaining may be stuck 
even if both parties repeat it several times after a short delay, as illustrated in Figure 4-
1(a). Here, the failures are caused by the buyer who cannot resume the negotiation after 
its offer approaches its valuation because its next offer will be higher than its next 
valuation (under M-protocol). However, under a non-monotonic offers protocol (N-
protocol for short), the failure can be remedied and the delay from re-opening a 
bargaining session disappears as illustrated in Figure 4-1(b).    ■ 
 
Figure 4-1 An example of the bargaining under (a) M- protocol and (b) N-protocol 
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Example 4-1 above only shows a partial scenario, which favors the N-protocol. 
The goal of the N-protocol is to allow agents to bargain as flexibly as possible so that 
they can always maximize their (expected) utility or increase the success rate, or both, 
depending on their goals. Indeed, some bargainers’ decision processes under the N-
protocol may suppress the convergence of spread in reaching a concession, which will be 
explained later. However, assuming that both bargainers are rational, slower convergence 
rates due to non-monotonic offers will not significantly reduce the overall performance of 
the bargaining in terms of agents’ expected surplus. 
4.1.2 Model Description  
In our formal model described in Chapter 3, we have discussed myopic-0 and 
myopic-1 agents, whose expected gains are defined in equations (3-4) and (3-6) 
respectively, and whose decisions follow equations (3-5) and (3-7). If a zero surplus is 
generated from a breakdown, then the buyers’ problems are as follows: 
(myopic-0)  EGt(x) = (1 – qt) pt(x) (Bt – x)    (3-4) 
Maxx EGt(x) = Maxx [pt(x)(Bt – x)]     (3-5) 
(myopic-1)  EGt(x) = (1–qt) [pt(x)(Bt–x) + γ(1–pt(x))EG’t+1(x)]  (3-6) 
Maxx EGt(x) = Maxx [pt(x)(Bt – x) + γ(1 – pt(x))EG’t+1(x)] (3-7) 
Along with the above formulae, our model here also includes Assumptions 3-8 
and 3-9 and also Propositions 3-1, 3-2, 3-3 and 3-4 regarding their belief functions and 
updating mechanisms (as described in section 3.3.2 and 3.3.3). The aforementioned 
properties hold for a buyer who knows the type of the seller which remains unchanged. If 
the buyer does not know or is unsure about the type of the seller, which is more 
reasonable, then we assume that the buyer will follow Assumption 3-11, which assumes 
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that the buyer will treat the seller as an EvalF-II seller but with lower value of kt(x). 
Finally, we also use Proposition 3-8 regarding the buyer’s preference over additional 
opportunities.  
In addition to those assumptions and properties, we will add some assumptions to 
make our analysis tractable. These assumptions will assure the convergence of the 
bargaining. The first two assumptions are: 
Assumption 4-1. qt is an increasing function over time t. 
Assumption 4-2. Bt is a decreasing function over time t. 
These two assumptions state that the buyer is facing pressure from the bargaining 
and believes that the likelihood of breakdown is increasing over time. In fact, these two 
assumptions are very common in both human and agent bargaining models. In much 
negotiation literature, a discounted utility function and time deadlines are used to 
represent the pressure of time [Kraus et al., 1995]. In contrast, we use surplus instead of a 
general utility function to represent an agent’s payoff from the bargaining; thus, we use a 
decreasing buyer’s valuation (Assumption 4-2) to represent a discounted surplus, as 
shown in Example 4-1. Recall that we have discussed this issue in section 3.1.3, Surplus 
and Utility.  
Given assumptions 4-1 and 4-2, the buyer will have less expected future gain due 
to the increasing probability of breakdown in the future and lower valuation which causes 
lower expected surplus in the future. Thus, we will assume that the buyer’s expected 
future gain EG’t+1(x) is decreasing over time, i.e. satisfies Proposition 3-7. Moreover, in 
Proposition 3-6 we have shown that EG’t+1(x) is ambiguous with respect to x. For the 
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sake of simplicity we assume it is constant with respect to x. Rather than using 
Proposition 3-7, we postulate the properties of EG’t+1(x) using Assumption 4-3: 
Assumption 4-3. EG’t+1(x) is a decreasing function over t and a constant function 
over x, denoted EG’t+1 for convenience. 
In the next two sub-sections, we will analyze the buyer’s characteristics when 
facing EvalF-I and EvalF-II sellers. 
4.1.3 A Society of EvalF-I Agents 
Given the characteristics of pt(x) and expected gain, a myopic buyer will be able 
to maximize its expected gain by offering xt*, either in a continuous or discrete domain. 
In a continuous domain when pt(x) and EGt(x) are continuous and differentiable, we can 
derive the necessary condition of optimal offer xt* by taking the first order derivative 
condition of maxx EGt(x), i.e. dEGt /dx = 0 at xt*. For a myopic-0 buyer, we use equation 
(3-4) for EGt(x) = (1 – qt) pt(x) (Bt – x); or the first order derivative condition can be 
written as 
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For a myopic-1 buyer, we use equation (3-6) for EGt(x) = (1 – qt)[ pt(x)(Bt – x) + 
γ(1 – pt(x))EG’t+1(x)], where the first order derivative condition has been derived 
previously in the proof of Proposition 3-9:  
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Since EG’t+1(x) is a constant function with respect to x but decreasing over time 
(by Assumption 4-3), then 0
)(' 1 =∂
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x
xEG t and we can simplify equation (3-18) into: 
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However, in real bargaining sometimes the bargaining attributes (e.g. price) are 
continuous (as stated in Assumption 3-5); hence, the conditions are slightly different, so 
we use finite difference instead of derivative. In the derivation of the necessary condition, 
we use the fact that an optimal offer xt* satisfies EGt(xt*) ≥ EGt(xt* ± ∆x) where ∆x is 
the smallest interval (increment) of x (e.g. $1). If EGt(x) has only a single peak value, 
then this condition is sufficient. To derive the necessary condition, let’s divide it into 
backward difference EGt(xt*) ≥ EGt(xt* – ∆x) (or, ∇EGt(xt*) ≥ 0) and forward difference 
EGt(xt*) ≥ EGt(xt* + ∆x) (or, ∆EGt(xt*) ≥ 0). Using equation (3-4), then  
EGt(xt*) = (1 – qt) pt(xt*) (Bt – xt*) and  
EGt(xt* – ∆x) = (1 – qt) pt(xt* – ∆x) (Bt – (xt* – ∆x)) 
From the condition EGt(xt*) ≥ EGt(xt* – ∆x), then 
⇔  (1 – qt) pt(xt*) (Bt – xt*) ≥ (1 – qt) pt(xt* – ∆x) (Bt – (xt* – ∆x)) 
⇔ pt(xt*) (Bt – xt*) ≥ pt(xt* – ∆x) (Bt – (xt* – ∆x))  
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⇔ pt(xt*) (Bt – xt*) ≥ pt(xt* – ∆x) (Bt – xt*) + pt(xt* – ∆x) ∆x (4-3) 
If we assume the backward difference [∇pt]xt* ≡ pt(xt*) – pt(xt* – ∆x), then pt(xt* – 
∆x) = pt(xt*) – [∇pt]xt*. Inequality (4-3) becomes 
⇔ pt(xt*) (Bt – xt*) ≥ (pt(xt*) – [∇pt]xt*) (Bt – xt*) + pt(xt* – ∆x) ∆x 
⇔ pt(xt*) (Bt – xt*) ≥ pt(xt*) (Bt – xt*) – [∇pt]xt* (Bt – xt*) + pt(xt* – ∆x) ∆x 
⇔ 0 ≥ – [∇pt]xt* (Bt – xt*) + pt(xt* – ∆x) ∆x 
⇔ [∇pt]xt* (Bt – xt*) ≥ pt(xt* – ∆x) ∆x  
⇔ [∇pt]xt* / ∆x  ≥ pt(xt* – ∆x) / (Bt – xt*)  
⇔ [∇pt / ∆x  ≥ pt(x – ∆x) / (Bt – x)]xt*     (4-4) 
In addition, from the forward difference we have  
EGt(xt* + ∆x) = (1 – qt) pt(xt* + ∆x) (Bt – (xt* + ∆x)) and  
[∆pt]xt* ≡ pt(xt*) – pt(xt* + ∆x)  or pt(xt* + ∆x) = pt(xt*) – [∆pt]xt*. Hence,  
EGt(xt*) ≥ EGt(xt* + ∆x) 
⇔ (1 – qt) pt(xt*) (Bt – xt*) ≥ (1 – qt) pt(xt* + ∆x) (Bt – (xt* + ∆x))  
⇔ pt(xt*) (Bt – xt*) ≥ pt(xt* + ∆x) (Bt – xt*) – pt(xt* + ∆x) ∆x 
⇔ pt(xt*) (Bt – xt*) ≥ (pt(xt*) – [∆pt]xt*) (Bt – xt*) – (pt(xt*) – [∆pt]xt*) ∆x 
⇔ pt(xt*)(Bt – xt*) ≥ pt(xt*)(Bt – xt*) – [∆pt]xt*(Bt – xt*) – (pt(xt*) – [∆pt]xt*)∆x 
⇔ 0 ≥ – [∆pt]xt* (Bt – xt*) – pt(xt*)∆x + [∆pt]xt* ∆x 
⇔ pt(xt*)∆x ≥ – [∆pt]xt* (Bt – xt* – ∆x)  
⇔ pt(xt*) / (Bt – xt* – ∆x) ≥ – [∆pt]xt* / ∆x 
⇔ – [∆pt]xt* / ∆x ≤ pt(xt*) / (Bt – (xt* + ∆x)) 
⇔ – [∆pt]xt* / ∆x ≤ pt((xt* + ∆x) – ∆x) / (Bt – (xt* + ∆x))  
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but – [∆pt]xt* = – (pt(xt*) – pt(xt* + ∆x)) =  pt(xt* + ∆x) – pt(xt*) ≡ [∇pt]xt*+∆x , thus 
⇔ [∇pt / ∆x ≤ pt(x – ∆x) / (Bt – x)]xt*+∆x    (4-5) 
Thus, combining inequality (4-4) and (4-5), we will have a compound condition: 
[∇pt / ∆x  ≥ pt(x – ∆x) / (Bt – x)]xt*  and [∇pt / ∆x ≤ pt(x – ∆x) / (Bt – x)]xt*+∆x. 
Or, we can express the condition as 
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Here xtb ≡ xt* – ∆x is the price just lower than xt*, and ∇pt ≡ pt(x) – pt(x – ∆x). 
The equality sign “≈” means that at xt* the difference of LHS and RHS is minimized but 
LHS ≥ RHS, and at xt* + ∆x we have LHS ≤ RHS. To differentiate it with an ordinary 
equality, we denote it as ε-equality.  
Using a similar method, we can derive the following condition for a myopic-1 
buyer. 
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Given the optimal-offer conditions above, we can prove that a buyer needs to 
adjust its offer in either an increasing or a decreasing way; which can only be realized 
under the N-protocol. 
Proposition 4-1. Suppose all agents under the N-protocol are EvalF-I agents and 
this is common knowledge. If xt* is an optimal offer at time t, then in order to maximize 
its expected gain at time t+1: 
(a) a myopic-0 buyer will monotonically increase its offer if Bt+1 – xt* >> 0, and decrease 
its offer if Bt+1 – xt* → 0 or Bt+1 – xt* < 0; 
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(b) a myopic-1 buyer will monotonically increase its offer if Bt+1 – xt* >> γEG’t+2, and 
decrease its offer if Bt+1 – xt* → γEG’t+2 or Bt+1 – xt* < γEG’t+2. 
Proposition 4-1 describes the self-adjustment of the buyer’s optimal offer in order 
to maximize its expected gain. When the projected surplus by sticking on its previous 
offer (= Bt+1 – xt*) is large, the buyer tends to increase its offer. But when the projected 
surplus is small or negative, then it will reduce its offer. The convergence of a buyer’s 
offers to its valuation is guaranteed as shown in Proposition 4-2. 
Proposition 4-2. Under the N-protocol, if all agents are EvalF-I agents and this is 
common knowledge, then x* converges to B over time. 
From Proposition 4-1 and 4-2, we can derive several properties of EvalF-I buyers: 
• The likelihood of breakdown does not affect myopic-0 buyers but does affect 
myopic-1 buyers. If the likelihood increases (γEG’t+1 decreases), then a myopic-1 
buyer’s optimal offers will converge quickly to its valuation. 
• If the buyer’s valuation decreases sharply, then its optimal offer may decrease too. 
In our previous analysis (Proposition 4-1 and 4-2), the agents are less concerned 
about failure or breakdown. However, in a real situation, humans may be more concerned 
about this than about the surplus. In such a situation, agents would be required to find a 
concession as soon as possible, even with a zero surplus. Intuitively, agents in the N-
protocol will outperform agents in the M-protocol in performing such tasks, as stated in 
proposition 4-3 below. 
Proposition 4-3. If EvalF-I agents are only concerned about the success rate, then 
the N-protocol is preferred over the M-protocol. 
Combining Propositions 4-1 through 4-3, we get the following theorem: 
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Theorem 4-1. The N-protocol is at least as good as the M-protocol for EvalF-I 
agents. 
4.1.4 A Society of EvalF-II Agents 
Recall that an EvalF-II agent uses an additional evaluation function in accepting 
an offer by its opponent, i.e., accept an offer if it is perceived to generate an optimal 
surplus. While they also behave as EvalF-I agents, this additional evaluation criterion 
makes EvalF-II agents more ‘vulnerable’ to their opponent’s strategy in the N-protocol. 
For instance, a seller may increase its price (which can only happen under N-protocol) 
because it maximizes the seller’s expected utility. If the buyer thinks that the offer is 
acceptable and perceives it as the ‘best’ offer, then it will accept it, even though the seller 
may make a better one in the future.  
Recall also from section 3.3.3 that the buyer’s belief πt(x) may consist of an 
ordinary belief pt(x) as if it is an EvalF-I buyer and kt(x) represents the likelihood of x 
being accepted by the seller because it is perceived as the best offer. However, if a 
sequence of the buyer’s offers for n+1 consecutive rounds < xt*, xt+1*, xt+2*,…, xt+n* > 
that are within [xt*–δ, xt*+δ] is rejected, then πt+n(x) = pt+n(x) (Assumption 3-10). Given 
that in reality πt(x) may not be a continuous function (cf. Proposition 3-4), we modify 
equation (3-5) and (3-7) into  
argmaxx EGt = argmaxx [πt(x) (Bt – x)]    (4-8) 
argmaxx EGt = argmaxx [πt(x)(Bt – x) + γ (1 – π t(x))EG’t+1] (4-9)  
In some situations, equation (4-8) and (4-9) can only be solved numerically. 
However, under certain conditions, the optimal offer may increase or decrease. For 
instance, xt* will increase at a moment πt(x) = pt(x) (by Assumption 3-10) and Bt+1 – xt* 
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>> 0 (myopic-0) or Bt+1 – xt* >> γEG’t+2 (myopic-1). And xt* will decrease if Bt+1 – xt* < 
0 (myopic-0) or Bt+1 – xt* < γEG’t+2 (myopic-1). Thus, similar to the situation in EvalF-I 
agents, we may conclude that EvalF-II buyers will benefit from the N-protocol, because 
they can maximize their expected gain either by increasing or decreasing their offers. 
But, the benefit for EvalF-II agents may not be as high as for EvalF-I agents due to the 
possibility of abuses of the N-protocol by greedy or irrational agents, which reduces the 
convergence speed of the bargaining spread and may reduce the success rate. However, 
we can prove that the buyers’ offers will eventually approach their valuations, and if they 
are only concerned about the success rate, then the N-protocol is better than the M-
protocol. 
Proposition 4-4. Under the N-protocol, if all agents are EvalF-II agents and this 
is  common knowledge, then x∞* → B∞. 
Proposition 4-5. If EvalF-II agents are only concerned about the success rate, 
then the N-protocol is preferred to the M-protocol. 
As for EvalF-I agents, the N-protocol is better than the M-protocol for EvalF-II 
agents if they are only concerned about the success rate (Proposition 4-5). Also, the N-
protocol is better than the M-protocol for EvalF-II agents because it gives them flexibility 
to offer an optimal price. However, if both agents are not concerned about the success 
rate, then the success rate of the N-protocol may not be as high as the success rate of the 
M-protocol, especially when most agents are relatively skeptical, i.e. n is relatively big 
compared to time deadline Td (recall that n represents the speed of reducing k(x) to zero 
in the agents’ belief update). The reason is that non-monotonic offers by skeptical agents 
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may reduce the convergence speed in reaching an agreement. This becomes the serious 
weakness of the N-protocol.  
Proposition 4-6. Suppose the deadline for EvalF-I agents is the same as the 
deadline for EvalF-II agents. Then the success rate of the N-protocol for EvalF-II agents 
is as low as (1/n~)-th of the success rate for EvalF-I agents, where, Td~ and n~ are the 
average value of Td and n for EvalF-II agents. 
If n~ is small, then the success rate of both types will not differ much. In other 
words, if the agents are benevolent then Theorem 4-1 can be applied for EvalF-II agents. 
This leads to Theorem 4-2. 
Theorem 4-2. The N-protocol is at least as good as the M-protocol for EvalF-II 
agents if the agents are benevolent. 
4.1.5 Summary 
According to Theorem 4-1 and 4-2, we conclude that the N-protocol is better than 
the M-protocol in terms of success rate and expected gain for buyers if the agents are 
benevolent. However, this conclusion can be drawn only if strict assumptions about 
agents’ rationality as utility maximizers and their other behaviors are satisfied. These 
assumptions may become a serious constraint in a real situation. For example, a designer 
may use belief revision that violates Assumption 3-8 or 3-9, or use production rules that 
may not really maximize the expected utility or unintentionally cause nasty behaviors that 
violate Theorem 4-2.  
Indeed, exhaustive analyses are not realistic considering the infinite possible 
belief functions and revision methods and also infinite possible seller’s behaviors. For 
this reason, we cannot (and do not) prescribe optimal decision or belief revision 
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procedures for the buyers in our analysis. Rather, the protocol design is intended to help 
agents to gain higher utility in a more general case under various assumptions stated 
previously. However, to a certain degree, we can test the usefulness of a protocol by 
alternative analysis through experimentation, as will be explained in the next chapter.  
4.2 Dynamic Delay Bargaining Protocol 
In the previous section we have shown the benefit of allowing non-monotonic 
offers in avoiding the cost from the delay generated from establishing a new bargaining 
session, in which we assume a decreasing valuation of the buyer (see Figure 4-1). In this 
section we analyze other bargaining situations. Under these situations, we will show the 
benefit of allowing a buyer to delay their offer without assuming a decreasing valuation 
over time.  
4.2.1 Motivation 
One of the advantages of artificial agents is their fast response, resulting in a short 
negotiation session. For example, a bargaining session between two agents may conclude 
within seconds or even milliseconds. Generally, when a negotiation needs no complex 
information processing, efficiency can be gained by increasing the speed of agent 
responses. However, in some cases, faster resolution may not be the ultimate goal of the 
negotiation. Consider the following example. 
Example 4-2. Suppose a buying agent is delegated to buy a product within three 
days. Then a deal made on the first day is no different from a deal on the third day; but 
finding a lower price and/or better quality item is a priority. If the buyer does not have 
enough information about the market conditions, such as where to find a good product or 
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a cheaper price, then it may act cautiously on the first day, i.e. assigning a relatively low 
qt and/or Bt, and/or a relatively high pt(x) and/or EG’t+1, which causes a very slow 
concession rate by the buyer. As time goes by, the buyer will act more aggressively, i.e. 
assigning a higher qt and/or Bt, and/or a relatively high pt(x) and/or EG’t+1, which 
speeds up its concession rate.  
In Example 4-2 above, the ideal strategy of the buyer is to open negotiation with 
all possible sellers within three days and accept the global best offer from the sellers (e.g. 
the lowest price that those sellers are willing to sell for before the buyer’s deadline 
passes). Unfortunately, this strategy may not work because the seller who offers the 
global lowest price may leave the negotiation whilst the buyer is still bargaining with 
other seller(s), or a seller may accept a buyer’s counter-offer which is higher than the 
global best offer. This situation may happen because the buyer does not know whether or 
not a local best offer (i.e. the best offer in a given time interval) is globally best, and it 
cannot predict what will be the global best offer. Thus, the best strategy of the buyer is to 
concede slowly and keep its negotiation open with preferred seller(s), who provide local 
best offers, until it is convinced that that a local best offer is globally best. This option of 
keeping a negotiation open is known as a strategic delay. In general, any attempt to 
prolong a negotiation by a deliberate slow concession, or by taking no action within an 
allowed time, or, by submitting a message such as “please wait…” or 
irrelevant/meaningless messages, is considered as a strategic delay. 
People use strategic delay in both complete and incomplete information games 
[Roth et al., 1988]. Delay is also observed in both finite and infinite horizon games. 
Game-theoretic work on strategic delay has focused on finite horizon games (bargaining 
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with a deadline), including those with complete yet imperfect information [Dekel, 1990], 
complete information with inadvertent random delay [Ma and Manove, 1993], complete 
information with increasing surplus [Larson and Sandholm, 2002], incomplete 
information of agents’ valuation [Cho, 1990; Gu and Kuhn, 1998], stochastic agents’ 
deadline [Sandholm and Vulkan, 1999; Yildiz, 2004], etc. In the infinite horizon game 
context, most studies concern incomplete information cases with discount rate or fixed 
cost, such as two-sided uncertain valuations [Cramton, 1992], etc. Nevertheless, most of 
the work above is from a game-theoretic perspective. Even when an agent decision 
function is prescribed, it is only valid under very restrictive assumptions and bargaining 
settings, such as both bargainers are rational with unlimited computational power, with 
perfect foresight to solve the game, without risk of breakdown from a strategic delay, etc. 
These assumptions are less realistic in open multi-agent systems. In contrast to game-
theoretic work, our goals here are to show the importance of allowing delay in automated 
negotiation in open systems, to propose an agent’s decision structure when using a 
delaying strategy, and to demonstrate the costs and benefits of delay by naïve (myopic) 
agents.  
4.2.2 Strategic Delay in Automated Negotiation 
As in our previous analysis, we assume that agents can depict all negotiated issues 
into a single real number (e.g. utility value) and are able to make choices and their offers 
according to this value. However, in some cases, agents may not have exact properties 
but only estimates, e.g. estimated reservation price or a fuzzy time deadline. Also, we 
assume that an agent can bilaterally negotiate with multiple opponents simultaneously. 
Now, we will look at several potential applications that may fit our model. 
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Example 4-3. Consider an e-market in which buying and selling agents can 
bargain over a product. Since both agents represent different users with different 
valuations, they will not reveal their private information. Besides, identical/similar items 
may be dynamically available from multiple sellers; thus, a buyer may simultaneously 
bargain with several sellers and prolong its negotiation with a preferred seller until it is 
convinced that no more sellers can provide a better offer. 
Example 4-4. Similar to Example 4-3 except that the price of the negotiated item 
is decreasing over time, e.g. as in electronics. Suppose a potential buyer is not in a hurry 
to buy the item. Then, his/her agent should prolong the negotiation until the deadline is 
approaching because by that time the market price may be lower and, thus, it can ask for 
a lower price. 
Example 4-5. Similar to Example 4-3 except that users have a vague valuation 
toward the item, for example, in a P2P system in which virtual currency is used to 
buy/sell digital items. When similar items are observed from many sources, users may 
change their preferences very frequently, especially at the beginning of the negotiation 
when the users have not made a definite decision. Thus, they may change the valuation 
fed to their agents and their agents may use strategic delay until the valuation is stable. 
The first reason for delay is that overpricing may occur if the valuation is reduced after 
the transaction is made. For example, let the user’s initial valuation be $100 and a 
minute later becomes $80. If within few seconds his/her buying agent has bought the item 
for $90, then an overpricing occurs. The second reason for delay is that a missed-
opportunity may happen if the valuation is raised after the agent leaves a bargaining 
session due to its initial low valuation.  
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Example 4-6. Consider an e-service in which a client may rent a scarce resource 
from a server within a specific time, e.g. doing a data analysis after all data have been 
collected. Since the complexity of the service varies for different cases, the renting price 
could be bargained and could depend on the service/renting duration. If the client does 
not have an exact schedule to do the analysis (e.g. the data collection can only be 
stochastically determined) but it wants to analyze the data soon after they are available, 
then it may delay the transaction until the data are ready for a shorter renting time (thus, 
a lower cost). 
Example 4-7. An argumentation-based negotiation in which agents need time to 
verify arguments from their opponent. Suppose a seller claims that “My price is very 
cheap compared to others’ prices.” For its rebuttal, the buyer may verify the seller’s 
claim by checking any available past-transaction information, which may need a certain 
time. If the buyer does not have any other counter-argument but does not want to accept 
the seller’s offer immediately, then a strategic delay can be used until the verification is 
completed.   
We can see from Examples 4-3 to 4-7 that the benefit of delay can be in the form 
of direct utility (e.g. paying a lower price in Example 4-3), and/or indirect utility (e.g. a 
more certain market price in Example 4-7). Generally, agents will use strategic delay if 
• they have increasing valuation/surplus over time; 
• they are averse to ambiguity/vagueness (imprecise probability/outcomes) that is 
reducing over time;1 and 
• they are willing to wait for a better opportunity. 
                                                 
1 In decision science, ambiguity aversion has received tremendous attention since the 1960’s and has been proven to be 
a separate human behavior from their risk aversion [Camerer and Weber, 1992]. 
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In conclusion, there are many applications in automated negotiation in which 
agents may use strategic delay. Intuitively, a delay may increase the utility of agents, but 
it may deteriorate joint utility. In the next sections we will formally analyze the benefit 
from delay. 
4.2.3 Basic Model 
The following assumptions are used in our model. 
Assumption 4-4. (Concurrent bilateral negotiation) A buyer may bargain with a 
set of sellers {S1, S2, …, Sn}, but all bargaining sessions are independent and 
asynchronous in the sense that the decision by two sellers are independently made (no 
collusion among sellers).  
Assumption 4-5. (Persuasive negotiation) An agent may persuade their opponent 
to accept their offer or to justify their refusal.  
Assumption 4-6. (Uncertain valuation) The buyer’s estimated valuation Bt may 
increase over time, and the real value Br may only be known by the buyer after the item is 
used or received.  
These assumptions are common in human negotiation. For instance, a salesperson 
may persuade buyers such that they increase their valuation, which may cause the buyers 
to overpay for the item. Similarly, underestimation may also happen if the buyer finds 
that the item is more useful than what s/he previously thought. And the buyer may 
negotiate with several suppliers to seek the item, as shown in our previous examples. 
After receiving the seller’s offer and argument, the buyer must decide whether to 
accept the offer or to counter-offer. We assume that the buyer is myopic-1 and also 
EG’t+1 is independent of x. Thus, the expected gain from its counter offer is: 
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EGt(x) = (1 – qt) [pt(x)(Bt – x) + γ(1 – pt(x))EG’t+1]  (3-6) 
To simplify the notation, we may use θt to represent the ratio of future expected 
value to current expected surplus, or,  
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Thus, equation (3-6) becomes  
EGt(x) = (1 – qt) pt(x)(Bt – x)(1 + θt)    (4-11) 
If the buyer chooses a delay, then the expected gain after the delay is [EG’t+1]delay. 
In its decision to accept the seller’s offer, or to counter offer, or to delay the bargaining, 
the buyer must choose an optimal offer that maximizes its expected payoff in equation (3-
6). If the buyer’s optimal offer and the seller’s offer are xt* and y respectively, then we 
can formalize the buyer’s decision making as follows: 
Definition 4-1. A buyer’s evaluation function is: 
Delay   iff γ [EG’t+1]delay > EGt(xt*) and γ [EG’t+1]delay > EGt(y) 
It  =    Accept  iff EGt(y) ≥ EGt(xt*) and EGt(y) ≥ γ [EG’t+1]delay 
Counter offer  otherwise    (4-12) 
Intuitively, after a buyer has received a seller’s offer and/or arguments αS, it will 
evaluate αS and update its belief function pt(x) and its valuation Bt accordingly. In 
addition, it can also select its best counter-argument αB that can influence pt(x) which 
may increase EGt(xt*). The selection of those arguments can be realized by evaluating 
the strength of each argument [Kraus et. al. 1998], the acceptability of the arguments 
[Parsons et al., 1998], etc.2 Only after the buyer has estimated EGt(xt*), EG’t+1 and 
                                                 
2 A more complete study of argumentation-based negotiation can be found in Rahwan et al. [2004]. 
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[EG’t+1]delay at time t, will it decide whether to accept the seller’s offer or to send a 
counter-offer xt* (plus a counter-argument if necessary) or to delay the bargaining. The 
value of [EG’t+1]delay may be lower than the value of EG’t+1, because a deliberate delay 
may increase the risk of breakdown (the seller may walkout if the buyer delays the 
negotiation). 
4.2.4 Delay as a Result of an Increasing Surplus 
When a buyer’s valuation is increasing over time, it is more willing to wait for a 
later transaction, because a later transaction with the same price generates higher surplus 
than an earlier one. Example 4-6 falls in this category because a later transaction means 
less renting cost or higher valuation. Similarly, if the valuation is constant, but the price is 
decreasing, then the buyer may also wait as shown in Example 4-4. This will only be 
possible, of course, if the buyer can foresee or surely know that there will be an 
increasing valuation/surplus in the next bargaining round; otherwise, this fact will not 
affect the buyer’s decision.  
Given Definition 4-1 and γ [EG’t+1]delay > EGt(y), we can derive the condition of 
strategic delay by a buyer who is facing an increasing surplus. 
Proposition 4-7. A delay will be used by a buyer if the ratio of its future surplus 
with respect to the current one, denoted byβ, satisfies 
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Here, ζ is the ratio of the estimated future non-breakdown rate to the current rate; 
η is the ratio of the buyer’s estimated future belief that its offer will be accepted to its 
current belief that its offer will be accepted; and λ is the ratio of the buyer’s estimated 
future expected payoff after delay to that without delay. When β is large (the buyer has 
much higher future surplus compared to the current surplus), then it is more likely to 
satisfy the condition in inequality (4-13), or a delay will be used. Similarly, a rise of ζ, η, 
or λ, will reduce the RHS of inequality (4-13) which promotes a delay.  
It follows that buyers must assess ζ, η, β, λ, and θt+1*, which depends on the 
implementation. For instance, an optimistic buyer may consider  ζ = 1 and η = 1; and a 
myopic buyer may consider EG’t+2 = 0 which implies θt+1* = 0. Thus, a delay may be 
used when β > [γ (λ – (1 – qt)(1– pt(xt*)))]–1 . A more realistic implementation of myopic 
buyers is by assumption EG’t+2 = EG’t+1, resulting in the following corollary. 
Corollary 4-1. If a buyer uses EG’t+2 = EG’t+1, then a delay will be used if 
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The delay is self-adjusting. For example, a longer delay may cause a higher risk 
of breakdown or a lower [EG’t+1]delay, or λlong < λshort. Thus, even if the surplus is 
constantly increasing (β is constant over time), at one point a delay will not be used, e.g. 
when λ → (1 – qt)(1 – pt(xt*)). Practically, the estimation of λ  must include the length of 
the delay that has been used. And it is not only affected by the change of the risk of 
breakdown, but also the change of pt+1(xt+1*) and EG’t+2 after a delay, if any. Intuitively, 
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pt+1(xt+1*) may be slightly different when a delay is used at time t, because it may have 
been revised after xt* is rejected. However, this difference is minor compared to the risk 
of breakdown. Therefore, we may ignore it in the real implementation.  
4.2.5 Delay as a Result of Ambiguity 
Example 4-5 is a case when a buyer is averse to ambiguity, because overpricing 
and missed-opportunity may occur due to uncertain valuation. Generally speaking, buyers 
may use strategic delay when they are averse toward ambiguity (either imprecise 
probability or outcome) that is reducing over time. The ambiguity may be in the form of 
the vagueness of the buyer’s valuation, belief, and other bargaining factors.  
One of the most influential theories in explaining ambiguity aversion in human 
behavior is Kahneman & Tversky’s prospect theory [1979]. Under this theory, the weight 
of a precise prospect is greater than the weight of an imprecise prospect. For example, if 
there is an imprecision factor ϕ that influences the judgment of pt(xt*), then the weight of 
current and future payoffs, i.e. (pt(xt*) and (1 – pt(xt*)), will be mapped to ψ(pt(xt*), ϕ) 
and ψ(1 – pt(xt*) , ϕ), respectively; thus 
EGt(xt*) = (1–qt)[ ψ(pt(xt*), ϕ)(Bt– xt*) + γ ψ(1–pt(xt*), ϕ) EG’t+1] (4-16) 
where the mapping satisfies ψ(pt(xt*), ϕ) + ψ(1 – pt(xt*), ϕ) ≤ 1 (subcertainty 
property). This property explains why people prefer a precise prospect ϕ1 rather than an 
imprecise one ϕ2, because we can have both ψ(pt(xt*), ϕ1) > ψ(pt(xt*), ϕ2) and ψ(1 – 
pt(xt*), ϕ1) > ψ(1 – pt(xt*), ϕ2),  which implies [EGt]ϕ1 > [EGt]ϕ2. Since imprecision 
reduces over time, we could have γ λ [EG’t+1]ϕ1 > [EGt]ϕ2, which causes a delay from the 
buyer. 
 130
Proposition 4-8. A delay will be used by a buyer if the ratio of the weight of its 
future precise belief with respect to the current imprecise belief satisfies 
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From this proposition, it is possible that pt+1(xt+1*) < pt(xt*) but ψ( pt+1(xt+1*), ϕ1) 
> ψ(pt(xt*), ϕ2), because the influence of the increasing of precision  may be stronger than 
that of the decreasing of belief. Figure 4-2 illustrates the effect, in which the imprecision 
causes ψ(pt(xt*), ϕ2) < pt(xt*). 
 
Figure 4-2 Imprecise belief versus precise belief functions 
Similarly, most people also prefer a precise outcome over an imprecise outcome 
[Camerer and Weber, 1992]. Suppose the buyer is uncertain of its valuation at time t, but 
can estimate it within a range, or Bet ∈ [BL, BH]. Since the ambiguity reduces over time 
pt(xt*) 
pt+1(xt+1*) =ψ( pt+1(xt+1*), ϕ1) 
ψ(pt(xt*), ϕ2) 
xt* 
pt(x) 
x 
Imprecise pt(x) 
precise pt+1(x) 
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(after more information is collected), the buyer expects that the range is converging over 
time, or  
(BH – BL )t+ n < … < (BH – BL )t+1 < (BH – BL )t   (4-19) 
According to common observation on human ambiguity aversion, the buyer will 
prefer a narrower range over a wider one even if the wider range has a higher mean value 
[Camerer and Weber, 1992]. Thus, the buyer’s estimated valuation satisfies  
Bet+n(ϕ1) > Bet+n-1(ϕ2) >… > Bet+1(ϕn-2) > Bet(ϕn-1).    (4-20) 
Given this, Proposition 4-7 can be applied by replacing β. 
Proposition 4-9. A delay will be used by a buyer if the ratio of its estimated future 
surplus with respect to the current estimated surplus satisfies 
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Using similar analysis, we can analyze the strategic delay from imprecise risk of 
breakdown. If the imprecision of the risk of breakdown reduces such that the risk of 
breakdown is estimated to be decreasing, then a delay may be used under similar 
conditions. 
Proposition 4-10. A delay will be used by a buyer if the ratio of its estimated 
future probability of breakdown with respect to the current estimate satisfies 
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The effects of ambiguity may be more than just those described above. However, 
we cannot analyze imprecision that arises from all possible bargaining factors, but only 
provide the general idea of a delay from ambiguity. 
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4.2.6 Delay as a Result of Verifying Arguments 
When the seller tries to persuade the buyer who does not believe the seller’s 
argument, then the buyer needs some time to verify it, as shown in Example 4-7. Since 
the buyer is rational, it must have an incentive for verifying the argument, such as 
reducing the ambiguity and/or finding a good reason for a rebuttal. Generally speaking, 
verification is useful if the buyer’s expected utility after verifying the seller’s argument to 
be false exceeds its expected utility without verifying the argument, which is helpful for 
its rebuttal. The following proposition describes this. 
Proposition 4-11. Let the true value of the seller’s argument (αS) induce an 
increasing of the buyer’s valuation from Bt–1 to Bt but reduce pt–1(x) to pt(x), while the 
negation of it (¬αS) does not change the buyer’s valuation (Bt+1 = Bt = Bt–1) but 
increases pt–1(x) to pt+1(x). Then, the seller’s argument will be verified, which causes a 
delay, if  
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verification results in the negation of the seller’s argument. 
The value χ can be obtained by calculating the trust toward the seller. If the seller 
is trustworthy, χ will be low and the buyer may not verify the seller’s argument. The 
condition above is similar to that in Proposition 4-7 except that the delay comes from 
verifying the argument after considering the benefit of the negation of the seller’s 
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argument. A seller’s argument “This car is in a very good condition” is an example of 
Proposition 4-11 above. If the buyer accepts it to be true, then it may raise the buyer’s 
valuation from Bt-1 to Bt and reduce the buyer’s belief from pt–1(x) to pt(x). If the 
argument is verified to be false, then it justifies the buyer’s rebuttal and raises its 
bargaining power; or the buyer will have a reason to persuade the seller to reduce its 
valuation which in turn will increase the buyer’s belief from pt–1(x) to pt+1(x). Another 
example of Proposition 4-11 is the argument “Your offer is not acceptable, because it is 
lower than market price.” If the buyer accepts it, then it reduces the buyer’s estimated 
belief such that pt(xt*) < pt–1(xt*) but Bt = Bt–1. If it is proven to be false, i.e. the buyer’s 
offer is acceptable or higher than market price, then the seller should accept the buyer’s 
offer, or pt+1(xt*) > pt(xt*). 
Intuitively, if the negation is useless (e.g. pt+1(x) is slightly higher than pt(x)) or 
very unlikely be proven (e.g. the seller has supporting evidence such that χ → 0), then 
the buyer will not verify the seller’s argument. Also, if the buyer trusts the seller (χ → 0), 
then the buyer will not verify the seller’s argument. However, this may not be true in 
some situations. For example, the previous argument “This car is in a very good 
condition” is sometimes interpreted as a vague argument, thus needing further 
verification before the buyer can estimate Bet. Or, a delay will still be used even if the 
buyer trusts the seller. Thus, verification is also useful when verifying the argument will 
generate higher expected utility than would happen without verifying it, the purpose of 
which is mainly for reducing imprecision/ambiguity, e.g. estimating Bet. The analysis, 
then, is similar to that in section 4.2.5. 
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4.2.7 Delay as a Result of Waiting for Better Opportunities 
When a buyer can negotiate with more than one seller concurrently, then it will 
have incentive to wait for better opportunities as in Example 4-3. Sim and Wang [2004] 
have recognized and proposed the use of delay (slow concession) in this kind of situation. 
They suggest setting the concession speed according to the probability of finding a better 
offer from other (potential) sellers, which is a function of the number of sellers in the 
market, e.g. a slow concession will be used if more sellers join the market. In contrast to 
their probabilistic approach, our approach relies more on the calculation in Definition 4-
1.  
Suppose an offer by a seller Sk satisfies EGt(y) ≥ EGt(xt*). Then we must check 
whether or not EGt(y) ≥ γ [EG’t+1]delay from all possible sellers, i.e. those in current and 
future encounters. If EGt(y) < γ [EG’t+1]delay, then a delay will be used. Certainly, when a 
larger number of sellers are involved in the negotiation, the likelihood of EGt(y) < γ 
[EG’t+1]delay is higher, which may support Sim and Wang’s approach. The calculation of 
[EG’t+1]delay from a seller which is already bargaining is not difficult, but estimating this 
for an incoming seller is more complicated. A probabilistic approach, such as that used 
by Sim and Wang, could be used for the estimation. Alternatively, statistical confidence 
can be built if there are enough bargaining sellers for whom it is estimated a delay would 
be useful. 
Proposition 4-12. Let an offer by a seller k satisfy EGt(y)k ≥ EGt(xt*). A delay 
will be used by the buyer if any of the following conditions applies:  
(i) EGt(y)k < γ [EG’t+1]delay 
(ii) there exists a seller j ≠ k s.t. EGt(y)k < γ [EG’t+1]j 
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(iii) there exists in the future a seller v ≠ k s.t. EGt(y)k < γ [EG’t+1]v  
When the buyer’s bargaining space is narrow (e.g. it can only increase its offer a 
few times), then the buyer may offer the same price repeatedly, which may result in a 
bargaining breakdown. The Boulware strategy is an example that uses repetitive same 
offers at the beginning of bargaining [Faratin et al., 1998]. This strategy has been known 
to cause a high breakdown rate [Raiffa, 1976]. 
Suppose the buyer is expecting an increase of its valuation, e.g. an adjustment by 
its owner, or a decrease of the seller’s valuation, e.g. the negotiation approaches the 
seller’s time deadline. Then the buyer will delay its counter-offer, which can help it to 
avoid a breakdown. In this case γ [EG’t+1]delay > EGt(xt*) ≥ EGt(y) where EGt(xt*) → 0 
due to a high possibility of breakdown, and EGt(y) = Bt – yt  < 0 (negative surplus). Thus, 
the condition of delay is similar to that in formula (4-13) in proposition 4-7, except that 
we have ζ instead of β on the LHS.  
4.2.8 Summary 
Proposition 4-7 to 4-12 have demonstrated the benefit of strategic delay for the 
buyer. Since the analysis is symmetric for the seller, we may expect that under similar 
circumstances the seller will also use strategic delay. From Proposition 4-7 to 4-12 we 
can derive Theorem 4-3: 
Theorem 4-3. (The existence of strategic delay) A myopic-1 agent may benefit 
from strategic delay.  
In existing MAS platforms, a long waiting time for a response may be considered 
as a network congestion or a connection failure, thus possibly resulting in a breakdown 
which is usually enforced by the platform manager. To overcome this, we may add a 
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waiting signal in the agent communication language (ACL) such that a communication 
will still be maintained during the waiting period. Thus, all agents must have common 
understanding of the waiting/delaying signal sent by their opponent. We denote this 
negotiation platform as a delay-enabled negotiation protocol, and the following theorem 
is applied. 
Theorem 4-4. If the primary goal of agents is to maximize their expected utility, 
then myopic-1 agents prefer a delay-enabled bargaining protocol. 
Proof. See Appendix 
4.3 Strategic Ignorance in Argumentation-based Negotiation  
4.3.1 Motivation 
To date, argument-based negotiation (ABN) among artificial agents has of 
necessity been less complicated than among humans, because humans have the creativity 
to use arguments which are beyond/broader than the context of the negotiated issues, and 
to seek/request the exact meaning of their opponent’s argument when it is ambiguous; 
none of which can be done by artificial agents due to limitations in their ontology, 
knowledge and reasoning.  
When the negotiated issues or protocol are complicated such as in an ABN, the 
cost incurred from the negotiation process, in terms of time and computational 
complexity, cannot be ignored. Intuitively, this cost increases with an increasing number 
of possible arguments in the ABN. And it will also increase if agents do not trust each 
other, because it will take some time to assess the validity of each argument, as described 
in section 4.2.6. Even worse, if the ABN protocol allows agents to use their own ontology 
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in generating/interpreting an argument, then those agents may need more time to respond 
and/or understand the meaning of their opponent’s argument. Excessive costs occurring 
from these factors may diminish the agent’s gains from using an ABN, thus discouraging 
the agent from using argumentation, especially when there are alternative solutions such 
as negotiating with other sellers/buyers who will not use argumentation [Karunatillake 
and Jennings, 2005]. 
In this section, we assume that the context of the negotiation is the same, i.e. the 
purchasing of a product or service with its price as the primary issue, but based on ABN 
protocol. Our focus here is on an ABN between a buyer and a seller agent who do not 
necessarily trust each other, and both agents may have different ontologies, knowledge 
and/or reasoning engines. Note that these cannot be completely different, because for the 
negotiation to work properly there needs to be at least some common ground such as the 
description of the service/item and the unit price. Here, argumentation could be used 
either to persuade an opponent to accept an offer or to change its stance (e.g. trust) 
toward the proponent, as shown in Figure 4-3. 
Realizing that an agent’s argument may not be understood by its opponent, agents 
should agree at least to inform their opponent that they do not understand the argument 
being received or they are unable to reply to the argument. This is important because 
misunderstanding or ignorance may cause an indeterminate process/stall in the 
negotiation. However, allowing agents to do so means allowing them to ignore their 
opponent’s arguments when they do not want to respond to them. Thus, a rational agent 
may use ignorance as a strategy to avoid a dialog which may lead it into a weaker 
position (e.g. lower expected payoff) during the negotiation. In addition, an agent may 
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also deliberately choose not to use specific arguments during negotiation. For example, if 
a property agent (seller) knows that a buyer drives a car, then persuading the buyer by 
argument “this apartment is less than a minute walking distance from the bus station” will 
be useless or even cause a negative impact because the buyer may not like a crowded 
area. We call this agent’s strategy of avoiding argumentation, either by pretending that it 
cannot understand the argument or avoiding the use of specific arguments, as strategic 
ignorance.  
 
Figure 4-3 An illustrative example of ABN in natural and agent language 
To the best of our knowledge, this strategy has not been broadly explored in the 
automated negotiation literature, especially in the context of ABN. Perhaps the work that 
comes closest to exploring strategic ignorance is by Karunatillake and Jennings [2005] 
who have shown the benefit of avoiding argumentation (evading conflict) when the ABN 
is costly and there are many non-arguing options, such as buying a similar product from 
Negotiation over a used car in natural language 
 
Buyer: How much does it cost? 
Seller: $5000, plus a new tire and a stereo. 
Buyer: How about $4000? 
Seller: $5000 is very cheap. It only has 120,000 Km. It’s rarely been used. 
Buyer: Yeah… But it’s manual. I can have an automatic one for $5000. 
Seller: Believe me, you can’t find a better one for this price. 
..… 
Negotiation in agent language 
 
Buyer: ask( price ) 
Seller: offer( price(this, 5000) ∧ add(tire, 1) ∧ add(stereo, 1) ) 
Buyer: offer( price(this, 4000) ) 
Seller: inform( quality(kms(this, 120000) ∧ usage(this, rare)) → offer_price(5000, cheap) ) 
Buyer: inform( quality(transmission(this, manual)) → ¬ offer_price(5000, cheap) ) 
Seller: inform( ¬∃ X (price(X, 5000) ∧ better_quality(X, this)) ) 
..… 
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other sellers (or what they called ‘resources’ in their paper). Using empirical simulation, 
they found that when the availability of ‘resources’ are high, then arguing is less 
favorable, because the cost from arguing may be higher than the cost of seeking other 
‘resources’. Our work is similar to theirs in that argumentation may incur some costs, but 
different in the sense that we do not assume the existence of any other non-arguing 
‘resources’. So, our agent can avoid argumentation by sending a statement “refusal to 
argue” for specific issues, such as “I do not understand your argument” or “No 
comments” without breaking the negotiation. For this supposition to work, we assume 
that all agents have universal understanding toward this statement and will avoid 
reiterating similar argumentation upon receiving it.  
Finally, it is worth mentioning that ignorance in argumentation is not the same as 
argument from ignorance (argumentum ad ignorantiam) [Walton, 1995]. The latter 
concept is used to describe arguments without solid knowledge/evidence that are subject 
to rebuttal, an issue commonly studied in the area of non-monotonic logic and reasoning. 
4.3.2 Basic Model 
Suppose that a buyer B wants to buy an item from a seller S, where other 
buyers/sellers may be available but each negotiation session is exclusively between a 
buyer and a seller only (concurrent bilateral negotiation in Assumption 4-4). In our ABN 
protocol, either party opens the negotiation by sending a message (an offer and/or an 
argument) to the other party, who is obliged to reply by counter-offer and/or counter-
argument. As usual, our approach here presumes an uncertain environment, in which 
deliberation and meta-reasoning is needed by the agent in maximizing their expected 
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utility. Moreover, arguments are used by both parties to persuade their opponent to accept 
their offer or to justify their refusal of their opponent’s proposal (Assumption 4-5).  
Since both parties represent different owners, they may have different (or 
identical) ontologies, knowledge, and reasoning engines for generating and understanding 
the arguments. Both parties know that their opponent may not necessarily understand all 
their arguments, and they can inform them if any argument is not understood. Suppose 
also that the buyer does not necessarily know the real value of the negotiated item (this 
assumption is slightly different from Assumption 4-6).  
Assumption 4-7. (Uncertain valuation) The buyer’s estimated valuation Bt is not 
fixed over time, and the real value Br may only be known by the buyer after the item is 
used or received.  
Thus, the buyer must assess/predict the risk of believing in the salesperson’s 
arguments; and also assign a belief value as to the likelihood that the seller may believe 
the buyer’s counter-argument, which leads us to the next assumption.  
Assumption 4-8. Suppose a seller uses argument αS at time t. Then the buyer’s 
belief over αS at time t, denoted by υt(αS), depends on the seller’s reputation and other 
information, such as the truth of the seller’s prior arguments and the truth value of αS 
itself. Similarly, the buyer’s belief of its own argument αB being accepted by the seller at 
time t, denoted by υt(αB), depends on the buyer’s reputation and other information that 
reflects the seller’s belief toward the buyer and the truth value of αB itself. 
In practice, agents may not have autonomy to change their valuation, because it is 
determined exogenously. For instance, the owner may set the reservation price using a 
time-dependent parameter, e.g. as in Kasbah [Chavez and Maes, 1996]. However, as 
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autonomy increases, agents may set the valuation endogenously, for instance by 
monitoring the fluctuation of the market price. We thus assume that the valuation is 
dynamic and agents may change their valuation according to the environment (including 
the influence of the seller’s arguments). To keep our model simple, we also assume that 
the buyer is risk neutral and is myopic-0 with qt = 0; therefore the expected payoff of the 
buyer is: 
Definition 4-2.  (i) EGt(x) ≡ pt(x) (Bt – x)   (4-24)  
(ii) EGt(y) ≡ Bt – y    (4-25) 
Usually, after the buyer receives a seller’s offer and/or arguments αS, it will 
evaluate αS and may update Bt and pt(x) accordingly. The updating is necessary in order 
to avoid stalling the negotiation and to allow both agents to deliberate and learn to 
maximize their utility. The updating mechanism may use the heuristics stated in the 
following assumption. 
Assumption 4-9. Upon receiving a seller’s argument and/or offer y, a buyer may 
update its valuation and belief according to the following heuristics: 
(a) pt(x) will be reduced for all prices less than the buyer’s last offer (inclusive) if the 
seller convinces the buyer that the seller will not accept the buyer’s last offer, 
either by insisting on its previous offer or using arguments. 
(b) pt(x) will be raised for prices close to the seller’s new offer if the seller decreases 
its previous offer. 
(c) In both heuristic (a) and (b) above, the updating of pt(x) will not affect its 
monotonic property. 
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(d) Bt will be increased if new credible information has been received, either directly 
from the seller or from other sources. 
We assume EvalF-I agents use a slightly different evaluation function as follows:   
Definition 4-3. A buyer’s evaluation function is: 
Withdraw   iff t > Td or maxEGt(x) ≤ 0  
It  =  Accept   iff EGt(y) ≥ maxEGt(x) and t  ≤ Td  
Counter offer and/or argument otherwise  (4-26) 
Only after the buyer has estimated maxEGt(x), will it compare it to EGt(y) and 
decide whether to accept the seller’s offer or to send a counter-offer (plus a counter-
argument if necessary). If a counter-offer must be sent, then it will counter offer xt* 
which generates the maximum expected payoff. Depending on the bargaining protocol, 
the counter-offer xt* could be monotonically increasing or not. To maintain the generality 
of our analysis, we do not assume the monotonicity property of the offers. 
Assumption 4-10. A buyer will always choose the best counter-argument αB that 
can affect the value of pt(x) which may increase EGt(x). 
The mechanism of choosing the best arguments could be based on the buyer’s 
expectation of those arguments being accepted, υt(αB), and the influences (strength) of 
those arguments in changing the seller’s internal states [Rahwan et al., 2004]. In our 
model, we assume that the buyer can always generate the best argument which may cost 
it some time; thus leaving our analysis as a choice between using counter-argument and 
not using it. 
The purpose of our model is to analyze general bounded-rational agents in ABN 
and thus it does not explicitly restrict the reasoning mechanism used by agents. As long 
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as the agent behavior follows or approximates our assumptions, then our analysis in the 
next two sections can be applied. Indeed, some of our analyses have extended our 
assumptions into more specific cases, such as expected utility for future outcome or time 
delay in processing arguments. Nevertheless, we will demonstrate the existence of 
strategic ignorance in our model. 
4.3.3 Analysis I: Proactive Ignorance  
As stated before, to maximize its expected payoff the buyer may decide to offer 
xt* which maximizes EGt(x), and/or to persuade the seller using argument αB that 
increases pt(x) for some x (including xt*). Intuitively, if the buyer believes that the 
expected marginal benefit of sending argument αB exceeds the cost incurred from the 
argumentation, then it is worth doing. Suppose that the buyer believes that with a positive 
probability υt(αB) the seller will instantly accept argument αB resulting in the increase of 
pt(x) to pαt(x) = pt(x|αB), a situation denoted by υt(αB) = P( pt(x) ↑ pαt(x) | αB ) > 0, 
where “↑” represents an “increase to” binary relation. Then, we could easily show that it 
is always worthwhile for the buyer to argue.  
Proposition 4-13. If the buyer believes that the probability υt(αB) = P( pt(x) ↑ 
pαt(x) | αB ) is positive, then αB will always be sent. 
Proof. First, we can re-write equation (4-24) such that by probability υt(αB) the 
expected payoff is pαt(x) (Bt – x) and by probability (1 – υt(αB)) the expected payoff is 
pt(x) (Bt – x), or 
EGαt(x) = υt(αB) pαt(x) (Bt – x) + (1 – υt(αB)) pt(x) (Bt – x)  (4-27) 
Since pαt(x) > pt(x), then we have 
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υt(αB)pαt(x) (Bt – x) + (1 – υt(αB)) pt(x) (Bt – x) >  
υt(αB)pt(x)(Bt – x) + (1 – υt(αB))pt(x)(Bt – x)  (4-28) 
But the RHS of inequality (4-28) equals to pt(x)(Bt – x) = EGt(x); or, EGαt(x) > 
EGt(x) for any υt(αB) ∈ (0, 1]. Thus, αB will always be sent.   ■ 
In Proposition 4-13, we assume that the cost of argumentation is zero or neglected 
by the buyer, or the argument will be instantly accepted or not at all. However, this is not 
true in many situations, because it may take some time to create a convincing argument 
and then to persuade an opponent to accept an argument (due to rebuttal, verification of 
the argument, building trust, etc.). In such a situation, we need to assign a cost to the 
negotiation delay and analyze the buyer’s meta-reasoning about whether or not to avoid 
the argumentation. 
4.3.3.1 Ignorance due to costly negotiation time 
Consider that it will take some time for the seller to process or be convinced by 
the buyer’s argument so that an argument αB may not be instantly accepted by the seller, 
but instead be subject to rebuttal for some finite rounds of interaction. Then we can 
modify equation (4-27) by distributing the probability υt(αB) to several bargaining rounds 
from t to t+n, where n represents the processing time until the time when the buyer 
believes that it has failed to convince the seller using argument αB. For the sake of 
simplicity, assume the estimation of the belief function pαt(x) is the same over time, or 
pαt(x) = pαt+1(x) = pαt+2(x) = … = pαt+n(x). Suppose also that if the buyer can estimate the 
time n, then its expected payoff can be expressed in a time series as follows:  
EGαt(x) = υt(αB) pαt(x) (Bt – x) + υt+1(αB) pαt(x) (Bt+1 – x) +  
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υt+2(αB) pαt(x) (Bt+2 – x) +  … + υt+n(αB) pαt(x) (Bt+n – x) +  
(1 – Σi=0nυt+i(αB)) pt(x) (Bt+n – x)     (4-29) 
where υt(αB) represents the probability that argument αB will be instantly accepted by the 
seller, and υt+1(αB) represents the probability that argument αB will be accepted by the 
seller at time t+1 after it is not accepted at time t, and υt+2(αB) represents the probability 
that argument αB will be accepted by the seller at time t+2 after it is not accepted at time t 
and t+1, and so on.  
The distribution of υt(αB) … υt+n(αB) depends on the buyer’s beliefs about the 
processing time needed by the seller and the estimated length of the argumentation; thus, 
it depends on the complexity of the arguments, the possibility of attack/rebuttal, and the 
trust between them. Practically, those values can be set externally by the owner or 
adjusted internally by the agent after several encounters using a specific learning 
mechanism. 
Example 4-8. Suppose n = 2 and υt(αB) = υt+1(αB) = 0 and υt+2(αB) = 1, which 
means it will take at least two rounds of argument before the buyer can convince the 
seller that  the seller will change pt(xt) to pαt(xt). Let pt(xt) = 0.7, pαt(xt) = 1.0, xt = $100, 
Bt = $150, and Bt+2 = $120. If we plug these values into equation (4-29) and (4-24) then 
EGαt(xt) = $20 and EGt(xt) = $35, that is EGαt(xt) < EGt(xt). Thus, the buyer will not use 
argument αB.          
From Example 4-8, we can derive Proposition 4-14 about the existence of a non-
arguing strategy. 
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Proposition 4-14. (Strategic ignorance due to costly negotiation time) If there is a 
cost incurred from sending argument αB as shown in equation (4-29), and the buyer’s 
valuation is decreasing over time, then αB may not always be sent. 
If we compare equations (4-27) and (4-29), the cost incurred from sending αB in 
equation (4-29) is mainly from the decreasing of the valuation Bt. This situation is similar 
to that used by Karunatillake and Jennings [2005] in their analysis. The difference is that 
their agents use overall argumentation cost which may lead to a withdrawal, while our 
agents consider a subset of argument topics which may lead to ignorance. However, is 
there any situation when a buyer with a non-decreasing valuation will also avoid 
argumentation? The answer is “yes”, which will be explained in the following two sub-
sections, section 4.3.3.2 and 4.3.3.3.  
4.3.3.2 Ignorance due to recoiling arguments   
If the buyer is aware of the negative impact of the argumentation, i.e. the 
possibility of pαt(xt*) < pt(xt*), then using argumentation may incur unpredicted costs to 
the buyer. This could happen, for example, if the buyer unintentionally reveals some 
information after sending αB or ignites an assessment that makes the seller refuse xt* 
rather than accepting it. For instance, sending an argument “xt* is a fair market price” 
will prompt the seller to verify it, which may lead to a reverse conclusion by the seller 
such as “xt* is not a fair market price” or “reject xt* with certainty”. Facing the 
possibility of its arguments recoiling to its disadvantage, the buyer should first assess the 
likelihood of this happening. Certainly, a deliberation is needed here and depending on 
the level of consideration we may have various types of buyer, exemplarily a 
sophisticated buyer versus a naïve one. 
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Suppose that the negotiation time is not as costly as in section 4.3.3.1, so we can 
neglect deliberation cost in our analysis here. Suppose also that the buyer is unsure that 
pαt(x) > pt(x) for xt* after sending αB (ambiguity), but it can assign a probability density 
function to pαt(xt*), denoted by f(pαt(xt*)) with mean value µ f (p(x|α)) or µ f  for short. For 
the sake of simplicity, let agents be neutral toward both risk and uncertainty (ambiguity), 
such that their decision depends on the mean value µ f  only. Given the above 
assumptions, then we can derive the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4-15. (Strategic ignorance due to recoiling arguments) Let the buyer 
be neutral to uncertainty and risk. If µ f  < pt(xt*) and υt(αB) is strictly positive, then αB 
will not be sent. 
Intuitively, Proposition 4-15 states that a buyer will avoid an argument if the 
buyer believes that the argument will reduce the expected probability of the seller’s 
acceptance of its offer. Relaxing the assumption of neutrality, Proposition 4-15 can be 
extended to an uncertainty-averse buyer. If the buyer is uncertainty-averse, then it may 
still avoid argumentation despite µ f  being slightly higher than pt(xt*). In other words, an 
uncertainty averse buyer will still avoid argumentation even if it may slightly increase the 
expected probability of its offer being accepted. 
Another similar situation that may cause ignorance is pαt(x) = pt(x), i.e. when the 
argument is not valuable or does not have persuasive power. In this case, a neutral buyer 
is indifferent between sending αB and not sending it. If sending it incurs a small 
processing time (cost), then αB will not be sent. However, if µ f  = pt(x), then it is more 
likely for the buyer not to send αB, even if the buyer is neutral toward uncertainty. 
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Nevertheless, the real implementation depends on the algorithm and user model --- 
whether the owners allow their agent to accept uncertainty or not, and this is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
In contrast to the previous section, this subsection has considered the value of the 
arguments in changing the opponent’s perception regardless of the importance of time. In 
the next sub section, we will show another reason for strategic ignorance due to the risk 
of breakdown from sending an argument, also without considering the cost of negotiation 
time. 
4.3.3.3 Ignorance due to risk of breakdown 
In the previous two subsections, we considered ignorance from the perspective of 
the buyer’s expected utility. However, sometimes an argument by the buyer may trigger 
the seller to terminate the negotiation prematurely (breakdown). We assume that the 
breakdown comes from the argument rather than exogenous factors in qt. There are at 
least three possible causes here, which are explained below. 
1. The buyer’s argument, αB, decreases the buyer’s estimation of the seller’s belief, 
wt(St), 3  that the buyer will accept the seller’s valuation St. From the buyer’s 
perspective, if the seller’s belief approaches zero, then there is no reason for the seller 
to continue the negotiation. Therefore, the buyer has to have a belief about its 
argument possibly affecting the seller’s belief in causing a breakdown, which can be 
expressed by υφ(αB) = P( wt(St) = 0 | αB ). An example of such a buyer argument is “I 
                                                 
3 We use wt(x) for the buyer’s estimation of the seller’s belief that the seller’s offer will be accepted by the 
buyer.  
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cannot pay any price higher than x.” when the buyer knows that x < St. This argument 
will only make the seller walkout, especially at the beginning of the negotiation. 
2. The buyer’s argument delays the negotiation by ∆t, and during the course of the delay 
the seller has sold the item to another buyer, with probability P( gt(∆t) = 1 | αB ), 
where gt(∆t) is the likelihood of the seller selling the item to another buyer within 
interval ∆t and there are no more items left; thus, the negotiation will be terminated 
immediately by the seller. We may consider this condition as the opportunity cost of 
negotiation delay, which is similar to our previous discussion in subsection 4.3.3.1. 
However, since the effect is breakdown instead of the decreasing of the buyer 
valuation, the buyer may consider it separately.  
3. The buyer’s argument cannot be processed by the seller, which eventually causes a 
breakdown of the negotiation. This condition relates to the robustness of the agent 
reasoning; for instance, in handling contradictive arguments, recursive computation, 
exceptional error, etc. 
Since the seller’s mental state is not transparent to the buyer, it is not possible for 
the buyer to know exactly when such breakdowns will happen. Therefore, the only way 
to handle breakdown situations is by assigning a probability value to each argument, 
denoted by υφ(αB), and use a meta-reasoning engine to assess the likelihood of that 
argument triggering a breakdown. Intuitively, if the buyer uses too many arguments from 
ignorance or threats, it will reduce the seller’s belief wt(St). And if the buyer uses third-
party information that may take a longer verification time (therefore longer ∆t), it will 
increase gt(∆t). And repeated or illogical arguments may trigger a failure in the seller’s 
reasoning.  
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If a breakdown costs nothing but a zero expected payoff, then we may consider its 
cost by integrating υφ(αB) into pt(x) in equation (4-24) such that the equation becomes 
EGαt(x) = (1 – υφ(αB)) pαt(x) (Bt – x)     (4-30) 
where υφ(αB)∈[0, 1]. 
Proposition 4-16. (Strategic ignorance due to risk of breakdown) If υφ(αB) is 
greater than the increasing rate of pt(xt*) from αB, i.e. υφ(αB) > (pαt(xt*) – pt(xt*)) / 
pαt(xt*), then αB will not be sent. 
This proposition states that an argument will be used only if the benefit of using it 
in terms of the increasing rate of pt(xt*) exceeds the cost of using it, in terms of the 
probability of breakdown caused.  
Corollary 4-2. If υφ(αB) > 1 – pt(xt*), then αB will not be sent. 
4.3.3.4 Summary 
So far, we have shown that the buyer may avoid argumentation when it is 
estimated as a costly and/or risky action. Thus, we can be sure that proactive ignorance 
may be used by a rational agent, that is it may actively choose not to make an argument 
as a rational choice. 
Theorem 4-5. (The existence of proactive ignorance) A rational agent may not 
use argument αB if it  
• incurs a high cost;  
• reduces the expected probability of the seller’s acceptance of its offer; and/or  
• raises the risk of breakdown more than the increasing rate of pt(xt*). 
Proof. By Proposition 4-14, 4-15, and 4-16.     ■ 
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Depending on the design of the agent and the particular argument, a buyer may 
take into account all or some conditions of ignorance described in the previous section. 
Certainly, it may also consider other conditions of ignorance which are beyond the scope 
of our analysis here. When an argument about a certain topic is costly or risky, then the 
buyer may choose to pick it or not. However, it is not the buyer’s sole right to open an 
argumentation, because the seller may have the same right to touch upon those topics that 
may threaten the buyer’s bargaining position. In this case, if the buyer has a reason not to 
counter argue, strategic ignorance will be used too. For instance, if the seller argues about 
a topic that is predicted to be a time consuming argumentation by the buyer, then the best 
strategy of the buyer is to avoid it. Thus, all conditions described in subsections 4.3.3.1, 
4.3.3.2, and 4.3.3.3 may also apply in response to the seller arguments. That is, they can 
be used in responsive ignorance as well as proactively. However, there are additional 
conditions beyond these that may cause responsive ignorance. In the next section we will 
show these other conditions, where the buyer may also avoid arguing in response to the 
seller’s argument.  
4.3.4. Analysis II: Responsive Ignorance 
In this section we will analyze several reasons for responsive ignorance in 
addition to the proactive conditions described in section 4.3.3. We will describe them 
according to the intention of the seller using an argument. We may classify the seller’s 
argument into the following categories: 
• It persuades the buyer to increase Bt (that the item offered by the seller is worth more 
than what the buyer has estimated), denoted by αS1. 
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• It justifies the seller’s offer such that (∀x < y) pt(x) → 0 (that it is almost impossible 
for the buyer to buy the item with a price below the seller’s offer, or the seller will not 
sell the item for a price lower than y), denoted by αS2. 
Undoubtedly, arguments can also be used to demonstrate the seller’s reputation, 
which increases the value of υt(αS), or to rebut the buyer’s argument. However, in this 
section we will only analyze the two categories. We will first discuss several types of 
response a buyer may have.  
Suppose during a negotiation of buying/selling an apartment, the seller uses the 
following argument “The government has planned to build a sport-center close to this 
apartment next year, so the price of the nearby properties may rise over 30%.” Under 
uncertain conditions and depending on the ABN protocol, upon receiving the seller’s 
argument the buyer may reply with one of the following arguments: 
• Affirmation --- inform the seller that the buyer understands and agrees to the 
statement. (e.g. “I see.”) 
• Rebuttal --- inform the seller that the buyer understands the seller’s statement but is 
skeptical as to the truthfulness of the statement. (e.g. “I don’t believe that the 
government will really build it; they changed a similar plan before.”) 
• Query --- inform the seller that the buyer does not understand some (or all) of the 
statement and ask for a clarification. (e.g. “What is a “sport-center”?”); or inform the 
seller that the buyer understands the seller’s statement and ask for further 
information. (e.g. “Is the government plan approved?”) 
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• Responsive Ignorance --- inform the seller that its previous statement cannot be 
processed and has been therefore ignored. (e.g. “Let’s not discuss this further; please 
continue with the negotiation.”) 
If the buyer replies affirmatively, it will inform the seller that the buyer may 
update its valuation, which implies that the seller’s offer is more reasonable than that of 
the buyer. Consequently, the buyer has an obligation to revise its offer by increasing it. A 
buyer may reply using this argument if it knows that both the seller and the government 
are trustworthy, and thus raises its offer accordingly.  
However, if the buyer believes that the seller’s argument is not true, then the 
buyer will rebut. It may lead to a degradation of the buyer’s trust toward the seller’s 
arguments, unless the seller could provide more data/facts to convince the buyer. In 
human negotiation, rebuttal may come from the buyer’s skepticism toward the seller’s 
trustworthiness regardless of the truth of the argument. When data that contradicts the 
seller’s argument exists, then the buyer should deny the seller’s argument, which may 
lead to a rebuttal.  
When the buyer, who trusts the seller, cannot assess the truthfulness of the seller’s 
argument or cannot understand the argument, then it may use a query as its counter-
argument. Such counter-arguments (R3) imply that the buyer has not changed its 
valuation and is still in the process of interpreting the seller’s argument. To convince the 
buyer, the seller may explain its argument, and the argumentation may continue for 
several rounds until the buyer understands the argument, which eventually leads to an 
affirmation or rebuttal, or a failure to fully clarify the argument, which leads to 
ignorance. 
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Certainly, a rational buyer will choose ignorance if it is better than all other 
responses, that is when the expected utility of ignorance is higher than the expected 
utility of any other responses (R1 to R3). In the next two sub sections we will 
demonstrate responsive ignorance for two different intentions of the seller’s argument: (i) 
to persuade the buyer to increase its valuation and (ii) to accept the seller’s offer. 
4.3.4.1 Ignoring αS1 
Suppose the seller uses argument αS1 to persuade the buyer to increase Bt to Bt’. 
Given equation (4-24) and (4-25), a buyer will have a higher expected payoff after 
increasing its estimated valuation from Bt to Bt’. But at the same time, it will also 
increase the chance that the real valuation Br is lower than Bt’ (cf. Assumption 4-7). 
Since Bt is chosen by the buyer without the seller’s interference, then any cost generated 
from it (∆B = Bt – Br) should not be blamed on the seller’s argument. Intuitively, from 
the buyer’s perspective, it will choose Bt as the estimated value of Br. However, any cost 
generated in term of ∆B’ = Bt’–Bt (when Bt ≥ Br) or ∆B’ = Bt’– Br (when Bt < Br), should 
be charged to the seller’s argument (buyer’s overvaluation due to seller’s persuasion). 
Since the buyer does not know the value of Br, it can only assign a probabilistic value to 
the occurrence of overvaluation using the known value ∆B’ = Bt’–Bt. Let’s denote the 
expected cost incurred from this risk as ρ∆B’, where ρ is the likelihood that the 
overvaluation occurs. If the seller’s reputation is high and its information is accurate, i.e. 
υt(αS1) is high, then the risk is low; conversely, if the seller’s reputation is low or the 
information is less accurate, then the risk is high. Under this rationale, we can infer that ρ 
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is proportional to (1 – υt(αS1)), or ρ ∝ (1 – υt(αS1)). Given this estimation, the new 
valuation that should be used by the buyer is Bt* = Bt + (1–ρ) (Bt’–Bt). 
Example 4-9. Suppose a buyer wants to buy a property from a renowned agent, 
and the buyer’s initial valuation was $150K. Suppose that the seller told the buyer that 
the government has planned to build a sport-center so the price of the nearby property 
may rise over 30%. Given this new information, the buyer now is willing to pay up to 
$200K if the government will really build the facility. However, since the buyer is also 
aware of the possibility that the government plan will not be approved, then the buyer 
may still have a risk of overpaying $50K for the property. If the buyer believes that the 
government can realize its plan with probability 0.6, then the buyer’s new valuation will 
be $150K + 0.6($200K-$150K) = $180K.       
From Example 4-9 we can see that the buyer is still facing a risk despite the high 
credibility of the seller. In this example the buyer can calculate its new valuation because 
it knows the credibility of the government. But what if the buyer does not know the 
reputation of the seller and has no ability to verify the truthfulness of the seller’s 
argument either from the third party or by itself? One possibility is to stick to its previous 
valuation and inform the seller, and another possibility is to try to assess the seller’s 
argument, which may be very costly or time consuming. Thus, the buyer may choose 
ignorance as its reply. If after several rounds of negotiation or from other argumentation 
the buyer has been convinced that the seller’s reputation is high (a truth-teller), then it 
may re-consider to accept the entire seller’s previous argument(s) that could not be 
verified. Thus, responsive ignorance buys time for the buyer. 
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Another reason for using strategic ignorance could be the consequence of the 
buyer’s self interest of pretending it is a low-valuation buyer, regardless of seller 
reputation or the truth of the argument. By doing so, it may reduce the seller’s 
expectation of selling the item at a high price, which in turn forces the seller to make 
greater concessions. This strategy may work if the buyer knows that the seller valuation 
is low and it is impatient or cannot find another buyer easily. In other words, the buyer 
must believe that its offer is very likely to be accepted, or pt(xt*) is high. However, if the 
buyer does not know this, then it will be very risky for the buyer to ignore the seller’s 
argument(s), because the seller may walk out due to its updated belief that the buyer will 
never buy at a reasonable price (w(St) = 0).  
Proposition 4-17. (Valuation hiding) Let the buyer believe that both the seller 
valuation and the risk of breakdown are low so that the seller is willing to accept the 
buyer’s offer and also υt(αS1) is high so that the seller’s argument is trusted and  ρ is low 
so that the buyer will increase its valuation; then 
(i)  αS1 will be affirmed if pt(xt*) is steep; and 
(ii) αS1 will be ignored if pt(xt*) is flat near certainty. 
4.3.4.2 Ignoring αS2  
Suppose the seller uses argument αS2 to justify that the seller will not reduce its 
offer anymore, and the buyer can fully understand αS2. Normally, if the buyer believes 
that αS2 is true and the seller’s offer is acceptable, then the buyer will just accept the 
seller’s offer. Conversely, if the buyer does not believe that αS2 is true and it has a low-
cost counter-argument(s), then rebuttal will be used, because it can force the seller to 
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reduce its offer. But if counter-arguing is very costly, then the buyer will use strategic 
ignorance as described in section 4.3.3.1. Therefore, ignorance will be used when the 
buyer does not believe that αS2 is true and counter-arguments are very costly, as stated in 
the following proposition. 
Proposition 4-18. Let υt(αS2) be low so that the seller’s argument is trusted and 
assume all possible counter-arguments are very costly, then αS2 will be ignored. 
However, there is a special situation in which ignorance will be used even when 
the buyer believes that αS2 is true, i.e. when the buyer benefits from the delay in the 
negotiation; for instance, when it has a temporary increasing valuation Bt over time or 
when it is waiting for a response by other seller(s). In this situation, the buyer basically 
agrees that the seller will not reduce its offer further and the seller’s offer is acceptable 
from the buyer’s perspective. Thus, the reason for not promptly accepting the seller’s 
offer is not because it is not a reasonable price, but expressly to incur a delay. 
Consequently, the buyer will not affirm αS2 because it wants to accept the seller’s offer at 
a later time. Instead, ignorance may be used, especially when there is no reasonable 
rebuttal or the rebuttal may increase the risk of breakdown. Alternatively, the buyer can 
also use strategic delay when it is applicable, which can be realized by sending a sentence 
like “Please wait; I am currently considering your offer but it is taking me time to factor 
in everything …” Indeed, the buyer’s action of delaying the negotiation by pretending to 
not fully understand the seller’s argument can be regarded as a ‘soft’ ignorance, in 
contrast with a ‘hard’ ignorance which informs the seller that the buyer does not 
understand the argument at all. The following proposition states the condition when 
responsive ignorance is used. 
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Proposition 4-19. Let υt(αS2) be high so that the seller’s argument is not trusted 
and assume Bt is increasing over time. If rebuttal and query are more costly and/or may 
increase the risk of breakdown more than ignorance, then αS2 will be ignored as long as 
its incurred cost is lower than the marginal gain of Bt. 
4.3.4.3 Summary 
In the previous two sub sections, we have shown that the buyer may use 
responsive ignorance toward a weak seller argument; especially when rebuttal is costly or 
risky. In addition, the buyer may also use ignorance for hiding its valuation and as a 
replacement for strategic delay, despite a strong seller argument. These choices are based 
on buyer rationality in wanting to increase its expected revenue. Therefore, we can 
conclude our analysis with the following theorem. 
Theorem 4-6. (The existence of responsive ignorance) A rational agent may 
benefit from ignoring argument αS1 and αS2. 
Proof. By Proposition 4-17, 4-18 and 4-19.     ■ 
4.4 Chapter Summary  
The following conclusions regarding bargaining protocols can be derived from 
our analysis in this chapter.  
First, a bargaining protocol should not restrict agents to submit monotonic offers 
only, because they may expect a higher expected utility from non-monotonic offers. 
However, as we stated previously in subsection 4.1.5, this protocol may be misused by 
malevolent agents, which eventually reduces the success rate of the negotiation. To avoid 
this, we may restrict the frequency of non-monotonic offers, e.g. each agent cannot 
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switch to submit non-monotonic offers more than N times. However, we cannot prove the 
effectiveness of this restriction now and it is left for our future work. 
Second, the protocol should allow agents to delay their offer, because it can be 
used to wait a better opportunity, increasing the accuracy of its estimation, or other 
purposes. Since the platform designer may restrict a communication delay which may 
result from a connection error or failure, the negotiation protocol should include a 
message (in Agent Communication Language) to inform explicitly that an agent is 
delaying its offer/decision.  
Third, the protocol, if incorporating argumentation, should allow agents to ignore 
their opponents’ argument. This ignorance-based protocol can improve the system’s 
robustness and also increase the benefit of agents. Again, the argumentation-based 
negotiation protocol should include a message that an agent cannot understand the 
argument of others.  
The above results are true based on the agents’ individual interest. However, 
bounded rationality is the central assumption in our analysis here. If either or both parties 
are not utility maximizers, it is unclear that the proposed modifications are still useful in 
increasing the social welfare. Intuitively, both parties may be benefit from the modified 
protocol under specific circumstances. For example, if both parties need time to clarify 
their information, then both may use strategic delay concurrently. In the next chapter, we 
will analyze empirically the impact of the modified protocol to the social welfare 
empirically. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SIMULATION AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
In this chapter we present experimental results of our study of the non-monotonic-
offers bargaining protocol, the delay-based bargaining protocol, and the ignorance-based 
argumentation-based negotiation. These experiments will be used to shed light on what 
happens when we impose more realistic constraints on the bargaining events than in the 
theoretical analysis in Chapter 4. In the real world, agents may not be able to maximize 
their expected utility due to computational limitations and incomplete information. Most 
of these agents cannot be analyzed formally. Hence, we need to analyze our protocols 
empirically. After describing these agents in section 5.1, we present an experimental 
study of the three bargaining protocols that are the focus of this research.  
5.1 Social Agents that Use Random or Reactive Strategy 
Many scholars have challenged the “utility maximization” principle of bargainers. 
For instance, several experiments with human subjects have shown that not all people are 
utility-maximizers, even under complete information. Some people seek fairness in 
bargaining [Forsythe et al., 1994], while others fail to find the optimal (equilibrium) 
solution because they fail to use backward induction [Neelin et al., 1988; Johnson et al., 
2002]. In terms of MAS, many people also question the possibility of building agents that 
 161
can have correct prior beliefs and an updating mechanism that can really help them to 
maximize their utility [Faratin, 2000].  
To overcome these constraints, a user may use social agents that have more 
straightforward strategies. Random and reactive strategies are commonly used in human 
society due to their simplicity. Static strategies (time-dependent tactics) and reactive 
strategies (behavioral tactics) are also commonly used in human negotiation and also 
common in the negotiation literature and will also be considered in some of our 
experiments. Hence, social agents will use social clues derived from human-human 
negotiation. It is not only important in attaining a satisfactory, or maybe an optimal, 
transaction, but also may improve the agents’ reputation in the electronic marketplaces 
where they are residing. 
5.1.1 Random Strategy 
In the random strategy, if the buyer valuation is 100 cu. (currency units) and the 
seller asks for 90 cu., then the buyer can randomly offer a price between 0 and 90 cu. 
without considering any factor. If the seller refuses to sell it at the randomly selected 
price, say 45 cu., then the buyer may try a new random price between 45 and 90 cu. In 
the negotiation literature, those agents using pure random strategies are known as zero 
intelligence (ZI) agents [Gode and Sunder, 1993; Duffy, 2006].  
In a more complex algorithm the agents may consider their characteristics in 
choosing a random value. For instance, a patient buyer may generate a random price 
using a distribution function with a lower mean value compared to a less patient buyer. 
Figure 5-1 shows a uniform distribution function (symmetric), a normal distribution 
 162
function (symmetric), and a lognormal distribution function (asymmetric) that may be 
used by agents in generating their offers. 
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Figure 5-1. Various distribution functions for generating agent’s offers 
In addition, the buyer may generate a random price using a specific distribution 
function it has learned from its past experience as the most effective one (e.g. generating 
highest average surplus). Or, it may also use different distribution functions for different 
groups of sellers at different times. In this case, the buyer’s decision is governed by social 
clues. For example, in the market of used cars, a buyer may use a normal distribution 
function, while in the market of used books it will use a lognormal distribution function, 
because the demand of used books is higher which leads to a smaller chance for the seller 
to reduce its price. Besides, it is more likely for the buyer to encounter the same book 
seller in the future (it is unlikely to buy several cars within a year); thus, the buyer’s 
reputation can be built by a higher successful negotiation (as a result of a fast concession 
from the lognormal distribution). These social clues, then, will be transformed into 
heuristics and ported to agents by their owner or designer. 
Normal distribution 
function (mean = 50 cu.) 
Lognormal distribution 
function (mean = 60 cu.)
Uniform distribution function 
(mean = 40 cu.) from 30 to 50 cu.
Probability 
Price 
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5.1.2 Reactive Strategy 
In contrast to a random strategy, a reactive strategy generates an offer according 
to the behavior of the agent’s opponent. Tit-for-tat is the most common reactive strategy 
and has been observed in many biological interactions. It is known as the best strategy in 
solving the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game [Axelrod, 1981]. For example, if the seller 
reduces its offer by 50 cu., then the buyer reacts by increasing its offer by 50 cu. too. 
Similarly, if the seller stands on its previous offer, then the buyer will follow it by 
standing on its previous one. Knowing that the buyer will follow its move, the seller can 
speed up the negotiation by reducing its offer faster. Thus, the advantage of tit-for-tat is 
its simplicity; yet, it is also powerful enough that it can guide the negotiation to a 
resolution. However, the disadvantage of this strategy is the possibility of deadlock. For 
example, if both parties use tit-for-tat, and one of them stands on its previous offer, then 
they will stand on their offers forever. To avoid the deadlock, at least one party must 
adopt a tie-breaker, e.g. never stand on its offer for more than j rounds. However, 
depending on the proponent’s characteristics and other constraints (e.g. time deadline and 
valuation), the proponent’s move may not be exactly the same as the opponent’s move. 
For example, after the seller reduces its offer by 50 cu., the buyer may increase its offer 
by 40 cu. only, because increasing more will generate negative surplus. Or, if the buyer is 
impatient, then it will reduce its offer by 60 cu. in order to speed up the negotiation. 
Again, in this thesis we will not study the strategy used by the agent because it could be 
varied according to designer/user characteristics, but rather, we include them in order to 
facilitate studying negotiation protocols. 
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Other reactive strategies considered in this chapter are tat-for-tit, tit-for-two-tat, 
and spread-driven strategy. In short, those four reactive strategies can be explained as 
follows. 
• Tit-for-tat: the proponent’s move is the same as the opponent’s previous move. For 
example, if the buyer concedes by increasing its offer, then the seller also concedes 
by decreasing its offer. Note here, their concession rate is not necessarily at the same 
amount, e.g. the seller may decrease its offer by 5 cu. as the response to an increasing 
of 10 cu. by the buyer.  
• Tit-for-2tat: if the opponent’s previous two consecutive moves are in the same 
direction but different from the proponent’s previous move, then the proponent 
switches its move to resemble the opponent’s previous move; otherwise the 
proponent does not switch. For example, suppose at time t–2 and t–1 the buyer did 
not concede, i.e. stood firm or decreased its offers, then the seller will respond by not 
conceding at time t, e.g. it also stands firm or increases its offer. 
• Tat-for-tit: the proponent’s move is the reverse of the opponent’s previous move. For 
example, if the buyer conceded, then the seller will not concede. 
• Spread-driven: the proponent’s move tries to reduce the spread of negotiation (the 
difference between the buyer’s and the seller’s offer) by a constant fraction. 
Even though tat-for-tit is not commonly used due to its odd behavior, we include 
it in some of our analysis as noise.  
5.1.3 Time-dependent Strategy 
Time-dependent strategy is a static strategy which only depends on the time factor. 
Using this strategy, a buyer will increase its offer monotonically until the value of the 
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offer reaches the buyer’s expected valuation or a specific predetermined price. Figure 5-2 
shows some time-dependent strategies. The increment of a buyer’s offer represents its 
characteristics. For example, a less patient buyer will concede faster (Conceder) than a 
more patient one (Boulware) [Faratin et al., 1998]. If a steady increment rate is chosen, it 
is regarded as a linear strategy. And if a mixture of two or more time-dependent strategies 
is chosen, we have a compound strategy (for example, combining Conceder and 
Boulware as in Figure 5-2). Most time-dependent strategies have been studied widely in 
the automated negotiation literature [Faratin et al., 1998; Fatima et al., 2004]. In our 
experiments, we will use linear and conceder strategies with various increment rates. 
 
Figure 5-2. Some examples of time-dependent strategies 
Boulware
Conceder 
Linear
Compound 
Time
Price Buyer’s 
valuation 
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5.2 Empirical Study of the Non-monotonic-offers Bargaining Protocol 
The purpose of this empirical study is to analyze the cost and benefit of the non-
monotonic-offers bargaining protocol among irrational agents. Since exhaustive 
experiments are unrealistic, our experiment is restricted to providing insight as to the 
effect of agents’ irrational behaviors in both monotonic and non-monotonic-offers 
bargaining protocols.  
These irrational behaviors are hard to be analyzed theoretically, because there is a 
large amount of possible combinations between two irrational strategies in a negotiation. 
For instance, we can have tens or even hundreds of different random strategies depending 
on the size of the random outcomes.  
5.2.1 Agents’ Valuation  
First, 100 pairs of non-decreasing valuations (both buyers and sellers have non-
decreasing valuations over time) are generated randomly under a pre-specified range. 
Figure 5-3 shows four representative pairs of agents’ valuations (out of 100 different ones 
generated), which are generated randomly. The vertical axis represents the price, and the 
horizontal axis represents the time line (in rounds). The thick line represents the buyer’s 
valuation in each round, and the thin line represents the seller’s valuation. The transaction 
may be made within the area where the thick line is on the top of the thin line, or when 
both of them are on the same horizontal line. Near the end of the bargaining period, both 
lines always overlap at 100 cu. This gives us a higher assurance of a success in the 
bargaining if the bargaining prolongs to the deadline. In all pairs of generated valuations, 
there is always a non empty feasible set (a period when the buyer’s valuation is higher 
than the seller’s valuation; or, a period when a resolution can be reached). However, the 
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length of these periods varies. For instance, the right upper diagram of Figure 5-3 
provides shorter periods than the right bottom. 
 
Figure 5-3. Four pairs (out of 100) of upward valuation used in the experiments 
Under this setting, the buyer’s offer will never get stuck in its valuation, because 
its valuation is non-decreasing. However, the seller’s offer may get stuck in its valuation 
because its next valuation may be higher than current one. This is especially true when 
the seller is risk-seeking and quickly offers a price lower than 100 cu. at the beginning of 
the bargaining.  
5.2.2 Experimental Design 
Two main parts of the experiment have been designed, based on the protocol and 
the strategies used by agents: 
• Part 1: Agents use random strategies in bargaining 
• Part 2: Agents use reactive (behavior-dependent) strategies in bargaining 
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Furthermore, we divide the experiment in Part 1 into four smaller groups 
according to the following strategies used by the sellers: 
• Risk-averse seller (R-averse): a seller who offers a monotonically decreasing price 
but will not offer any price below its maximum valuation (in this case 100 cu.); 
• Risk-seeking seller (R-seeking): a seller who offers a monotonically decreasing price 
but may offer any price above its present valuation (in this case it may offer a price 
less than 100 cu.); 
• Nonmonotonic-offer seller (N-seller): a seller who offers any price above its present 
valuation and may increase it as its valuation increases, but only when it is stuck on 
its valuation; 
• Nonmonotonic with random change (NR-seller): a seller who is similar to N-seller, 
except that it may increase its price randomly (with probability equal to 0.1)1 in order 
to attract EvalF-II buyers. 
For each group in the experiment above, we subdivide it into four treatments 
based on the strategies used by sellers and buyers in accepting an offer by their opponents. 
These four treatments are shown in Table 5-1, labeled as S1B1, S1B2, S2B1, and S2B2. 
S1B1 means that all sellers are EvalF-I agents and all buyers are EvalF-I agents. S2B1 
means that all sellers are EvalF-II agents and all buyers are EvalF-I agents. Similar 
explanations are used for S1B2 and S2B2.  
Given these treatments, a total of 16 groups of experiments are conducted in part 
1. Each group is repeated 300 times for each pair of valuations, resulting in 16 groups x 
300 repetitions x 100 pairs of valuation = 480000 trials in part 1. In this experiment, 
                                                 
1 This probability 0.1 is particularly chosen for the current simulation only. The small value is chosen since 
we believe that agents will not change their offers arbitrarily and frequently. 
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agents only follow random strategies, i.e. sellers (buyers) randomly increase (decrease) 
their offers until the valuations are reached. Both the increment and decrement vary from 
0 to 5 cu. Depending on agents’ characteristics, some may raise/drop their offers faster 
than others, but they never take their opponents’ offers/behavior into consideration.  
Table 5-1. Four treatments based on agents’ evaluation (non-monotonic-offers protocols) 
Seller 
 
EvalF-I EvalF-II 
EvalF-I S1B1 S2B1 
Buyer 
EvalF-II S1B2 S2B2 
 
The realization of an EvalF-I agent is by using the following method:  
• if my opponent’s current offer generates higher positive surplus than my offer which 
will be sent in the next round, then accept my opponent’s current offer; 
The realization of an EvalF-II agent is by adding the following method in addition 
to the criterion in an EvalF-I agent:  
• if my opponent’s current offer generates higher positive surplus than the previous one, 
do nothing; 
• if my opponent’s current offer generates lower positive surplus than the previous one, 
accept it. 
The experiment in part 2 is almost the same as that in part 1, except that most 
agents use reactive strategies. Four reactive strategies are considered: tit-for-tat, tit-for-
2tat, tat-for-tit, and spread-driven. These reactive strategies are slightly different from 
those used in [Faratin et al., 1998], but with some overlap, e.g. tit-for-tat. The spread-
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driven strategy in our experiment is also slightly different from the market-driven 
strategy used in [Sim, 2002]. 
Each experiment in part 2 consists of agents with reactive strategies plus agents 
with random strategies. Eight different treatments are conducted in part 2: the 4 different 
treatments given in Table 5-1, and 2 different protocols for each of them (N-protocol and 
M-protocol). For statistical analysis purposes, each possible combination is repeated 
more than 30 times; thus 900 trials are conducted for each treatment, because there are 5 
different agent strategies which results in 25 possible pair combinations. Therefore, on 
average 900/25 = 36 repetitions are done for each possible combination, which is enough 
for statistical analysis. In total, we have conducted 8 treatments x 900 trials x 100 pairs of 
valuation = 720000 trials in part 2.  
Since two reactive agents may stand on their offers (e.g. two tit-for-tat agents will 
always use the same strategies if they meet), then we use a “tie-breaker” mechanism such 
that an agent will not stand on their current offer for more than 3 rounds. Moreover, we 
assume a high cost in repeating a bargaining session. Thus, if an agent is stuck in their 
valuation, then we will consider it as a breakdown. Table 5-2 shows general parameters 
used in both part 1 and part 2 of our experiments. 
5.2.3 Evaluation Criteria 
In both part 1 and part 2, two main variables are recorded for evaluation purposes, 
i.e. total surplus generated from each group experiment, in terms of the sum of surplus for 
both buyers and sellers, and, the number of breakdowns/successes.  
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Based on those two values, three pieces of information are computed: average 
surplus, average surplus per successful transaction, and success rate (percentage of 
successful negotiation). 
Table 5-2. Parameters used in both parts of experiments (non-monotonic-offers protocols) 
Parameters Values 
Maximum bargaining rounds 99 
Sellers’ and buyers’ initial valuation 50 – 85 cu. 
Sellers’ and buyers’ final valuation 100 cu. 
Increment of valuation 5 cu. 
Range of sellers’ initial offers 100 – 120 cu. 
Range of buyers’ initial offers 30 – 50 cu. 
Min. increment/decrement of offers 1 cu. 
Max. increment/decrement of offer 5 cu. 
Note: cu. is the currency unit of the offer 
 
5.2.4 Results 
5.2.4.1 Results of Part 1: Agents use random strategies in bargaining 
It is shown in Table 5-3 that agents in N-protocol (the two bottom rows) generate 
higher surplus compared to agents in M-protocol (the two upper rows). The success rates 
of N-protocol are also higher compared with the setting where sellers are risk-seeking in 
an M-protocol (2nd row).  
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Table 5-3. Result of experiment in part 1 (non-monotonic-offers protocols) 
 Ave. surplus (cu.)* Ave.surplus (cu.)/ transaction Success rate (%) 
R-averse  (M-protocol) 6.690 (10.543) 7.047 94.937 
R-seeking (M-protocol) 7.069 (10.767) 8.817 80.183 
N-seller (N-protocol) 9.902 (11.619) 10.083 98.200 
NR-seller (N-protocol) 10.091 (11.736) 10.815 93.307 
*The corresponding standard deviation is inside the parentheses 
Table 5-4. The p-values of the pair-wise t-test on “Average surplus” and “Success rate” 
Average surplus 
 R-seeking  (M-protocol) 
N-seller  
(N-protocol) 
NR-seller  
(N-protocol) 
R-averse  (M-protocol) 2.80242E-18 0 0 
R-seeking (M-protocol)  0 0 
N-seller (N-protocol)   7.17231E-05 
Success rate 
 R-seeking  (M-protocol) 
N-seller  
(N-protocol) 
NR-seller  
(N-protocol) 
R-averse  (M-protocol) 0 0 1.17069E-64 
R-seeking (M-protocol)  0 0 
N-seller (N-protocol)   0 
 
A relatively large standard deviation (approx. 11 cu.) of the average surplus in 
Table 5-3 reveals that the results are distributed in a quite large range. However, very low 
p-values from the t-test (assuming two tails and unequal variances) shown in Table 5-4 
justify that the differences of the mean values reported in Table 5-3 are statistically 
significant. These results justify our theoretical analysis that N-protocol favors 
negotiation under sellers’ upward valuations. We can also show that similar results may 
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appear for bargaining under downward valuation (both sellers and buyers decrease their 
valuation over time), since it is a dual (symmetric) of this experiment. 
If we compare the results of each group of strategies used by buyers and sellers 
(four possible combinations of buyer/seller acceptance strategies), we find out that the 
effect of various strategies used by sellers and buyers are not significant in N-protocol 
(Figure 5-4). Smaller average surpluses are only observed in the case when sellers are 
EvalF-II and buyers are EvalF-I (shown as S2B1). When we check the effect in the M-
protocol, much smaller average surpluses are only observed when sellers are EvalF-I (see 
Figure 5-5, in case S1B1 and S1B2). The result suggests that EvalF-I sellers may reduce 
their overall surplus under M-protocol, in other words, EvalF-II sellers outperform 
EvalF-I sellers in generating surplus. 
 
 
 
Figure 5-4. A comparison between N-seller and NR-seller in four possible combinations 
of EvalF-I and EvalF-II agents as shown in Table 5-1 (average surplus is normalized) 
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Figure 5-5. A comparison between R-averse and R-seeking in four possible combinations 
of EvalF-I and EvalF-II agents as shown in Table 5-1 (average surplus is normalized) 
Moreover, introducing NR-sellers in the N-protocol reduces the success rate as 
predicted. The effort to increase the price in order to convince the buyer to make 
concessions earlier will prolong the bargaining, thus increasing the risk of breakdown. 
However, as expected, it generates higher total surplus; since more concessions are made, 
surplus is generated for both parties. 
 
5.2.4.2 Results of Part 2: Agents use reactive strategies in bargaining 
Figure 5-6 shows some examples of encounters among agents with various 
reactive strategies. Unlike the results in part 1, more failures are detected due to the 
characteristics of reactive agents who are more risk-seeking and “stubborn” to insist on 
their offers. However, the success rate and the average surplus generated are higher in the 
N-protocol, as shown in Table 5-5.  
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Figure 5-6 Examples of encounters between agents with reactive strategies 
Table 5-5. Result of experiment in part 2 (non-monotonic-offers protocols) 
 M-protocol N-protocol 
 S1B1 S1B2 S2B1 S2B2 S1B1 S1B2 S2B1 S2B2
Ave. Surplus  
(cu.)* 
7.50 
(11.86) 
7.47 
(11.81)
7.61 
(10.09)
7.60 
(10.09)
8.46 
(11.87)
8.55 
(11.73) 
8.38 
(10.11)
8.48 
(10.04)
Success rate (%) 57.6 57.7 65.9 65.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
*The corresponding standard deviation is inside the parentheses 
Within the same group (either within M-protocol or N-protocol) the results are 
similar. Some of them are not statistically different. For instance, the p-values from the 
comparison of the average surplus between “S1B1” and “S1B2” groups under M-
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protocol is approximately 0.564. The corresponding p-value of “S1B1” and “S2B2” 
groups under N-protocol is approximately 0.736, which means they are unlikely to 
represent different groups. However, the p-value of the average surplus made under M-
protocol and N-protocol is close to zero (approximately = 3.8842 10-277), which means 
they are statistically different. Hence, the effect of allowing non-monotonic offers among 
reactive-strategy and random-strategy agents, in terms of the generated surplus, is 
significant. 
Finally, analyzing success rates, 100% success rate is gained under our 
experiment in N-protocol, which is much higher than 57% - 66% in M-protocol. This 
result justifies that N-protocol is better than M-protocol in terms of success rate, when 
both parties have increasing valuations. 
5.2.5 Summary 
In general, agents in N-protocol generate higher surplus compared to agents in M-
protocol. The success rates of negotiation under N-protocol are also higher in most cases. 
Thus, our experimental results support our theoretical analysis in Chapter 4 regarding the 
benefit of allowing non-monotonic offers, even under the more relaxed agent constraints 
described in this chapter.  
5.3 Empirical Study of Delay-based Bargaining Protocol 
The purpose of the empirical study in this section is to analyze the cost and 
benefit of a delay-based bargaining protocol under more forgiving constraints allowing 
for irrational agents as with the other studies in this chapter. Specifically, we compare 
agents’ surplus and success rate under delay- and non-delay-based bargaining protocols. 
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We assume that buyers under the non-delay-based protocol will always make a 
concession unless they are stuck on their valuation. And buyers under the delay-based 
protocol may stick on the same offer for several rounds if they decide to use strategic 
delay. Buyers will use strategic delay only after observing their future valuation, i.e. 
delay will be used if their future valuation is higher than their current one. For that 
purpose, we only simulate cases of buyers’ increasing valuation, while the sellers’ 
valuation is kept constant. The seller will never delay the bargaining and both will 
concede to offer their valuation at their time deadline. 
 5.3.1 Experimental Design 
10 different sellers’ valuations and 3 groups of 10 different buyers’ valuations are 
used in this experiment. The buyers’ valuations are increasing over time from 100 cu. to 
as high as 150 cu. with time deadline at the 30th round. In contrast, the sellers’ valuations 
are constant over time (= 100 cu.), but they have various time deadlines (from the 21st to 
30th round). The reason for varying the sellers’ time deadline is to simulate the cost of 
strategic delay. For example, a long delay by the buyer may cause a breakdown when the 
seller’s time deadline is short. If the seller’s time deadline is very long, then no cost will 
occur. 
Since we could have various increments of the buyer’s valuation, we study three 
groups here: high-increment valuations (HI), medium-increment valuations (MI), and 
low-increment valuations (LI). The reasons of studying these groups are: 
(i) a larger increment of valuation within a short period of time may be more 
likely to overcome the cost of delay; 
(ii) a higher frequency of increment may induce a more frequent delay. 
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(c) LI 
Figure 5-7. Three groups of buyer valuations used in the experiments 
Figure 5-7 (a), (b), and (c) show some examples of each of these valuations 
(respectively HI, MI, and LI). The horizontal line represents the time and the vertical line 
represents the valuation. For the sake of clarity, only four different valuations (out of ten) 
are shown in each diagram. 
With regard to the negotiation strategy, we consider two groups of sellers, namely: 
• Time-dependent group: sellers who monotonically reduce their offers with a constant 
rate;  
• Tit-for-tat group: sellers who follow an opponent’s concession, but with various 
initial offers. 
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The buyer will always use a time-dependent strategy by increasing its offer at a 
predefined rate, with or without a delay. The delaying strategy uses the following rule:  
Buyer’s delaying rule: If the buyer observes an increment of its valuation within the d-th 
round ahead (compared to that in the current round), then a delay will be used at the 
current round.  
Here, d represents the buyer’s myopic horizon. When d = 0 the buyer will never delay its 
offer, so it resembles non-delaying bargaining. Since the buyer’s valuation is increasing 
over time, a higher d implies a higher likelihood of a longer delay. We use d = {0, 1, 2, .., 
12}, and this becomes the control variable. Table 5-6 shows other parameters used in our 
experiment. Given these parameters, for each group of buyers’ valuations we have (10 x 
10) pairs of agents’ valuations, (3 x 3) pairs of their initial offers, (4 x 4) pairs of their 
increment/decrement of offers, 2 different seller strategies, and 12 different buyers’ 
delaying strategies, totaling to 345600 different trials. Therefore, for 3 different groups of 
buyers’ valuations we run 3 x 345600 = 1036800 trials. 
Table 5-6. Parameters used in both parts of experiment (delay-based protocols) 
Parameters Values 
Maximum bargaining rounds ≤ 30 
Sellers’ initial offer {120, 130, 140} cu. 
Buyers’ initial offer {70, 80, 90} cu. 
Buyers’/sellers’ increment/decrement of offers {1, 2, 3, 4} cu. 
Acceptance criteria of both buyers and sellers EvalF-I 
 180
 
5.3.2 Evaluation Criteria 
In all trials, two main variables are recorded for evaluation purposes: surplus 
generated, in terms of the sum of surplus for both buyers and sellers, and 
breakdown/success of the negotiation. Then, three pieces of information are computed: 
total surplus, average surplus per successful transaction, and success rate. 
5.3.3 Results 
Figure 5-8 shows the results of our experiment for various values of d = {0, 1, 2, …, 12} 
with respect to the success rate (in %), surplus rate (in %), and total surplus (in cu.).  
The success rate is calculated by dividing the number of successes by the total 
number of trials (= 28800 trials). The surplus rate is calculated by dividing the average 
surplus of successful negotiations with the estimate of the maximum surplus. And the 
estimate is calculated as the average surplus when the negotiation succeeds between 
round 21 and 30, i.e. ∑ ∑
= =
−
10
1
30
21
)100(
100
1
j t
jtB , where j is the index of 10 different buyers’ 
valuations and t is their valuation from round 21 to 30. Since this estimate is for the 
average of maximum surplus, it is possible that the real surplus is higher than this 
estimate, as shown in Figure 5-8 (e). 
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Figure 5-8. The experimental results of HI (a and b), MI (c and d), and LI (e and f) for 
various d (x-axis) 
It is shown from Figure 5-8 (a), (c), and (e) that a longer delay from a higher 
horizon d may increase the surplus rate but reduce the success rate. This is intuitive, 
because a longer delay may defer the transaction to the time where the buyers’ valuation 
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is higher, but at the same time causes a higher rate of breakdown due to the sellers’ 
earlier deadline. However, the results on total surplus are not as intuitive as shown in 
Figure 5-8 (b), (d) and (f). Several more important results are as follows: 
• The decreasing of success rate is slower in the HI group compared to that in the MI 
and LI groups, and in the LI group’s it is the fastest. We observe that the frequency of 
the increment of the buyers’ valuation in those groups has affected the success rate. 
When the buyers’ valuation increases more frequently over time, such as in the LI 
group, delay will be invoked more frequently and continuously until a stable 
valuation is reached; thus prolonging the delaying time. However, when the buyers’ 
valuation increases less frequently, such as in the HI group, only very few delays will 
be invoked. Conclusively, HI is more stable in terms of the success rate; thus a 
moderate horizon (d ≤ 6) could be applied without increasing the risk of breakdown 
(less than 10% reduction of success rate).  
• A fast reduction of success rate appears in the LI group when a delay is adopted, i.e. 
from 92.5% for d = 0, to 57.9% for d = 1, as shown in Figure 5-8(e). This 
phenomenon is accompanied by a drop of the total surplus (a decrease from 
approximately 507000 to 444000 cu. in the left-most data in Figure 5-8(f)). However, 
the average surplus is steadily increasing until d = 12, where it exceeds the estimation 
of maximum surplus. 
• The total surplus is increasing when d is less than or equal to 7 and 3 in HI and MI 
respectively; but it is decreasing over d in the LI group (Figure 5-8(f)). The increases 
of total surplus in HI and MI groups justify our hypothesis that the society may 
benefit from adopting strategic delay when the buyers’ valuations are increasing and 
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the sellers’ valuations are constant. This result provides counter evidence to the 
common belief that a delay in negotiation deteriorates social welfare in terms of total 
surplus (joint utility) in the presence of a time deadline (shorter sellers’ time deadline).  
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Figure 5-9. The experimental results of HI (a and b), MI (c and d), and LI (e and f) when 
the sellers’ time deadline is the same as that of the buyer (the 30th round) 
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From our experimental results, delay deteriorates social welfare only when d is 
high or when the buyer’s valuation is increasing more frequently (LI group). Note here 
that lower social welfare occurs because the sellers have a shorter time deadline. If the 
sellers’ time deadlines are equal to those of the buyers’, then the cost can be avoided. 
Figure 5-9 shows partial experimental results for the case when the sellers’ time deadline 
is equal to the buyers’ (at the 30th round). It is shown that the total surplus is always 
increasing and the success rate is always 100%, because by the end of the negotiation the 
buyers’ valuation is always exceeding the sellers’, thus always resulting in a transaction. 
From this partial result, the LI group benefits most from adopting delay, a jump of 
percentage and total surplus when d increases from 0 to 1. However, from the general 
results (Figure 5-8), we conclude that a longer delay could be applied when the frequency 
of increment is low (HI group). 
Another interesting setting is to study the worst-case scenario in which the sellers 
are facing the shortest time deadline. Figure 5-10 shows the experimental results. 
An interesting anomaly is observed in the HI group, where the total surplus is not 
monotonically decreasing after a delay is adopted (see Figure 5-10 (b) when d = 0 to 5). 
This anomaly originates from the increasing speed of the breakdown rate that is 
systematically caused by the buyers’ valuation. Figure 5-11 shows (a) the absolute 
success rate and (b) three buyer’s valuations that cause the drop of success rate at d = 1, 2, 
and 3. From Figure 5-11(a) we observe that a fast drop of success rate occurs when d 
increases from 0 to 1 and from 2 to 3. These drops explain the decreasing of total surplus 
when d is 1 and 3 (Figure 5-10(b)).  
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Figure 5-10. The experimental results of HI (a and b), MI (c and d), and LI (e and f) when 
the sellers’ time deadline is the shortest one (the 21th round) 
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Figure 5-11. (a) The absolute success rate in HI group for the shortest sellers’ deadline 
and (b) the buyers’ valuations that caused the decreasing of success rate at d = 1, 2, and 3. 
But where does the drop of success rate come from? Recall here that the seller’s 
deadline is at t = 21, or it will accept any buyer’s offer at t = 20 as long as it is greater 
than or equal to 100 cu. In other words, a delay by the buyer at t = 20 may cause a 
breakdown because the delay also delays its offer reaching 100 cu. Thus, the buyers’ 
valuation around t = 20 will determine whether a breakdown occurs or not. From Figure 
5-11 (b), the buyers with valuation B1 will delay their offer at t = 20 when d = 1, 2, or 3; 
similarly, buyers with B2 will delay their offer at t = 20 when d = 2 or 3, and buyers with 
B3 will delay their offer at t = 20 when d = 3. Or, B1, B2, and B3 will cause some 
breakdowns for d = 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Since the magnitude of B2 is only 20 cu. 
(see Figure 5-11(b)), the loss caused by it, in terms of total surplus, is not as severe as 
those from B1 and B3; therefore, the decreasing of total surplus happened when d is 1 
and 3 only.  
Nevertheless, there is only one case where the total surplus exceeds the surplus 
without delay (d = 0), that is at d = 5 (62000 cu.) (in Figure 5-11 (b)) which is not much 
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higher than that in d = 0 (57620 cu.). And this is the only case for all conditions shown in 
Figure 5-10 (b), (d), and (f). Therefore, we may conclude that delay is generally not 
helpful, in terms of increasing the total surplus, when the seller’s deadline is much shorter 
than that of the buyer’s. 
Since sellers may use either the time-dependent strategy or tit-for-tat, we also 
would like to know the impacts of those different responses toward buyers’ delay. When 
a buyer delays its decision, it is reasonable for the seller to wait until the buyer has made 
its decision. So, tit-for-tat can be seen either as a retaliation by the seller or a norm in 
bilateral negotiation. Sometimes, it may also happen that the seller steadily changes its 
offers, even when the buyer has delayed its decision: especially when the seller is eager 
to sell the item. Thus, both the time-dependent strategy and tit-for-tat become our focus 
here. Figure 5-12 and 5-13 show the total and average surplus, respectively, when the 
sellers use either time-dependent or tit-for-tat, respectively.  
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(a)    (b)    (c) 
Figure 5-12. The total surplus for various d (x-axis) in (a) HI, (b) MI, and (c) LI groups 
for both time-dependent and tit-for-tat groups 
It is shown here that higher total and average surpluses are observed in the tit-for-
tat group. This phenomenon is not surprising because a longer delay will be generated in 
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the tit-for-tat group due to the delay by the sellers when the buyers delayed the 
negotiation. The peaks of social welfare in the HI group are at d = 8 (time-dependent) and 
d = 7 (tit-for-tat), and are the same at d = 3 in MI the group (Figure 5-12 (a) and (b)). 
This result shows that the pattern of social welfare depends on the horizon of delay, not 
on the sellers’ strategy. However, this conclusion and also all previous conclusions are 
only applied in our experimental setting. They may not be generalized into other 
situations, such as when the sellers use tat-for-tit or other time-dependent strategies (e.g. 
Conceder or Boulware strategies), etc. 
10
20
30
40
50
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
time-dependent
tit4tat
 
10
20
30
40
50
0 2 4 6 8 10 12  
10
20
30
40
50
0 2 4 6 8 10 12  
(a)    (b)    (c) 
Figure 5-13. The average surplus in (a) HI, (b) MI, and (c) LI groups 
5.3.4 Summary 
So far, we have shown through simulations the benefit of strategic delay, 
especially in terms of total and percentage surplus. This result complements our 
theoretical analysis in Chapter 4 that strategic delay may be beneficial from an agent’s 
individual perspective. 
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5.4 Empirical Study of Ignorance-based ABN 
The purpose of this empirical study is to analyze the benefit of the ignorance- and 
argumentation-based negotiation protocol. In Chapter 4 we have shown the benefit of 
strategic ignorance from an individual agent’s perspective. In this section we will show 
the benefit of allowing strategic ignorance from the agent society’s perspective. 
Specifically, we compare social welfare under ignorance-based and non-ignorance-based 
ABN protocols. We assume that agents under a non-ignorance-based protocol will always 
argue on each topic/issue, while agents under an ignorance-based protocol may ignore a 
topic if they believe that arguing is costly. Since the agents’ beliefs may deviate from 
reality, i.e. a deemed beneficial topic may be costly and a deemed costly topic may 
actually be beneficial, we will also simulate the deviation of the agents’ beliefs. In 
addition, ignorance may also cause distrust among agents or generate a side-cost, which 
will also be simulated by cost-bearing ignorance.  
 5.4.1 Experimental Design 
We assume agents have 20 different topics and each agent has their own 
estimated surplus (benefit/cost) from discussing each topic. We randomly generate the 
estimated surplus between -1 cu. and 1 cu., where the value within [-1, 0] cu. represents 
the cost of argumentation and within (0, 1] cu. the benefit of argumentation. We use 
either uniform or normal probability distribution functions to generate those values. The 
actual values are generated by randomly deviating the estimated values so that each value 
can deviate by up to ±b cu., where b (bias) is a control variable with discrete value = {0 
cu., 0.01 cu., 0.02 cu., …, 2.00 cu.}. The bias b is also generated randomly by using 
either a uniform or a normal distribution function, but is always consistent with the 
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distribution function in generating the estimated surplus. In both cases the uniform 
distribution function is within the range [-1, 1] cu., while the normal distribution 
function’s mean value equals to 0 cu. and its standard deviation equals to 0.5 cu 
respectively. However, we restrict agents’ surplus within a range [-1, 1] cu.; thus, if an 
out-of-range value was generated from a normal-distribution random generator, we will 
randomly generate it once again. If the second generated value is still out-of-range, then 
we replace it with the boundary value -1 cu. (if the secondly generated value is less than -
1) or 1 cu. (if the second generated value is greater than 1).  
Under the non-ignorance protocol, we assume both agents will argue on all topics; 
thus, the social welfare is calculated by adding actual surplus after discussing all topics. 
We divide the ignorance-based protocol into two groups: proactive-ignorance and full-
ignorance (both proactive and reactive). In the proactive-ignorance case we assume 
argumentation over a topic will be performed if the topic is beneficial for either side; thus, 
we exclude topics that generate negative surplus for both sides. Conversely, in the full-
ignorance case, only mutually beneficial topics will be discussed by the agents; thus, we 
sum the surplus of topics that are estimated as beneficial topics by both.  
The cost of ignorance is deducted from the agents’ surplus. It is intended to 
simulate the side-cost from ignorance, such as distrust, penalty, etc. We varied the cost 
from 0 cu. (cost-free) to 2 cu. to study its effect. This factor becomes the second major 
control variable in our experiment. Finally, we also varied the mean value of the uniform 
distribution function to study its effect toward the social welfare; thus, the ranges of 
uniform distribution varied from [-1, 1] cu. to [0, 1] cu. The latter is to simulate the 
situation where agents are very optimistic or they believe that no cost will be generated 
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from the argumentation. The variation of this mean value is the last control variable in 
our experiment. 
In total, we use 2 different random generators, 200 different costs of ignorance, 
200 different agents’ bias b, and 200 different ranges of uniform distribution functions. 
And we repeat each setting with 10 different random values for statistical analysis 
purposes. But we do not test all combinations of those factors. Instead, we sub-divide 
them into 20 groups of experiment and run 2000 trials for each group. So this leads to 
40000 trials, overall. These groups can be categorized into the following four parts: 
- Part 1: study the effect of bias b in each of the protocol (non-ignorance, proactive-
ignorance and full-ignorance), where both the estimated surplus and bias are 
generated from uniform-distribution random generator. We run 3 groups of 
experiments in this part, i.e. {non-ignorance, proactive-ignorance, and full-ignorance}. 
- Part 2: the same as those in Part 1, except that both the estimated surplus and bias are 
generated form normal-distribution random generator. We also run 3 groups of 
experiments in this part. 
- Part 3: study the effect of the cost of ignorance under a full-ignorance protocol for 
both uniform- and normal-distribution random generator. Here, the bias b is restricted 
to {0, 2} only. Thus, we run 4 groups of experiments in this part, i.e. {(uniform-
distribution; b = 0), (normal-distribution; b = 0), (uniform-distribution; b = 2), 
(normal-distribution; b = 2)}. 
- Part 4: study various mean values (μ) in normal-distribution random generator. It 
includes all three protocols and four different biases (b = 0, 0.5, 1, and 2). We assume 
zero cost and run 10 groups of experiments in this part: all combination of three 
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protocols for various biases except for the proactive-ignorance protocol for b = {0, 2} 
only.  
5.4.2 Evaluation Criteria 
Since we are only concerned with the overall social welfare, the total actual 
surplus is our important measure. We assume that the ignorance does not affect the 
success rate, but incurs some costs. 
5.4.3 Results 
Figure 5-14 shows the results of our experiment for various values of bias b (x-
axis) with respect to the total surplus (y-axis) when we use the uniform distribution 
function to generate the surplus (Part 1 of our experiment). 
 It is shown in Figure 5-14 (a) that the average of total surplus in non-ignorance-
based ABN is approximately zero regardless of the bias of agents’ estimation, as shown 
by a very small slope parameter of the linear regression function (= 0.0772). This result is 
not surprising because all agents are forced to discuss all topics no matter whether they 
incur cost or benefit, which, in aggregate, will cancel out each other (the average surplus 
is zero). Conversely, Figure 5-14 (b) and (c) show that the average of total surplus is 
decreasing over b, as shown by a negative slope parameter (-2.9994 and -1.3348, 
respectively) of the linear-regression function. A positive average total surplus is 
observed at b = 0, because strategic ignorance is used to filter out those topics that 
generate negative surplus, thus leaving a positive surplus in the summation of the total 
surplus. The negative slope can be explained as follows: an increasing of bias causes a 
higher estimation error, which more severely deteriorates the filtering by ignorance; thus, 
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more topics picked by agents are actually generating costs which reduce the average total 
surplus.  
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Figure 5-14. The total surplus (y-axis) in (a) non-ignorance, (b) proactive-ignorance, and 
(c) full-ignorance-based ABN (cost-free) against various biases in predicting the real 
surplus (x-axis) under the uniform-distribution random generator 
If we compare Figure 5-14(b) and (c), then higher total surplus is observed in 
Figure 5-14(c), which means that allowing full-ignorance is better than only allowing 
proactive-ignorance. However, in all cases the R-square values are low, indicating that 
those linear-regression functions cannot predict the stochastic outcomes (total surplus) 
given a bias b. The results from normal-distribution random generators are different from 
those from the uniform-distribution random generator, as no significant difference is 
observed from proactive and full-ignorance cases in the normal-distribution-random-
generator group (Part 2 of our experiments), as shown in Figure 5-15 (b) and (c). 
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Since the normal-distribution random generator uses a lower standard deviation 
(= 0.5) compared with the uniform-distribution random generator (= 0.58), we expect less 
estimation error from the former. This explains the flatter negative slopes, i.e. -1.1337 
and -1.0513 in Figure 5-15(b) and (c), compared with the slopes in the uniform-
distribution generator, i.e. -2.9994 and -1.3348 in Figure 5-14 (b) and (c), respectively. In 
conclusion, a higher uncertainty or error in estimating the surplus from the argumentative 
topics causes a lower expected social welfare (total surplus). 
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Figure 5-15. The total surplus (y-axis) in (a) non-ignorance, (b) proactive-ignorance, and 
(c) full-ignorance-based ABN (cost-free) against various biases in predicting the real 
surplus (x-axis) under the normal-distribution random generator  
 Next, we want to see the effect of various costs on full-ignorance cases (Part 3 of 
our experiments). Figure 5-16 shows the simulation results with various costs (x-axis) for 
both random generators and for b = 0 and 2. 
b
b
b
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Since the cost of ignorance reduces the total surplus, we expect a lower social 
welfare as the cost increases. Figure 5-16 conforms to this rationale as shown by 
decreasing linear-regression trends in all cases. At a certain cut-off, a negative social 
welfare will be generated, where the cut-off is lower in the right-side diagrams (Figure 5-
16 (b) and (d)) compared with their left-side counterparts, and also lower in bottom-side 
diagrams compared with their upper-side counterparts. These results come from the 
uncertainty factor or bias in estimating surplus (higher bias in the right-side diagrams, 
and higher standard deviation in the bottom two diagrams).  
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Figure 5-16. The total surplus (y-axis) under the uniform-distribution random generator 
(a and b) and normal-distribution random generator (c and d) against various costs of 
ignorance (x-axis), where the bias is 0 (a and c) or 2 (b and d) 
The above results support the usage of responsive-ignorance, especially when 
both the cost of ignorance and the uncertainty of the estimated surplus are reasonably low. 
cost cost
cost
cost
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However, that conclusion is applied when the mean value of surplus is zero. What if the 
mean value is not zero? Figure 5-17 shows the result after we alter the uniform-
distribution random generator so that the distribution range of surplus varies from [-1, 1] 
to [0, 1], with mean values changing from 0 to 0.5, respectively (x-axis of Figure 5-17), 
and with zero cost (Part 4 of our experiments). 
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Figure 5-17. The total surplus (y-axis) against various mean values (μ) of the uniform-
distribution random generator (x-axis), for bias b = 0 and for (a) non-ignorance, (b) 
proactive-ignorance, and (c) full-ignorance-based protocols 
It is shown in Figure 5-17 (b) and (c) that both proactive and full ignorance help 
agents attain higher social welfare compared to non-ignorance when the mean values are 
low (< 0.15). The superiority of the ignorance-based protocol increases when the bias 
increases (see Figure 5-18). The intersections of quadratic equations (full-ignorance) and 
μ
μ μ
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linear equations (non-ignorance) shift further to 0.2 as the bias increases (orderly from (a) 
to (d)). It is conclusive, therefore, that the full-ignorance-based protocol is more likely to 
outperform the non-ignorance-based one when the bias is larger.  
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Figure 5-18. The total surplus (y-axis) against various mean values (μ) of the uniform-
distribution random generator (x-axis), for bias equal to (a) 0, (b) 0.5, (c) 1.0 and (d) 2.0, 
and under both non-ignorance and full-ignorance protocols 
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Figure 5-19. The total surplus (y-axis) against various mean values (μ) of the uniform-
distribution random generator (x-axis), for bias equal to (a) 0 and (b) 2.0, under both 
proactive-ignorance and full-ignorance protocols 
A more interesting result is shown in Figure 5-19 when we compare proactive and 
full ignorance for various mean values. From both Figure 5-19 (a) and (b) we conclude 
that proactive ignorance (shown by upper quadratic equations) outperforms full ignorance 
(shown by lower quadratic equations) when we change the range of the random generator. 
This result can be explained from the calculation of total surplus. Under the full-
ignorance case, we only add surpluses that are considered positively by both agents 
(both-win), while in proactive-ignorance we also add surpluses that are considered 
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positively by a single agent only (single-win). Therefore, in addition to both-win topics as 
in the full-ignorance case, some single-win topics will also be argued in the proactive-
ignorance case. Since the mean values are increasing, the benefit gained by the agent in 
single-win topics may supersede the cost incurred from its opponent. Thus, in aggregate, 
a positive marginal surplus will be generated, which causes the total surplus of the 
proactive-ignorance case to be higher than that of the full-ignorance case. 
5.4.4 Summary 
 We have shown through simulation the benefit of full and proactive ignorance in 
terms of total surplus. Specifically, they will be beneficial if the cost of ignorance is 
relatively low, the bias is also reasonably low, and the cost of argumentation is relatively 
high (low mean value). 
This result complements our theoretical analysis in Chapter 4 that strategic 
ignorance may be beneficial from an agent’s perspective.  
5.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter is concerned with empirical studies of modified protocols, i.e. 
allowing non-monotonic offers, strategic delay, and strategic ignorance in argumentation-
based negotiation. The results have proven the benefit of these modified protocols under 
various settings. In Chapter 4 we have shown the benefit of the modifications by means 
of theoretical analysis from agents’ perspective. In this chapter we demonstrate their 
benefits and drawbacks in term of social welfare and success rate, which complement the 
results drawn in Chapter 4. 
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For example, it is difficult to conclude from the theoretical analysis whether or 
not the society will really benefit from allowing non-monotonic offers, delaying the 
negotiation or ignoring arguments from others. The primary reason is due to the large 
combinations of (irrational) strategies in a negotiation and many uncertain factors 
affecting agent decisions.  
From theoretical analysis we have proved that agents tend to prefer a non-
monotonic-offers bargaining protocol to monotonic-offers bargaining one; however, we 
do not know if allowing non monotonic offers bargaining protocols will be able to 
increase the social welfare of both agents. In order to understand it, experimental studies 
were carried out. We find out that allowing non-monotonic offers can increase both the 
success rate and total surplus of the negotiation. Similarly, allowing a relatively short 
delay can increase the total surplus and slightly reduce the success rate. Furthermore, 
allowing ignorance in argumentation-based negotiation can be useful for both parties, 
especially when they can accurately predict the benefit from the ignorance.  All of these 
are hard to be derived from theoretical analysis. 
 
201 
CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION 
 
In this concluding chapter we further discuss the implications of our findings, 
some possible weaknesses of our approach, and some suggested solutions or policies to 
improve the protocols. First, we will discuss each modified protocol separately, including 
some problems that may arise in the implementation of those protocols and possible 
solutions to those problems. Then, we will discuss the limitations and boundaries of our 
approach.  
6.1 Non-monotonic-offers Protocol 
As mentioned earlier, alternative solutions for an agent who has diminishing 
valuation include re-opening negotiation with the same opponent or starting a new one 
every time the agent gets stuck in its valuation. This situation is not analyzed and 
simulated in our experiment for the following reasons: 
1. Intuitively, if two agents have met before, then they may restart their initial offers on 
the same item closer than if they do not know each other in the first place, which 
may speed up the convergence to the concession, as shown in Figure 6-1 (where the 
seller always restarts a bargaining by offering its last offer in the previous session). 
However, there are several weaknesses with the restarting mechanism, among them: 
 202
- There are some extra costs to restarting the bargaining, in terms of delay 
(illustrated by several gaps during the bargaining in Figure 6-1). A long delay 
may cause a failure. Or even if an agreement is reached, the total surplus may be 
lower than that from an early agreement. 
- If the market server is involved in the process of restarting the bargaining, then 
restarting will incur an overhead to the server, which may charge a fee for each 
match-making between a buyer and a seller. 
 
Figure 6-1 An illustration of the cost from restarting a bargaining session under the 
monotonic-offers bargaining protocol 
2. If two agents can repeat their bargaining without friction in the monotonic-offers 
protocol, then the efficiency (in terms of expected gain and success rate) gained by 
them is at most as high as the efficiency gained in the non-monotonic-offers 
protocol, which becomes the upper bound of the efficiency of the monotonic-offers 
Seller’s valuation 
Buyer’s valuation 
time 
price 
Seller’s initial offers after restarting bargaining may equal to 
its last offers in its previous bargaining session 
Buyer’s offers in three bargaining sessions using 
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protocol. Thus, allowing a restarting mechanism in the monotonic-offers protocol 
cannot be better than allowing non-monotonic offers in the non-monotonic-offers 
protocol. 
Another issue in the empirical analysis is the coverage of the study. From our 
simulation in non-monotonic-offers protocol, agents who use a simple bargaining 
strategy, such as random strategy or tit-for-tat, can gain higher efficiency (in terms of 
success rate and surplus) compared to agents in the monotonic-offers protocol. This 
suggests that the non-monotonic-offers protocol may work better than the monotonic-
offers protocol for many classes of agents, including those able to maximize expected 
gain, as shown in Chapter 4. However, it does not mean that non-monotonic-offers 
protocols are resilient to any manipulative strategies. Indeed, this is the weakness of the 
simulation approach in general. For example, our simulation results may not be true if we 
have the following agents in the bargaining. 
• Misinformed agents, who cannot accept a non-monotonic offer, and therefore retreat 
from the bargaining immediately;  
• Nasty agents, who use non-monotonic offers to threaten their opponents, arbitrarily 
increase or decrease their offers, or mislead their opponents.  
Nasty agents’ behaviors can be avoided by imposing a restriction on the number 
of monotonic-offers sequences in a negotiation session. For example, the protocol may 
only allow three monotonic-offers sequences. Suppose the buyer starts the negotiation by 
increasing its offers sequentially until a certain price level, and then reduces its offers 
sequentially until another price level. By this restriction, now the buyer can only have an 
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opportunity to increase its offers sequentially until an agreement or breakdown is reached. 
Imposing this restriction will restrict fluctuated offers by nasty agents. 
In the case of misinformed agents, these agents may perceive a non-monotonic 
offer as a sign of the lack of seriousness of their opponent, or an indication of prolonged 
bargaining, or a higher likelihood of breakdown. Thus, they will retreat from the 
bargaining, and try to find a new opponent. This situation cannot be avoided unless they 
can self-identify themselves as agents who cannot accept a non-monotonic offer. Early 
announcement about the possibility of non-monotonic offers by their opponents may help 
to avoid misinformation. However, nothing can be done if the agents are ported with a 
program to deny any non-monotonic offers. 
In conclusion, allowing a non-monotonic-offers bargaining strategy is useful 
when agents have a decreasing surplus over time --- either a decreasing valuation for the 
buyer or an increasing one for the seller, or both. Empirical results have shown the 
benefit of that strategy in the absence of the agents’ ability to maximize their expected 
utility. Therefore, an alternating-offer bargaining protocol should not restrict agents from 
non-monotonically changing their offers when their valuation is discounted over time.  
6.2 Delay-based Bargaining Protocol 
Allowing strategic delay during the negotiation is useful when agents gain 
positive utility during the delay, either in terms of direct utility (e.g. a higher surplus) or 
indirect utility (e.g. more certain bargaining information). The empirical study of the 
former setting (i.e. increasing of the buyer’s valuation) has proven the benefit of this 
strategy in terms of total surpluses.  
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According to several examples that we have pointed out in section 4.2.2, we 
believe that allowing strategic delay is very important in attracting agents’ participation 
in a bargaining-based market, especially in e-commerce or service-oriented markets. A 
delayed-based protocol is also important when agents are not deployed in a fully 
autonomous mode, e.g. agents need to report the possible outcomes to their owner for 
final approval (e.g. the last acceptable offer by its opponent) or seek help in the middle of 
the negotiation (e.g. tuning some parameters or changing their strategy). In such cases, a 
delay-based protocol is a must in maintaining the continuity of the negotiation.  
Given this benefit, we suggest a modification in the standard bargaining protocol, 
such that agents are allowed to delay their negotiation, either by sticking to their previous 
offer or by sending a waiting signal. Note here that in the current standard negotiation 
protocol, a long waiting time for a response in a multi-agent system platform may be 
considered as network congestion or a connection failure, thus resulting in a breakdown 
usually enforced by the system manager rather than the seller.  
To differentiate a strategic delay and a connection failure, we suggest that a 
message of delay be added to the agent communication language. Given this modification, 
the only shortcoming of allowing delay is the communication cost during the delay. This 
may not be a problem when the delay is within minutes, or when the communication cost 
is low. Intuitively, we may let the agent, who initiates a strategic delay, to disconnect the 
bargaining session and reconnect it later by recalling its opponent. However, agents may 
suffer from a commitment problem --- an opponent may not be willing to go back to the 
negotiation with its previous proposal after a recall. To remedy the problem, the 
following actions can be taken by agents who initiate a delay. 
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1. Enforcing an intermediate contract before the delay --- This action is used to ensure 
that their opponent will come back to the negotiation according to the intermediate 
contract (e.g. start from the last proposal). 
2. Contacting the opponent repetitively during the delay --- This is used to ensure the 
existence/readiness of their opponent during the delay, and to update any relevant 
information (e.g. the item is still unsold). 
3. Rewarding a commitment by the opponent --- Agents can provide an incentive to 
their opponent to come back to the negotiation (e.g. by a higher rating in reputation 
system or monetary reward). 
Certainly, the above actions may incur cost; thus, they are useful only if the 
incurred cost is less than the cost of maintaining the connection during the delay.  
Other policies may be imposed by the protocol in order to maintain the robustness 
of the system from malicious agents and to increase the participation of those who do not 
like to wait, for example, restricting the bargaining session within a limited time to avoid 
unnecessary long delays, disallowing a frequent delay in order to avoid frustration of 
those who do not want to wait, forbidding agents who have used excessive delay in the 
past, etc.  
In conclusion, allowing delay in bargaining may be useful when agents have an 
increasing expected surplus over time and the deadline is long enough so that the delay 
will not jeopardize the negotiation (causing a breakdown). Empirical results have also 
shown the benefit of strategic delay in the absence of the agents’ ability to maximize their 
expected utility. Therefore, the bargaining protocol should incorporate a waiting message 
in order to facilitate strategic delay.  
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6.3 Ignorance-based ABN Protocol 
Allowing strategic ignorance in argumentation-based negotiations (ABNs), could 
increase the aggregate surplus when the cost of ignoring expensive arguments is low. As 
stated previously in section 4.3.1, allowing ignorance in ABNs is also part of the effort in 
designing a robust open system, especially when agents do not have a common ontology 
and reasoning. But from the agents’ perspective, this can be strategically used to avoid 
costly argumentation, which could be beneficial for both agents.  
If the direct cost of argumentation is high, such as incurring a high waiting cost or 
risk of breakdown, then agents may prefer an ignorance-based ABN protocol that allows 
them to strategically ignore argumentation. If there is no direct cost of argumentation, 
then they may also prefer the ignorance-based ABN protocol for allowing them to avoid 
the opportunity cost of argumentation. However, if there is no opportunity cost of 
argumentation and the direct cost of argumentation is low, then they will prefer an ABN 
protocol that forbids the use of strategic ignorance. Therefore, a conflict of interest will 
appear when two parties have different attitudes toward strategic ignorance (low-cost 
versus high-cost agents). This conflict may reduce the efficiency of ABN in terms of the 
rate of success and waiting cost in making a transaction, because the risk of breakdown 
will increase due to the unacceptability of responsive ignorance by the low cost agent. 
We propose several methods to resolve this issue. 
First, we can use a matchmaker to select agents such that both parties have the 
same attitude toward ignorance (both are low-cost or high-cost agents). Therefore, we can 
avoid situations where only one prefers to use ignorance in ABN. Since agents can assess 
the cost of argumentation, there is no incentive for them to lie about their preference 
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whether allowing ignorance or not. Suppose a buyer is low-cost but lies to the 
matchmaker that it is a high-cost buyer, so the matchmaker assigns it with a high-cost 
seller which will use the ignorance-based ABN protocol. But the buyer will not utilize 
strategic ignorance (because argumentation does not cost it much) and will be worse off 
from the strategic ignorance used by the seller (because the ignorance deteriorates the 
persuasion of the buyer). Thus, a low-cost agent prefers a non-ignorance-based ABN 
protocol and will not lie about its preference. 
On the other hand, if the high-cost buyer pretends to be a low-cost one, it will 
meet a low-cost seller and they will use a non-ignorance-based ABN protocol. Then the 
buyer cannot use strategic ignorance because it is restricted by the protocol or 
alternatively, can displease the seller so that it causes a breakdown, and thus is worse off 
from pretending as a low-cost buyer. In other words, agents will tell their type truthfully. 
This method can work well if there are many similar agents who want to negotiate at the 
same time. Otherwise, agents may miss opportunities while waiting for a similar type of 
opponent. 
Second, we may allow both parties to set the number of ignorance arguments that 
they may use during the ABN. If the number of ignorance arguments used by either party 
is over this limit, then the negotiation will be terminated automatically. Since both parties 
are rational, they will use responsive ignorance more carefully for a necessary situation 
only. However, the overhead incurred by the setting of this limit may reduce the 
efficiency of the negotiation itself, because agents may need to negotiate this limit (first 
stage) before the real negotiation over the item (second stage). Therefore, this method 
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may only work if we can have an efficient (fast) first-stage negotiation and agents can 
incorporate/reason according to the limit in using responsive ignorance. 
Third, we could set a limit on the total number of responsive ignorance arguments 
by both parties during the negotiation. If the total number of responsive ignorance 
arguments used by both parties is over this limit, then the negotiation will be terminated. 
This method will also restrict the abuse of responsive ignorance, and it does not have the 
overhead of the first stage negotiation. However, it may cause unnecessary termination, 
especially when there is a big discrepancy between agent ontologies or knowledge bases. 
For example, when one party cannot understand most arguments used by the other, 
repetitive non-strategic ignorance will cause a premature termination of the negotiation. 
Thus, the limit must be chosen very carefully, because it will be used for all agents in the 
system. 
Fourth, we may impose a penalty for both parties when either of them uses 
responsive ignorance; for example, by paying a certain amount of ‘money’. Since the 
penalty is per a responsive ignorance argument, it will suppress both parties in using 
complex or unnecessary arguments which may prolong the argumentation. However, this 
method may not be supported by the agent owner, unless the penalty is reasonable and 
both agents have common and synchronized ontologies, knowledge, and reasoning 
engines. 
Fifth, we may adopt a reputation mechanism to record the amount of responsive 
ignorance arguments used by an agent and also the trust given by others toward the agent. 
Therefore, agents can assess and predict the argumentation capability and also the 
reputation of others. For an effective result, this mechanism needs agents to have the 
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capability to evaluate each other and report truthfully their trust toward other agents. 
Moreover, the reliability of the system can only be gained after many participants have 
used the system. 
In a simple-yet-crowded ABN system, such as when the amount of possible 
arguments is very limited and there are plenty of agents with various attitudes toward 
ignorance, the system may not need any method to restrict the usage of ignorance 
argumentation and could leave agents to adjust their beliefs and trust by themselves, 
because the conflict of agent attitude toward ignorance will not seriously affect the 
efficiency of the negotiation. For example, if a buyer finds that the seller is the opposite 
of its type, then it may walkout and find another seller. However, when the 
argumentation is very complex and the number of participants is very few, then it is more 
likely that agents will use responsive ignorance more frequently which will reduce the 
overall efficiency of the negotiation; therefore, we need to adopt any combination of the 
aforementioned methods according to the nature of the negotiation and users. The 
analysis of the effectiveness of those methods is beyond the scope of this thesis, and 
should be studied more thoroughly in the future. 
6.4 Theoretical Analysis: What We Have Learned? 
The theoretical analysis in Chapter 4 is based on a decision-theoretic approach, in 
the sense of neglecting the interaction among agents in deciding a move by an agent. The 
moves of other agents are seen as probability values not as the result of motivated action 
by these agents. Therefore, a proponent has no incentive to influence its opponent’s move. 
In fact, we assume that the proponent may not know the type of its opponent, who might 
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be an irrational agent. The proponent’s moves, then, are guided by its belief about the 
states of the world (pt, qt, EG’t+1, etc.). This approach is more realistic in open MAS, 
where very limited information can be sensed by an agent prior to its interaction. 
One of the critical issues in the real implementation is the assignment of those 
prior (initial) beliefs. However, it is not our focus, because our theoretical framework can 
be seen as an abstraction beyond other particular reasoning model. For instance, an agent 
may use a Bayesian net to generate pt, qt, or even EGt. Reinforcement learning or 
Bayesian update or something else may be used to update those beliefs. It is at the 
discretion of the agent’s owner or designer to adjust or assign its prior beliefs. The crucial 
thing in our analysis is that we can use our simple framework to analyze the benefits of 
using the proposed protocols. As long as the agent gains benefit from the protocol, it will 
use the system, which eventually increases the participation rate. However increasing the 
participation rate is also not our terminal goal. Our main interest is to evaluate the benefit 
of the proposed protocols in terms of social welfare, as described in Chapter 5. 
Nevertheless, the decision-theoretic approach in this thesis can be seen as an 
alternative to complement the traditional game-theoretic approach, especially in an ill-
informed environment or when the bargaining cannot be iterated too many times (that is, 
no effective learning mechanism can be used to infer the opponent’s type). 
6.5 Limitations of the Current Work 
Both our theoretical and empirical studies are restricted to the models described in 
Chapter 3, 4 and 5. Certainly, the situations and conditions considered in these chapters 
are not exhaustive. We believe there are many more situations in which agents may 
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submit non-monotonic offers, use strategic delay, and deploy ignorance-based 
argumentation. Definitely, there are many research issues about further uses of those 
strategies that remain unexplored here. Specifically, the following high-level problems 
have limited our analyses (the responses in italics are given below each): 
1. Many other behavior-based strategies can be adopted by agents, including irrational 
strategies, and these have not been tested empirically in our model. 
Response: Exhaustive testing is not possible. Our empirical studies have adopted 
common human strategies, which is the first step in understanding agents’ bargaining 
behavior under the proposed protocols. 
2. Our current model and experiment does not include qualitative negotiation. 
Response: Indeed, our model does not include qualitative negotiation. Many methods 
can be used to quantify the qualitative properties of an item, e.g. fuzzy quantification 
[Barro et al., 2003]. If by quantification we can map the qualitative properties into 
agents’ valuation, then our model can still be applied. However, if this cannot be 
done, our model may serve as the abstraction of the agent’s meta-reasoning. 
3. Our current model and experiment does not include multiple-issues negotiation, 
which is very common in complex negotiation. 
Response: Study in multiple-issues negotiation is relatively new. Some suggest issue-
by-issue negotiation in solving this problem. If this is the case, then our model can be 
applied. If it requires a simultaneous negotiation, then we may combine the bundle 
into a single value. If this cannot be done, then our model needs a further extension. 
4. The empirical studies are limited to simulation, not a real implementation; hence, the 
actual results are not predictable. 
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Response: This is a common objection to a theory or simulation approach. The non-
monotonic offer protocol is rarely used in human negotiation, but we believe it will be 
used and accepted if both bargainers are informed of the possibility of using it prior 
to the negotiation. Strategic delay is common in human negotiation; thus, we believe 
it has a real application value. In fact, snipping agents in an online auction wait until 
the last minute before submitting their bid, which reflects the value of delay. Strategic 
ignorance is also rarely used in human negotiation. But it is one of the requirements 
of designing a robust open ABN. Therefore, we believe it has a real application value 
too. However, these protocols have not been explored in MAS and have not been 
implemented in the real world (except for a delay-based one), so their benefits are 
still uncertain and need more experimental studies. In this thesis, we analyze them by 
simulation only. However, we have used the most common strategies in our 
simulation. 
At a lower level, limitations of our analysis come from our assumptions and the 
experimental settings. Several of them are discussed here. 
First, the temporal factors (e.g. deadline, delay duration, etc.) may not be 
proportional to the speed of the negotiation. For example, a strategic delay in an e-
commerce negotiation could be as long as hours or days, while the duration between an 
offer and a counter-offer can be as short as several milliseconds. In such a case, 
disconnection between bargainers is very likely to happen; thus, intermediate contracts 
may be used to enforce commitment to a delay. A similar situation can happen for some 
cases in a non-monotonic-offers protocol, i.e. the agents’ valuation could be flat relative 
to the negotiation session, because the valuation may change in the order of hours. Thus, 
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agents are unlikely to meet their weak deadline. Unfortunately, this issue is context-
dependent and can only be fully known in the real application. Certainly, if all valuations 
are flat relative to the negotiation session, then there is no reason to use the non-
monotonic-offers protocol. 
Second, our simulation in the ignorance-based ABN protocol is restricted to only 
two random generators, and the other settings explained in section 5.3.1; thus, the 
conclusions derived from our simulation may not be generalized to a broader setting. For 
example, if agents use a reactive strategy, such as tit-for-tat, then strategic ignorance may 
be used improperly, thus, reducing the benefit of argumentation. So far, we cannot make 
any conjecture on this issue, but plan to address it in the future.  
Third, another drawback of strategic ignorance in argumentation-based 
negotiations may happen if most topics are excessively important for a party, but not at 
all for another party. In this case, allowing strategic ignorance may suppress the 
argumentation on those topics which causes a lower social welfare than would result 
from disallowing the ignorance. This situation is not addressed in our analysis and, again, 
is context-dependent. Nevertheless, we suggest the explicit inclusion of an ignorance 
message in ABN for the sake of the robustness of open ABN and for the benefit 
generated under the settings discussed in our previous chapters. 
Given those limitations, we still need to study many things before a real 
deployment of our proposed protocols. For example, we may add some policies into these 
protocols to avoid irrational behavior, such as restricting the frequency of switching in 
the non-monotonic-offers protocol, limiting the number of responsive ignorance replies 
in the ignorance-based ABN protocol, or other policies that we have suggested previously.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
7.1 Conclusions 
This thesis has shown three important modifications of the traditional alternating-
offers bargaining protocol for automated negotiation in an open system. Both theoretical 
and empirical analyses have shown the benefit of these modifications either from an 
agent’s or society’s perspective under various settings, such as a discounting surplus in 
non-monotonic-offers protocol or an increasing surplus in the delay-based protocol.  
We assume that the system is open, the agents are selfish, and various negotiation 
factors are uncertain. In the theoretical analysis, we assume our agents are bounded 
rational and not aware of their opponent’s type. In the empirical analysis, our agents 
replicate common human strategies. These assumptions are weak in the sense they cover 
a wide variety of agents. Relaxing these assumptions may be one of our future goals, as 
shown in section 7.2. 
The proposed modifications may be combined. For example, a bargaining 
protocol may allow both delay and ignorance, or delay and non-monotonic offers, or all 
of them. However, they may not be resilient to all malicious strategies. To remedy this, 
we have also pointed out some potential problems and proposed several policies to refine 
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the protocols, so that they can prevent malicious strategies from destroying the advantage 
of the protocols. 
In addition to proposing modified protocols, our study has also used decision-
theoretic analysis to prove the benefit of these protocols. The analytical method is a 
complement of the existing game-theoretic method. This, to the best of our knowledge, is 
a method that has not been used in MAS community so far.  
Within research in automated negotiation, this thesis has specifically contributed 
to the mechanism and protocol design to be used in negotiation and also to the 
development of open MAS. Other contributions include a novel decision-theoretic 
analysis of bargaining (Chapter 3 and 4) and an agent simulation (Chapter 5) to provide 
insight on the range of situations for which the modified protocols will be useful.  
7.2 Future Work 
The proposed future work can be derived from the limitations of our analysis. 
Basically, we can classify this future work into (i) more empirical studies, (ii) extension 
to other bargaining models and (iii) implementation in real applications. Several 
important future directions are described below. 
First, we may perform more empirical studies including of various irrational 
strategies. Specifically, we may test various reactive strategies in the simulation of the 
delay-based protocol, and may explore effective policies in filtering out irrational agents 
in the non-monotonic-offers protocol. Testing various policies (described in Chapter 6), 
that deter agents’ irrational behaviors is another reasonable extension. In addition, we 
may also incorporate knowledge about some risks of breakdown in the agents’ reasoning, 
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which can be used to adjust the delay or the concession rate in order to maximize their 
gain from delay. This feedback may tune the agents’ concession rate or delay and thus 
will need to incorporate repetitive bargaining and learning mechanisms. Finally, we may 
extend the negotiation session (longer deadlines) and increase the fluctuation of the 
buyer’s and seller’s valuations in order to study the sensitivity of the proposed protocols, 
especially the non-monotonic-offers and delay-based ones. The goal is to analyze 
situations where the negotiation session is relatively longer than the negotiation time 
and/or the dynamism of the market reflected by highly volatile valuations. 
A second main direction for future work is to extend the theoretical model in 
Chapter 3 and 4. A natural extension is to develop a model that includes qualitative and 
multiple-issues negotiation, for example, by adopting a multi-attribute utility function. 
We may divide this work into (i) incorporating a simple combination of multi-attribute 
utility functions in our proposed protocols, and (ii) studying a qualitative negotiation 
under the theoretical model in Chapter 3 (especially section 3.2 and 3.3). Another 
possibility is to extend our proposed protocols into other negotiation settings, for example, 
by allowing agents in a contract-net protocol to use strategic delay or non-monotonic 
offers in solving task allocation. The effect of those protocols on the overall social 
welfare needs a further study. 
A third direction is to implement the protocols proposed in this thesis and to test 
them against human players. This is crucial before we can have a real system using the 
proposed protocols. The robustness of the protocols in avoiding malicious strategies is 
one of the major concerns in our design. As mentioned previously, human players are 
very creative in finding the weaknesses of a protocol and manipulating the outcomes. The 
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testing of these proposed protocols in a real world domain with human players is one of 
the most important stages before the final deployment. Some possible real world 
applications of these protocols are e-commerce, service-oriented computing, mobile ad-
hoc networks, and game-oriented interactive learning environments.  
It is our hope that the proposed protocols can open up a new direction in 
automated negotiation, and shed light on how they can be applied or integrated to current 
applications. For example, we may use it in a contract-net protocol such that a task will 
be negotiated bilaterally among agents in order to achieve a better allocation. Or, we may 
develop a new e-commerce site which can handle multi-attribute negotiation while 
preserving the high flexibility characteristic for open systems to allow agents to join the 
system at any time. We also believe that our work will stimulate more research in 
exploring better negotiation protocols other than alternating offers bargaining and other 
kinds of traditional human negotiation. 
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APPENDIX  
FORMAL PROOFS 
 
List of Assumptions 
Assumption 1-1. An agent prefers one protocol over others if it believes that the 
protocol is more helpful in attaining the agent’s goal, which could be a highest expected 
utility, a highest success (agreement) rate, or a combination of both. 
Assumption 2-1. The system is open in the sense that  
1. agents may join or leave the system anytime; 
2. agents may be created by different designers and represent different owners; and 
3. bargaining may be done simultaneously and asynchronously among agents.  
Assumption 3-1. Both the buyer and the seller have limited information and 
computational resources, and they are constrained by bargaining attributes and/or 
environmental factors, such as time deadlines, access to other buyers/sellers, etc., and all 
of those aspects are not necessarily symmetric for both of them.  
Assumption 3-2. Both the buyer and the seller are bounded rational and selfish. 
Assumption 3-3. (Zermelo’s Axiom of Choice) Given limited information, limited 
computational resources, a time deadline, and other environmental constraints, both the 
buyer and the seller have totally ordered choices that can be expressed using utility 
functions, and both the buyer and the seller are utility maximizers. 
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Assumption 3-4. An alternating offer protocol is used as the basis of the 
bargaining, where the seller always starts by submitting a proposal/offer at time t = 0, 
and after receiving it the buyer will either accept the seller’s proposal/offer or submit a 
counter proposal/offer at time t = 0 too. After that the virtual clock moves to t = 1 (next 
round) and it is then the seller’s turn to evaluate the buyer’s counteroffer. The process 
continues until a bargaining solution is found (all negotiated issues are solved) or a 
breakdown occurs (either or both parties left the negotiation without a solution).  
Assumption 3-5. Unless otherwise specified, the theoretical analysis in this thesis 
is from the buyer’s perspective and the offers and counteroffers are for the price only, 
which is in a continuous domain. 
Assumption 3-6. A myopic-0 buyer will offer an optimum price xt* that yields the 
highest expected surplus at the present time t, i.e., Maxx [ pt(x) × Surt(x)]. 
Assumption 3-7. A myopic-1 buyer will offer a price xt* that yields the highest 
expected gain of the combination of positive surplus at time t and expected gain at time 
t+1, i.e. Maxx [pt(x) × Surt(x) + γ(1 – pt(x))EG’t+1(x)] subject to Surt(x) > 0. 
Assumption 3-8. Suppose that the buyer knows that the seller is EvalF-I. (i) If the 
buyer’s offer xt is rejected, then the buyer will reduce pt(x) for all x∈Acc and x ≤ xt, 
where a price smaller than xt is reduced faster; thus yielding a steeper function pt+1(x) at 
x ≤ xt. (ii) If the seller concedes such that yt+1 < yt, then the buyer will increase its belief 
such that pt+1(x) = 1 for all x ≥ yt+1, and may also increase pt(x) for x that is slightly 
lower than yt+1. (iii) If the seller’s offer is unchanged or raised to yt+1 > yt, then the buyer 
will decrease all belief of x < yt+1, i.e. pt+1(x) becomes a steeper function. 
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Assumption 3-9. Suppose the buyer knows that the seller is an EvalF-II agent and 
the buyer’s offer xt* is rejected by the seller. Then the buyer will update πt(x) by 
decomposing it into pt(x) and kt(x), and update them separately. pt(x) will be updated 
according to Assumption 3-8, and kt(x) will be  updated according to the following rules:  
(i) If xt* is less than or equal to xt–1*+δ, then kt(x) will be reduced to kt+1(x), 
where the reduction rate depends on the buyer’s belief about the reason for the seller’s 
refusal, either due to the seller’s skepticism or the seller’s high valuation. 
(ii) If xt* is greater than xt–1*+δ, then kt(x) will not be updated. Instead, a new 
kt+1(x) will be generated whose a peak is around xt*.  
Assumption 3-10. There exists n and δ such that if the buyer’s consecutive offers 
xt+1*,…, xt+n* are less than xt*+δ and all are rejected by the seller, then kt+n(x) = 0 and 
πt+n(x) = pt+n(x).  
Assumption 3-11. If the buyer agent does not know the type of the seller, then it 
will assign a probability that the seller is EvalF-I and EvalF-II of κ and 1 – κ, 
respectively; and consider the seller as an EvalF-II seller with k+1(x) = (1 – κ) k+1(x)’, 
where k+1(x)’ is the value if the buyer certainly believes that the seller is EvalF-II.  
Assumption 4-1. qt is an increasing function over time t. 
Assumption 4-2. Bt is a decreasing function over time t. 
Assumption 4-3. EG’t+1(x) is a decreasing function over t and a constant function 
over x, denoted EG’t+1 for convenience. 
Assumption 4-4. (Concurrent bilateral negotiation) A buyer may bargain with a 
set of sellers {S1, S2, …, Sn}, but all bargaining sessions are independent and 
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asynchronous in the sense that the decision by two sellers are independently made (no 
collusion among sellers).  
Assumption 4-5. (Persuasive negotiation) An agent may persuade their opponent 
to accept their offer or to justify their refusal.  
Assumption 4-6. (Uncertain valuation) The buyer’s estimated valuation Bt may 
increase over time, and the real value Br may only be known by the buyer after the item is 
used or received.  
Assumption 4-7. (Uncertain valuation) The buyer’s estimated valuation Bt is not 
fixed over time, and the real value Br may only be known by the buyer after the item is 
used or received.  
Assumption 4-8. Suppose a seller uses argument αS at time t. Then the buyer’s 
belief over αS at time t, denoted by υt(αS), depends on the seller’s reputation and other 
information, such as the truth of the seller’s prior arguments and the truth value of αS 
itself. Similarly, the buyer’s belief of its own argument αB being accepted by the seller at 
time t, denoted by υt(αB), depends on the buyer’s reputation and other information that 
reflects the seller’s belief toward the buyer and the truth value of αB itself. 
Assumption 4-9. Upon receiving a seller’s argument and/or offer y, a buyer may 
update its valuation and belief according to the following heuristics: 
(a) pt(x) will be reduced for all prices less than the buyer’s last offer (inclusive) if the 
seller convinces the buyer that the seller will not accept the buyer’s last offer, 
either by insisting on its previous offer or using arguments. 
(b) pt(x) will be raised for prices close to the seller’s new offer if the seller decreases 
its previous offer. 
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(c) In both heuristic (a) and (b) above, the updating of pt(x) will not affect its 
monotonic property. 
(d) Bt will be increased if new credible information has been received, either directly 
from the seller or from other sources. 
Assumption 4-10. A buyer will always choose the best counter-argument αB that 
can affect the value of pt(x) which may increase EGt(x). 
 
 
 
List of Definitions 
 
Definition 3-1. An acceptable set Acci ⊆ X of agent i is a set such that ∀x ∈ Acci 
we have Suri(x) > 0. In other words, ∀x ∈ Acci ⇒ x ≿i Vi. 
Definition 3-2. A feasible set F ⊆ X is a compact set (closed and bounded) such 
that ∀x ∈ F we have both Surb(x) > 0 and Surs(x) > 0. 
Definition 3-3. A disagreement set is D = X \ F. 
Definition 3-4. Suppose it is the turn of an EvalF-0 buyer at time t. Then it uses 
the following evaluation function in making its decision: 
 Withdraw   iff t > Td 
It  =    Accept yt  iff Surt(yt) > 0 and t ≤ Td  
 Counter offer xt otherwise     (3-1) 
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where It is the buyer’s decision function at time t, Td is the buyer’s time deadline, yt is the 
offer by the seller at time t, xt is the buyer’s offer that will be proposed, Surt(yt) is the 
surplus if yt is accepted by the buyer at time t. 
Definition 3-5. Suppose it is the turn of a EvalF-I buyer at time t. Then it uses the 
following evaluation function in making its decision: 
 Withdraw   iff t > Td or (Surte(xt)  ≤ 0 and Surt(yt) ≤ 0) 
It  =    Accept yt  iff Surt(yt) > 0 and Surt(yt) ≥ Surte(xt) and t ≤ Td  
 Counter offer xt otherwise     (3-2) 
where xt is the buyer’s offer that will be proposed, Surte(xt) is the estimated surplus at 
time t if xt is accepted by the seller in the next bargaining period, i.e. at time t+1. 
Definition 3-6. Suppose it is the turn of an EvalF-II buyer at time t. Then it uses 
the following evaluation function in making its decision: 
 Withdraw  iff t > Td or (Surte(xt) ≤ 0 and Surt(yt) ≤ 0) 
 
It  =    Accept yt iff [Surt(yt) ≥ Surte(xt) ∨ ∧j(Surt(yt) ≥ Surte(yj))] and  
Surt(yt) > 0 and t ≤ Td  
 Counter offer xt otherwise     (3-3) 
where Surte(yj) is the estimated value of Surt(yj) and j ∈ {t+1, t+2, …, Td} are the turns of 
the buyer in the future until its time deadline Td. 
Definition 3-7. EGt(x) ≡ (1 – qt) pt(x) (Bt – x) + qt Bφ   (3-4) 
Where qt∈[0, 1] is the buyer’s belief of the likelihood of negotiation breakdown 
caused by the seller at time t which is independent of x, Bφ is the buyer’s valuation if the 
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negotiation breaks down, and pt(x)∈[0, 1] is the buyer’s belief (subjective probability) 
function that price x will be accepted by the seller (acceptance rate) at time t.  
Maxx EGt(x) = Maxx [ pt(x) (Bt – x)]       (3-5) 
Definition 3-8. EGt(x) ≡ (1–qt) [pt(x)(Bt–x) + γ(1–pt(x))EG’t+1(x)]+qtBφ (3-6) 
where γ ∈ [0, 1] is the weight of the expected gain in the next round t+1, EG’t+1(x) is the 
estimation of the expected gain in the next round which is made by the buyer at the 
current round t, and the rest of parameters are as defined in Definition 3-7. 
Maxx EGt(x) = Maxx [pt(x)(Bt – x) + γ(1 – pt(x))EG’t+1(x)]    (3-7) 
Definition 3-9. πt+1(x) = min(pt+1(x) + kt+1(x), 1).    (3-8) 
Definition 3-10. The estimation of EG’t+1(x) by recursive method is calculated by  
])]())(())(()[[()( φ B q' xEG'xp'γxB'xp'q' MaxxEG' tttttt
x
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          (3-9) 
where all parameters except γ and Bφ must be predicted or calculated iteratively by 
assuming that xt has been rejected, and p’t+1(x) is the buyer’s estimation of its revised 
belief if xt has been rejected. And for a myopic-1 buyer with no payoff from breakdown 
(Bφ =0) the estimation becomes 
)])(()[()( xB'xp'q' MaxxEG' ttt
x
t −−≡ ++++ 1111 1     (3-10) 
 
Definition 4-1. A buyer’s evaluation function is: 
Delay   iff γ [EG’t+1]delay > EGt(xt*) and γ [EG’t+1]delay > EGt(y) 
It  =    Accept  iff EGt(y) ≥ EGt(xt*) and EGt(y) ≥ γ [EG’t+1]delay 
Counter offer  otherwise     (4-12) 
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Definition 4-2.  (i) EGt(x) ≡ pt(x) (Bt – x)    (4-24)  
(ii) EGt(y) ≡ Bt – y     (4-25) 
 
Definition 4-3. A buyer’s evaluation function is: 
Withdraw   iff t > Td or maxEGt(x) ≤ 0  
It  =  Accept   iff EGt(y) ≥ maxEGt(x) and t  ≤ Td  
Counter offer and/or argument otherwise   (4-26) 
 
 
 
List of Propositions and Their Proofs 
 
Proposition 3-1. Suppose the buyer knows that the seller is EvalF-I. Then the 
buyer’s belief function that its offer at time t will be accepted by a seller, pt(x) is an 
increasing function of x, where for any x we have pt(x)∈[0, 1].  
Proposition 3-1 follows from the property of an EvalF-I seller: accepting any 
buyer’s offer when it is higher than the seller’s (about-to-submit) next offer. Since 
offering a higher price will have a higher chance of exceeding the seller’s about-to-offer 
price, it implies an increasing function of pt(x) in terms of x. 
Proposition 3-2. If an optimal offer xt* is rejected by an EvalF-I seller, who does 
not concede significantly from its previous offer yt, then the buyer’s posterior belief will 
be steeper at x ≤ xt*.  
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Proof. The proof can be trivially derived from Assumption 3-8(i) and instantiation 
of 3-8(iii) if the seller does not concede at all, where 3-8(ii) is not satisfied. ■  
Proposition 3-3. Suppose that the buyer knows that the seller is EvalF-II. If the 
buyer’s consecutive offers which are lower than xt*+δ were rejected for n periods and 
the seller concedes insignificantly during these periods, then the buyer’s posterior belief 
πt+n(x) will be steeper than that of πt(x) for all x ≤ xt*. 
Proof. When an offer xt* is rejected, the buyer will update its belief according to 
Assumption 3-9, where pt+1(x) is steeper than πt(x) for all x ≤ xt*. If the buyer’s offers 
lower than  xt*+δ are still rejected for n rounds, then by Assumption 3-10 we haveπt+n(x) 
= pt+n(x), where pt+n(x) is derived using Assumption 3-8 from p t+n–1(x), and pt+n–1(x) is 
derived from pt+n–2(x), and so on until pt+2(x) is derived from pt+1(x). Therefore, for all x 
≤ xt* we have πt+n(x) = pt+n(x) is steeper than pt+n–1(x) which is steeper than pt+n–2(x) and 
so on which is steeper than pt+1(x) which is steeper than πt(x); or by transitivity, πt+n(x) is 
steeper than πt(x) for all x ≤ xt*.       ■ 
Proposition 3-4. Suppose the buyer knows that the seller is EvalF-II. Then the 
effective buyer’s belief that its offer at time t be accepted by a seller, πt(x), is an 
increasing function with respect to its offer x, where πt(x)∈[0, 1] for all x. However, πt(x) 
may not be a continuous function. 
Proposition 3-4 follows from the rationality of the buyer. Suppose x1 > x2 but x1 is 
less likely be accepted by the seller than x2. Then there is no reason for the buyer to offer 
x1. Thus, the search space of the buyer (effective belief function) is always an increasing 
function. Since x1 is not considered, then πt(x1) is undefined, or πt(x) is a discontinuous 
function. 
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Proposition 3-5. In the long run qt is an increasing function of time t.  
Proposition 3-5 follows from the explanation described in section 3.3.4. 
Intuitively, the likelihood that the seller’s deadline is met is higher as time goes by; thus, 
qt is an increasing function of time t. 
Proposition 3-6. (Ambiguity of EG’t+1(x) with respect to x) EG’t+1(x) may 
increase or decrease with respect to x submitted at time t.  
Proof. Suppose there are two different offers that can be submitted by a buyer at 
time t, i.e. a higher and a lower one, denoted by xth and xtl, where xth > xtl. Let the buyer’s 
belief at time t be pt(x). From the buyer’s perspective, if it offered xth and it was rejected, 
then it will update pt(x) to pht+1(x). Similarly, if it offered xtl and this was rejected, then it 
will update pt(x) to plt+1(x). Now, suppose the buyer knows that the seller is EvalF-I, then 
by Assumption 3-8(i) a new belief plt+1(x) will be steeper for all x ≤ xtl and also pht+1(x) 
will be steeper for all x ≤ xth. Since xth > xtl, then pht+1(x) must be steeper than plt+1(x) for 
all x ≤ xth, or pht+1(x) < plt+1(x) for all x ≤ xth. Given this, the expected surplus at time t+1 
will be lower if xt+1 ≤ xth. Thus, in this case EG’t+1(x) may be a decreasing function of x. 
However, this can only be guaranteed if the buyer believes that the seller will react 
identically in both cases, i.e. pht+1(x) = plt+1(x) for all x > xth. If this is not true, e.g. due to 
the seller’s different counter-offers after receiving two different buyer’s offers, then by 
Assumption 3-8(ii), pht+1(x) may not be equal to plt+1(x) for all x > xth. Note here, 
EG’t+1(x) depends on the buyer’s offer xt+1, which may be higher than xth. Therefore, it 
may happen that pht+1(x) > plt+1(x) for all x > xth, or EG’t+1(x) may be an increasing 
function of x at time t. In conclusion, without knowing the seller’s reaction, the 
characteristic of EG’t+1(x) over x at time t is ambiguous.     ■ 
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Proposition 3-7. If a myopic-1 buyer is facing time pressure in the long run such 
that its belief at time t+1 satisfies B’t+1 – Bt ≤ 0 and (q’t+1 – qt) ≥ (1 – (1 + ω)pt(xt*))(1 – 
qt),where  
))]()(([
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*
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and its estimated optimal offer x’t+1* > xt* + B’t+1 – Bt, then its expected future gain will 
be lower than its current expected gain, i.e. EG’t+1(x’t+1*) < EGt(xt*).  
Proof. First, we will see what kind of conditions should be met for the buyer’s 
expected future gain to be lower than its current one.  
EG’t+1(x’t+1*) < EGt(xt*)  
But EGt(xt*) = (1 – qt) [pt(xt*)(Bt – xt*) + γ(1 – pt(xt*))EG’t+1(x’t+1*)] 
⇔ EG’t+1(x’t+1*) < (1 – qt)pt(xt*)(Bt – xt*) + γ(1 – qt)(1 – pt(xt*))EG’t+1(x’t+1*) 
⇔ (1 – γ(1 – qt)(1 – pt(xt*)))EG’t+1(x’t+1*) < (1 – qt)pt(xt*)(Bt – xt*) 
⇔ EG’t+1(x’t+1*) < (1 – qt)pt(xt*)(Bt – xt*) / (1 – γ(1 – qt)(1 – pt(xt*))) 
And from EG’t+1(x’t+1*) = (1 – q’t+1) p’t+1(x’t+1*)(B’t+1 – x’t+1*) the LHS becomes 
⇔ (1 – q’t+1) p’t+1(x’t+1*)(B’t+1 – x’t+1*) <  
 (1 – qt)pt(xt*)(Bt – xt*) / (1 – γ(1 – qt)(1 – pt(xt*))) 
Now, suppose the estimated value q’t+1 = qt + Δq and p’t+1(x’t+1*) = pt(xt*) + Δp, 
Substituting these into the inequality yields: 
⇔ (1 – qt – Δq)(pt(xt*) + Δp)(B’t+1 – x’t+1*) <  
 (1 – qt)pt(xt*)(Bt – xt*) / (1 – γ(1 – qt)(1 – pt(xt*))) 
⇔ (1 – qt)(pt(xt*) + Δp)(B’t+1 – x’t+1*) – Δq (pt(xt*) + Δp)(B’t+1 – x’t+1*) < 
 (1 – qt)pt(xt*)(Bt – xt*) / (1 – γ(1 – qt)(1 – pt(xt*))) 
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Suppose also that the estimated value B’t+1 = Bt + ΔB, and x’t+1* = xt* + Δx. Substituting 
these into the first term yields: 
⇔ (1 – qt)(pt(xt*) + Δp)(Bt + ΔB – xt* – Δx) – Δq (pt(xt*) + Δp)(B’t+1 – x’t+1*) < 
 (1 – qt)pt(xt*)(Bt – xt*) / (1 – γ(1 – qt)(1 – pt(xt*))) 
⇔ (1 – qt)pt(xt*)(Bt + ΔB – xt* – Δx) + (1 – qt)Δp(B’t+1 – x’t+1*) –  
 Δq(pt(xt*) + Δp)(B’t+1 – x’t+1*) <  
  (1 – qt)pt(xt*)(Bt – xt*) / (1 – γ(1 – qt)(1 – pt(xt*))) 
And by expanding (Bt + ΔB – xt* – Δx) into (Bt – xt*) + (ΔB – Δx), we get 
⇔ (1 – qt)pt(xt*)(Bt – xt*) + (1 – qt)pt(xt*)(ΔB – Δx) + (1 – qt)Δp(B’t+1 – x’t+1*) –  
 Δq(pt(xt*) + Δp)(B’t+1 – x’t+1*) <  
  (1 – qt)pt(xt*)(Bt – xt*) / (1 – γ(1 – qt)(1 – pt(xt*))) 
And by regrouping (1 – qt)pt(xt*)(Bt – xt*) to the RHS of inequality, we get 
⇔ (1 – qt)pt(xt*)(ΔB – Δx) + (1 – qt)Δp(B’t+1 – x’t+1*) –  
Δq(pt(xt*) + Δp)(B’t+1 – x’t+1*) <  
[(1 – qt)pt(xt*)(Bt – xt*) / (1 – γ(1 – qt)(1 – pt(xt*)))] – (1 – qt)pt(xt*)(Bt – xt*)  
From p’t+1(x’t+1*) = pt(xt*) + Δp, we get 
⇔ (1 – qt)pt(xt*)(ΔB – Δx) + [(1 – qt)Δp – Δq p’t+1(x’t+1*)](B’t+1 – x’t+1*) < 
(1 – qt)pt(xt*)(Bt – xt*)[1 – (1 – γ(1 – qt)(1 – pt(xt*)))] / [1 – γ(1 – qt)(1 – pt(xt*))] 
⇔ (1 – qt)pt(xt*)(ΔB – Δx) + [(1 – qt)Δp – Δq p’t+1(x’t+1*)](B’t+1 – x’t+1*) <  
 (1 – qt)pt(xt*)(Bt – xt*)γ(1 – qt)(1 – pt(xt*)) / [1 – γ(1 – qt)(1 – pt(xt*))]  
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From B’t+1 = Bt + ΔB and x’t+1* = xt* + Δx, we have Bt – xt* = (B’t+1 – x’t+1*) – (ΔB – Δx); 
substituting 
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ttt
ttt
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γω  and Bt – xt* = (B’t+1 – x’t+1*) – (ΔB – Δx) 
⇔ (1 – qt)pt(xt*)(ΔB – Δx) + [(1 – qt)Δp – Δq p’t+1(x’t+1*)](B’t+1 – x’t+1*) <  
 (1 – qt)pt(xt*)((B’t+1 – x’t+1*) – (ΔB – Δx))ω    
⇔ (1 – qt)pt(xt*)(ΔB – Δx)(1 + ω) +  
[(1 – qt)(Δp – pt(xt*)ω) – Δq p’t+1(x’t+1*)](B’t+1 – x’t+1*) < 0  (3-13) 
Since qt ∈ [0, 1], γ ∈ [0, 1] and pt(xt*) > 0, then 0 ≤ γ(1 – qt)(1 – pt(xt*)) < 1, or ω > 0. 
Moreover, due to the time pressure in the long run, qt is strictly increasing and Bt is 
decreasing over time, or Δq > 0 and ΔB ≤ 0. And since (B’t+1 – x’t+1*) is an expected 
surplus, then it must be positive. However, p’t+1(x’t+1*) may be greater or less than pt(xt*), 
and x’t+1* may be greater or less than xt*; hence, the sign of Δp and Δx are ambiguous. 
Consequently, the conditions for inequality (3-13) to hold are  
(ΔB – Δx) < 0 and (1 – qt)(Δp – pt(xt*)ω) – Δq p’t+1(x’t+1*) ≤ 0 
⇔  Δx > ΔB and (Δp – pt(xt*)ω) / p’t+1(x’t+1*) ≤ Δq / (1 – qt) 
Since ΔB ≤ 0, then Δx > 0 will guarantee the first condition. The second condition can be 
modified as follows: 
(Δp – pt(xt*)ω) / p’t+1(x’t+1*) ≤ Δq / (1 – qt) 
⇔  (p’t+1(x’t+1*) – pt(xt*) – pt(xt*)ω) / p’t+1(x’t+1*) ≤ Δq / (1 – qt) 
⇔  1 – pt(xt*)(1 + ω) / p’t+1(x’t+1*) ≤ Δq / (1 – qt) 
Since 0 < p’t+1(x’t+1*) ≤ 1, then 1 – pt(xt*)(1 + ω) ≤ Δq / (1 – qt) is a sufficient condition 
for the above inequality. Therefore, the condition can be further simplified as follows: 
 1 – pt(xt*)(1 + ω) ≤ Δq / (1 – qt) 
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⇔  [1 – pt(xt*)(1 + ω)](1 – qt) ≤ Δq 
Thus, the sufficient condition that satisfies inequality (3-13) can be rewritten as follows: 
 Δx > ΔB and Δq ≥ [1 – pt(xt*)(1 + ω)](1 – qt)    (3-14) 
The conditions 3-14 are in fact the premises in the proposition that 
x’t+1* > xt* + B’t+1 – Bt and (q’t+1 – qt) ≥ [1 – pt(xt*)(1 + ω)](1 – qt).   ■ 
Proposition 3-8. A series of consecutive offers <x1, x2 , …, xt-1, xt, φ> is preferred 
to <x1, x2 , …, xt-1, φ > for 0 ≤ xt < Bt. 
Proof. Given equation (3-4) and (3-6), the probability of bargaining success in 
each round can be calculated as follows. The probability that the bargaining will succeed 
in the first round is (1 - q1) p1(x1), and the probability that the bargaining proceeds to the 
second round is (1 - q1)(1 - p1(x1)). The probability that the bargaining will succeed in the 
second round is equal to the probability that the bargaining proceeds to the second round 
times the probability that the bargaining succeeds in the second round, i.e. (1 - q1)(1 - 
p1(x1))(1 – q2)p2(x2), and the probability that the bargaining proceeds to the third round is 
(1 - q1)(1 - p1(x1))(1 – q2)(1 – p2(x2)). Therefore, the probability that the bargaining will  
succeed in the i-th round is  
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Suppose the total probability that any offer in a sequence X1 = <x1, x2 , …, xt-1, φ > is 
accepted by the seller is ft-1. Or,  
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Then by adding xt > 0, the total probability that any offer in X2 = <x1, x2 , …, xt, φ> is 
accepted by the seller becomes ∏
=
− −−−+=
t
j
jjjtttt xpqxpqff
1
1t ))(1)(1()()1( , which 
results in ft > ft-1. Since the last round is a breakdown, then the expected gain from X1 or 
X2 is the same for both myopic-I and myopic-II agents, which can be expressed 
consecutively as follows: 
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where Sur(xi) = (Bi - xi) is the positive surplus if the bargaining succeeds at round i. 
From both equations above we have EGX2 ≥ EGX1. Since the probability of finding a 
concession in X2 is strictly greater than in X1 and the expected surplus of X2 is weakly 
greater than of X1, then we can conclude that X2 is preferred to X1.  ■ 
Proposition 3-9. Suppose both bargainers are myopic agents and their valuations 
are constant within a long period, and x, pt(x), and EG’t+1(x) are continuous and 
differentiable. If the seller does not concede significantly within that period so that the 
buyer will update its belief pt(x) to a steeper one for all x ≤ xt*, then the buyer concedes 
provided 
(a) the buyer is myopic-0, or 
(b)  the buyer is myopic-1 with convex belief pt(x) at x ≤ xt*, i.e. ∂ pt(x)/∂ x > 0 and          
∂ 2pt(x)/∂ x2 ≤ 0, and with expected future gain EG’t+2(x) that satisfies:  
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Proof. Suppose at time t the buyer with πt(x) offered xt* and it was rejected. Since 
the bargaining period is long enough without significant concession from the seller, then 
there is enough time for the buyer to update πt(x) to πt+n(x) = pt+n(x). If before time t+n 
the buyer concedes, then the proposition is proven. If the buyer does not concede, then by 
Assumption 3-9 eventually kt+n(x) = 0, and πt+n(x) = pt+n(x). So, let us ignore the 
intermediate transition state between t and t+n and only consider πt(x) = pt(x) and πt+n(x) 
= pt+n(x), where pt(x) and pt+n(x) are continuous and differentiable. 
(a) Since in this case the buyer is a myopic-0 agent, then it will offer optimal price 
xt* that maximizes its expected gain, i.e. Maxx [pt(x)(Bt – x)], which can be illustrated by 
the largest area of the rectangle bounded by belief pt(x), x-axis and buyer’s valuation Bt 
in Figure 3-12. Since the seller rejects xt* and the counter-offer is insignificant, then by 
Proposition 3-2 the slope ∂pt(x)/∂x becomes steeper for x ≤ xt*, or ∂(pt(x) – pt+1(x))/∂x ≤ 
0 for x ≤ xt* and pt+1(x) > 0. Also, from by Assumption 3-8 we have pt+1(x) < pt(x) for x ≤ 
xt*. Given these conditions, we can prove that a myopic-0 buyer will concede as shown 
by the following Lemma.  
Lemma 3-1. Let ∂(pt(x) – pt+1(x))/∂x ≤ 0 and pt(x) > pt+1(x) > 0 for all x ≤ xt*, then a 
myopic-0 buyer will concede, or xt+1* > xt*. 
Proof by contradiction: suppose the buyer does not concede but still generates a positive 
expected gain, or xt+1* ≤ xt* and pt+1(xt+1*) > 0, then by integrating ∂(pt(x) – pt+1(x))/∂x ≤ 
0 from xt+1* to xt*, we have 
[pt(x) – pt+1(x)] xt* – [pt(x) – pt+1(x)] xt+1* ≤ 0 
⇔ [pt(xt*) – pt+1(xt*)] – [pt(xt+1*) – pt+1(xt+1*)] ≤ 0 
⇔ pt(xt*) – pt+1(xt*) ≤ pt(xt+1*) – pt+1(xt+1*) 
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⇔ pt(xt*)(B – xt+1*) – pt+1(xt*)(B – xt+1*) ≤ pt(xt+1*)(B – xt+1*) – pt+1(xt+1*)(B – xt+1*) 
           (3-15) 
Since xt+1* ≤ xt*, then (B – xt*) ≤ (B – xt+1*); and given pt(xt*) > pt+1(xt*) we have: 
(pt(xt*) – pt+1(xt*))(B – xt*) ≤ (pt(xt*) – pt+1(xt*))(B – xt+1*), or 
pt(xt*)(B – xt*) – pt+1(xt*)(B – xt*) ≤ pt(xt*)(B – xt+1*) – pt+1(xt*)(B – xt+1*)  
Then by transitivity we can replace the LHS of (3-15), and it becomes: 
pt(xt*)(B – xt*) – pt+1(xt*)(B – xt*) ≤ pt(xt*)(B – xt+1*) – pt+1(xt*)(B – xt+1*) ≤  
  pt(xt+1*)(B – xt+1*) – pt+1(xt+1*)(B – xt+1*) 
⇔ pt(xt*)(B – xt*) – pt+1(xt*)(B – xt*) ≤ pt(xt+1*)(B – xt+1*) – pt+1(xt+1*)(B – xt+1*) (3-16) 
However, pt(xt*)(B – xt*) is the maximum expected gain at time t, or pt(xt*)(B – 
xt*) > pt(xt+1*) (B – xt+1*); or, pt(xt*)(B – xt*) = pt(xt+1*) (B – xt+1*) + d+, where d+ is 
some positive value. Hence, by substituting pt(xt*)(B – xt*) = pt(xt+1*) (B – xt+1*) + d+ 
into (3-16) we get  
pt(xt+1*) (B – xt+1*) + d+ – pt+1(xt*)(B – xt*) ≤ pt(xt+1*)(B – xt+1*) – pt+1(xt+1*)(B – xt+1*) 
⇔ d+ – pt+1(xt*)(B – xt*) ≤ – pt+1(xt+1*)(B – xt+1*)  
⇔ d+ – pt+1(xt*)(B – xt*) ≤ – pt+1(xt+1*)(B – xt+1*)  
⇔ pt+1(xt*)(B – xt*) ≥ pt+1(xt+1*)(B – xt+1*) + d+    (3-17) 
But at time t+1, pt+1(xt+1*)(B – xt+1*) is the maximum gain, or pt+1(xt+1*)(B – xt+1*) > 
pt+1(xt*)(B – xt*); thus,  
⇔ pt+1(xt*)(B – xt*) > pt+1(xt*)(B – xt*) + d+ 
which is a contradiction. Thus, xt+1* > xt* or a myopic-0 buyer concedes (End of the 
proof of Lemma 3-1). 
 252
(b) Since the buyer is a myopic-1 agent, then it will offer optimal price xt* that 
maximizes its expected gain, i.e. Maxx [pt(x)(Bt – x) + γ(1 – pt(x))EG’t+1(x)]. If xt* is an 
optimal offer, then the necessary condition is that xt* be a critical point which satisfies 
∂[pt(x)(B – x) + γ(1 – pt(x))EG’t+1(x)] /∂x = 0 at xt* (first order derivative test), or 
( ) ( ) 01 11 =∂
∂−∂
∂−+−∂
∂− ++ x
xp
xEG
x
xEG
xpxp
x
xp
xB tt
t
tt
t )()('
)('
)()(
)( γγ
 at xt* 
⇔ ( ) ( ) 0)(')(1)()()(' 11 =∂
∂−+−∂
∂−− ++ x
xEGxpxp
x
xpxEGxB ttttt γγ  at xt* 
⇔ 
( )
( )
*
1
1
* )('
)(')(1)()(
t
t
xx
t
t
tt
xx
t
xEGxB
x
xEGxpxp
x
xp
=
+
+
= −−
∂
∂−−
=∂
∂
γ
γ
  (3-18) 
Similarly, for the optimal offer xt+1* at time t+1, we also have: 
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Since the seller rejects xt* and counter offers insignificantly, then by Proposition 
3-2 the slope ∂pt(x)/∂x becomes steeper for all x ≤ xt*, or ∂pt(x)/∂x ≤ ∂pt+1(x)/∂x for x ≤ 
xt*. If the buyer does not concede, or xt+1* ≤ xt*, then we have 
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At this point, we can substitute equation (3-18) and (3-19) into the inequality above: 
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The inequality condition above tells us that if xt+1* is an optimal offer at time t+1 that 
satisfies xt+1* ≤ xt*, then the inequality holds. If the inequality does not hold, then by 
modus tollens, we can conclude that xt+1* is not an optimal offer, or a contradiction. Thus, 
we come out with a sufficient condition for xt+1* > xt*, which is the negation of the 
inequality above, i.e. 
(∀ x’ ≤ xt*) 
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which can be elaborated into 
(∀ x’ ≤ xt*)   
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and more specifically into two joint conditions: 
 
(∀ x’ ≤ xt*)  
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(∀ x’ ≤ xt*) 
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Since x’ ≤ xt*, then (B – xt*) ≤ (B – x’) and pt(xt*) ≥ pt(x’) > pt+1(x’), or pt(xt*) > 
pt+1(x’). Given pt(xt*) – pt+1(x’) > 0 and (B – x’) – (B –  xt*) ≥ 0, then the joint condition 
above holds if 
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And since (1 – pt(xt*)) < (1 – pt+1(x’)), then the sufficient condition becomes 
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          (3-20) 
Thus, given the condition in (3-20), the buyer’s optimal offer xt+1* > xt*.  ■ 
 
 
The following propositions and theorems are for the non-monotonic-offers protocol 
Proposition 4-1. Suppose all agents under the N-protocol are EvalF-I agents and 
this is common knowledge. If xt* is an optimal offer at time t, then in order to maximize 
its expected gain at time t+1: 
(a) a myopic-0 buyer will monotonically increase its offer if Bt+1 – xt* >> 0, and decrease 
its offer if Bt+1 – xt* → 0 or Bt+1 – xt* < 0; 
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(b) a myopic-1 buyer will monotonically increase its offer if Bt+1 – xt* >> γEG’t+2, and 
decrease its offer if Bt+1 – xt* → γEG’t+2 or Bt+1 – xt* < γEG’t+2. 
Proof. (a) Suppose the buyer has already offered an optimal price at time t, i.e., 
xt* such that 
  [∇pt]xt* / Δx ≈ pt(xtb)/(Bt – xt*)     (4-8)  
If this offer is rejected by the seller, then by Assumption 3-8(i) the buyer will 
reduce both pt(xt*) and pt(xtb) to pt+1(xt*) and pt+1(xtb) respectively at time t +1, such that 
pt(xtb) is reduced more than pt(xt*), or [∇pt+1]xt* = pt+1(xt*) – pt+1(xtb) is greater than 
[∇pt]xt* = pt(xt*) – pt(xtb). Thus, the LHS of ε-equation (4-8) increases from [∇pt]xt*/Δx to 
[∇pt+1]xt* /Δx, and the RHS decreases from pt(xtb)/(Bt – xt*) to pt+1(xtb)/(Bt – xt*), which 
changes the ε-equality such that there exists a valueμ that satisfies  
[∇pt+1]xt* / Δx > μ ≈ pt+1(xtb) / (Bt – xt*)    (4-9) 
Since the buyer’s valuation decreases over time from Bt to Bt+1, say by ΔB, then 
the denominator of the RHS of (4-8) decreases, or pt+1(xtb)/(Bt+1 – xt*)>pt+1(xtb)/(Bt – xt*).  
Let’s consider three cases. First, if ΔB is relatively small compared to (Bt – xt*), 
i.e. when (Bt – xt*) >> ΔB or (Bt+1 – xt*) >> 0, then the drop of Bt to Bt+1 is not enough to 
increase the RHS of (4-9) to be ε-equal to the LHS, or there still exists a μ such that 
[∇pt+1]xt* / Δx > μ ≈ pt+1(xtb) / (Bt+1 – xt*)    (4-10) 
Thus, the buyer needs to increase xt* to a new optimal offer xt+1*, which in turn 
increases pt+1(xtb) to pt+1(xt+1b) and decreases (Bt+1 – xt*) to (Bt+1 – xt+1*) (therefore, the 
RHS of (4-10) increases to pt+1(xt+1b)/(Bt+1 – xt+1*)), and may also decrease [∇pt+1]xt* to 
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[∇pt+1]xt+1* (therefore, the LHS of (4-10) decreases to [∇pt+1]xt+1* /Δx) such that the ε-
equality of (4-8) holds again at time t+1, or [∇pt+1]xt+1*/Δx ≈ pt+1(xt+1b)/(Bt+1 – xt+1*).  
Second, if ΔB is relatively large compared to (Bt – xt*), i.e. when (Bt – xt*) is 
almost equal to ΔB or Bt+1 – xt* → 0, then the drop of Bt to Bt+1 may increase the RHS of 
(4-9) even more than the LHS of (4-9), or  
[∇pt+1]xt* / Δx < pt+1(xtb) / (Bt+1 – xt*)    (4-11) 
Consequently, the buyer needs to decrease xt* to a new optimal offer xt+1*, which 
in turn decreases pt+1(xtb) to pt+1(xt+1b) and increases (Bt+1 – xt*) to (Bt+1 – xt+1*) (thus, the 
RHS of (4-11) decreases), and may increase [∇pt+1]xt* to [∇pt+1]xt+1* (thus, the LHS of (4-
11) may increase) such that the ε-equality of (4-8) holds again.  
In the third case, if Bt+1 – xt* < 0, then a negative surplus is generated at xt*; thus, 
the buyer must offer a lower price Bt+1 – xt+1* > 0. 
(b) The proof for a myopic-1 buyer is similar to the proof for a myopic-0 buyer 
(a), except with an additional term γEG’t+1 that decreases over time. The decrease of this 
term, say by ΔEG, will increase the denominator of the RHS of (4-7). However, if ΔB – 
ΔEG is relatively small compared to (Bt – xt* – γEG’t+1), i.e. when (Bt – xt* – γEG’t+1) 
>> ΔB – ΔEG, or (Bt+1 – xt*) >> γEG’t+2, then the buyer needs to increase xt* to a new 
optimal offer xt+1* as in the proof of (a). The proofs of the case of Bt+1 – xt* → γEG’t+2 
and Bt+1 – xt* < γEG’t+2 are also similar to the steps used in the proof of (a).    ■ 
Proposition 4-2. Under the N-protocol, if all agents are EvalF-I agents and this is 
common knowledge, then x* converges to B over time. 
Proof. To show the convergence of x* to B we only need to show that Bt+1 – xt+1* 
< Bt – xt* at any t, either when Bt+1 – xt* >> 0, Bt+1 – xt* → 0, or Bt+1 – xt* < 0.  
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First, we can prove the case for myopic-0 buyers using Proposition 4-1(a). If 
Bt+1 – xt* >> 0, then the buyer will increase its offer to xt+1* > xt*. Since the buyer’s 
valuation decreases over time, then Bt+1 < Bt. Or, Bt+1 – xt+1* < Bt – xt+1* < Bt – xt*. Thus, 
Bt+1 – xt+1* < Bt – xt*. If Bt+1 – xt* → 0 or Bt+1 – xt* < 0, then the buyer will decrease its 
optimal offer to xt+1*, resulting in xt+1b < xtb. Given this, by Assumption 3-8 we have 
pt(xtb) > pt+1(xtb) > pt+1(xt+1b) and by Proposition 3-2 we have [∇pt]xt* ≤ [∇pt+1]xt+1*. 
Rewriting equation (4-6), we have 
[∇pt]xt* / Δx ≈ pt(xtb) / (Bt – xt*)   
⇔  (Bt – xt*) [∇pt]xt* / Δx ≈ pt(xtb)  
⇔ Bt – xt* ≈ pt(xtb) Δx / [∇pt]xt* and Bt+1 – xt+1* ≈ pt+1(xt+1b) Δx / [∇pt+1]xt+1*.  
Since, pt(xtb) decreases to pt+1(xt+1b) and [∇pt]xt* increases to [∇pt+1]xt+1*, then Bt – 
xt* should also decrease to Bt+1 – xt+1* for the ε-equality to hold; thus, Bt+1 – xt+1* < Bt – 
xt*, or x* converges to B over time.  
Similarly, to prove the case for myopic-1 buyers we use proposition 4-1(b) and an 
alteration of ε-equation (4-7), Bt – xt* ≈ pt(xtb) Δx/ [∇pt]xt* + γEG’t+1. When the buyer 
increases its offer, then Bt+1 – xt+1* < Bt – xt*, or x converges to B. When the buyer 
decreases its offer, by the fact that pt(xtb) decreases to pt+1(xt+1b), [∇pt]xt* may increase, 
and γEG’t+1 decreases over time, then  Bt – xt* should also decrease to Bt+1 – xt+1* for the 
ε-equality to hold; or, x* → B.       ■ 
Proposition 4-3. If EvalF-I agents are only concerned about the success rate, then 
the N-protocol is preferred over the M-protocol. 
Proof. Suppose both the buyer and the seller are only concerned about the success 
rate. Then, under the N-protocol the best strategy of the buyer is to offer its valuation, 
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which decreases over time, because pt(Bt) will be the highest (cf. Proposition 3-1). The 
seller also always offers its valuation. But under the M-protocol the buyer cannot do this. 
Thus, both the buyer’s and seller’s offers will be more likely to fall in the feasible set 
under the N-protocol which increases the success rate. Now, suppose that only the buyer 
is concerned about the success rate. Then, under the N-protocol the buyer will also offer 
its valuation, which decreases over time. If the seller’s initial offer falls in the feasible set, 
then the bargaining succeeds. If it does not fall in the feasible set, then the buyer will 
decrease its offer along with its valuation; thus, by applying the inverse of Assumption 3-
8(iii) to the seller, the seller will decrease its belief faster than the buyer increases its 
offer. Or, the seller will concede faster when the buyer offers its valuation. Therefore, 
both offers will be more likely to fall in the feasible set under the N-protocol. ■ 
Theorem 4-1. The N-protocol is at least as good as the M-protocol for EvalF-I 
agents. 
Proof. A protocol is preferred by agents if it can help the agents to achieve their 
goals better than another protocol. First, if the goal of agents is to maximize their 
expected gain, then it is shown by Proposition 4-1 that the N-protocol guarantees a way 
for the agents to offer a price that maximizes their expected gain; while agents in the M-
protocol cannot because they are restricted to increase their offers only. This is true not 
only for a decreasing valuation, but also for an increasing one, because it is possible that 
Bt+1 – γEG’t+2 > Bt – γEG’t+1 (cf. equation (4-7) for myopic-1 buyers), or the buyer has 
incentive to decrease its offer at time t+1 to maximize its expected gain. Second, if the 
goal of agents is to find a resolution as soon as possible, then it is shown by Proposition 
4-3 that the N-protocol is preferred to the M-protocol. Finally, if the agents cannot 
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optimize their offers but submit them according to a pre-defined strategy (a pre-defined 
sequence of offers), then buyers in the M-protocol may get stuck in their valuation (in 
case of decreasing valuation), which incurs some cost in order to repeat the bargaining. 
Buyers under the N-protocol will never get stuck, and by Proposition 3-8, this is preferred 
over getting stuck. While this does not apply in the case of increasing valuation, still the 
N-protocol incurs no extra cost.          ■ 
Proposition 4-4. Under the N-protocol, if all agents are EvalF-II agents and this 
is common knowledge, then x∞* → B∞. 
Proof. If xt+1* is always beyond the region [xt* – δ, xt* + δ ] for any t, then 
equation (4-8) and (4-9) become equation (3-5) and (3-7) respectively. Thus, we can 
apply the maximization analysis done for EvalF-I agents; therefore, Proposition 4-2 holds 
and xt* converges to B. Consequently, a divergence appears only if xt+1* is within the 
region [xt* – δ, xt* + δ ] (we have a discontinuous function πt+1(x)). Let the buyer 
consecutively offer prices within the region. However, under Assumption 3-10, within 
interval n the buyer will have πt+n(x) = pt+n(x). And n rounds after that, the buyer will 
have πt+2n(x) = pt+2n(x), where pt+2n(x) is the updated version of pt+n(x). If xt+2n* and xt+n* 
are the optimal offers at time t+2n and t+n, respectively, and we ignore the situation 
between time t+2n and t+n, then from Proposition 4-2 we get xt+2n* → Bt+2n, or xt+2n* 
relatively converges to Bt+2n compared to xt+n* from Bt+n. Iteratively, xt+3n* also 
relatively converges to Bt+3n compared to xt+2n* from Bt+2n. Therefore, x∞* → B∞.    ■ 
Proposition 4-5. If EvalF-II agents are only concerned about the success rate, 
then the N-protocol is preferred to the M-protocol. 
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The proof of Proposition 4-5 is similar to the proof of Proposition 4-3, with an 
additional condition that the seller may concede faster because a decreasing of the 
buyer’s offers along its valuation may be perceived by the seller as the ‘best’ offer from 
the buyer. And a faster concession by the seller will result in higher probability of finding 
a resolution; thus, the N-protocol is preferred to the M-protocol. 
Proposition 4-6. Suppose the deadline for EvalF-I agents is the same as the 
deadline for EvalF-II agents. Then the success rate of the N-protocol for EvalF-II agents 
is as low as (1/n~)-th of the success rate for EvalF-I agents, where, Td~ and n~ are the 
average value of Td and n for EvalF-II agents. 
Proof. The worst case is that all EvalF-II agents always choose an offer from the 
region [xt*–δ, xt*+δ] which never yields a success. Since the effect of k(x) disappears 
after on average n~ rounds, then on average, we can find Td~/n~ rounds where EvalF-II 
agents are under the same condition as EvalF-I agents. If the success rate of EvalF-I 
agents under the N-protocol is m, then the success rate of EvalF-II agents will be as low 
as m/n~.          ■ 
Theorem 4-2. The N-protocol is at least as good as the M-protocol for EvalF-II 
agents if the agents are benevolent. 
Proof. The same as the proof of Theorem 4-1, except that agents are benevolent.■ 
 
 
 
 
 261
The following propositions and theorems are for strategic-delay-based protocols 
Proposition 4-7. A delay will be used by a buyer if the ratio of its future surplus 
with respect to the current one, denoted byβ, satisfies 
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Corollary 4-1. If a buyer uses EG’t+2 = EG’t+1, then a delay will be used if 
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Proof. From the definition of θt* 
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the inequality condition in Proposition 4-17 becomes 
■ 
Proposition 4-8. A delay will be used by a buyer if the ratio of the weight of its 
future precise belief with respect to the current imprecise belief satisfies 
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Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 4-7 except we use ψ(p, ϕ) 
instead of p( ).          ■ 
Proposition 4-9. A delay will be used by a buyer if the ratio of its estimated future 
surplus with respect to the current estimated surplus satisfies 
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Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of proposition 4-7 except we use the 
estimated value of B.         ■ 
Proposition 4-10. A delay will be used by a buyer if the ratio of its estimated 
future probability of breakdown with respect to the current estimate satisfies 
*))](1))((1(*)[1(
1
)(1
)(1
212
11
tt
e
tt
e
t
e
t
xpqq
q
−−−+>−
−=
+
+
ϕλθηβγϕ
ϕς  (4-22) 
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 4-7 except we use 
estimated value of q.         ■ 
Proposition 4-11. Let the true value of the seller’s argument (αS) induce an 
increasing of the buyer’s valuation from Bt–1 to Bt but reduce pt–1(x) to pt(x), while the 
negation of it (¬αS) does not change the buyer’s valuation (Bt+1 = Bt = Bt–1) but 
increases pt–1(x) to pt+1(x). Then, the seller’s argument will be verified, which causes a 
delay, if  
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verification results in the negation of the seller’s argument. 
Proof.  For the verification taken place, we must have 
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Proposition 4-12. Let an offer by a seller k satisfy EGt(y)k ≥ EGt(xt*). A delay 
will be used by the buyer if any of the following conditions applies:  
(i) EGt(y)k < γ [EG’t+1]delay 
(ii) there exists a seller j ≠ k s.t. EGt(y)k < γ [EG’t+1]j 
(iii) there exists in the future a seller v ≠ k s.t. EGt(y)k < γ [EG’t+1]v  
Proof. The proof is straightforward from Definition 4-1.    ■ 
Theorem 4-3. (The existence of strategic delay) A myopic-1 agent may benefit 
from strategic delay.  
Proof. By Proposition 4-7 to 4-12.      ■ 
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Theorem 4-4. If the primary goal of agents is to maximize their expected utility, 
then myopic-1 agents prefer a delay-enabled bargaining protocol. 
Proof. A protocol is preferred by agents if it can help the agents to achieve their 
goals better than another protocol. Since the goal of agents is to maximize their expected 
gain, then it is shown by Proposition 4-7 to 4-12 that strategic delay can maximize their 
expected gain; while agents in the non-delay-enabled protocol cannot because they 
cannot delay their responses.        ■ 
 
 
The following propositions and theorems are for ignorance-based ABN protocols 
 
Proposition 4-13. If the buyer believes that the probability υt(αB) = P( pt(x) ↑ 
pαt(x) | αB ) is positive, then αB will always be sent. 
Proof. First, we can re-write equation (4-24) EGt(x) ≡ pt(x) (Bt – x) such that by 
probability υt(αB) the expected payoff is pαt(x) (Bt – x) and by probability (1 – υt(αB)) the 
expected payoff is pt(x) (Bt – x), or 
EGαt(x) = υt(αB) pαt(x) (Bt – x) + (1 – υt(αB)) pt(x) (Bt – x)  (4-27) 
Since pαt(x) > pt(x), then we have 
υt(αB)pαt(x) (Bt – x) + (1 – υt(αB)) pt(x) (Bt – x) >  
υt(αB)pt(x)(Bt – x) + (1 – υt(αB))pt(x)(Bt – x)  (4-28) 
But the RHS of inequality (4-28) equals to pt(x)(Bt – x) = EGt(x); or, EGαt(x) > 
EGt(x) for any υt(αB) ∈ (0, 1]. Thus, αB will always be sent.   ■ 
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Proposition 4-14. (Strategic ignorance due to costly negotiation time) If there is a 
cost incurred from sending argument αB as shown in equation (4-29), and the buyer’s 
valuation is decreasing over time, then αB may not always be sent. 
Proposition 4-14 follows from situations where the negotiation time is costly. 
Example 4-8 shows one of the possible case. 
Proposition 4-15. (Strategic ignorance due to recoiling arguments) Let the buyer 
be neutral to uncertainty and risk. If μ f  < pt(xt*) and υt(αB) is strictly positive, then αB 
will not be sent. 
Proof. Since the agents are neutral toward uncertainty, then we can substitute 
pαt(xt*) with its mean value μ f  < pt(xt*). By altering the inequality sign of equation (4-28) 
we have 
EGαt(xt*) = υt(αB)pαt(xt*) (Bt – xt*) + (1 – υt(αB)) pt(xt*) (Bt – xt*) <  
υt(αB)pt(xt*)(Bt–xt*) + (1 – υt(αB))pt(xt*)(Bt – xt*) = EGt(xt*) 
or, EGαt(xt*) < EGt(xt*) for any υt(αB) ∈ (0, 1]. Therefore, αB will not be sent. ■ 
Proposition 4-16. (Strategic ignorance due to risk of breakdown) If υφ(αB) is 
greater than the increasing rate of pt(xt*) from αB, i.e. υφ(αB) > (pαt(xt*) – pt(xt*)) / 
pαt(xt*), then αB will not be sent. 
Proof. Suppose υφ(αB) > (pαt(xt*) – pt(xt*)) / pαt(xt*) = 1 – (pt(xt*) / pαt(xt*)). By 
equation (4-30)   
  EGαt(xt*) = (1 – υφ(αB)) pαt(xt*) (Bt – xt*)  
 ⇒ EGαt(xt*) < (1 – 1 + (pt(xt*) / pαt(xt*))) pαt(xt*) (Bt – xt*) 
 ⇔ EGαt(xt*) < pt(xt*)(Bt – xt*) 
 ⇔ EGαt(xt*) < EGt(xt*).  
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Since EGαt(xt*) less than EGt(xt*), αB will not be sent.   ■ 
Corollary 4-2. If υφ(αB) > 1 – pt(xt*), then αB will not be sent. 
Proof. Suppose υφ(αB) > 1 – pt(xt*). From the fact that pt(xt*) ∈ [0, 1] then  
 EGαt(xt*) = (1 – υφ(αB)) pαt(xt*) (Bt – xt*)  
⇒ EGαt(xt*) < (1 – 1 + pt(xt*)) pαt(xt*) (Bt – xt*)  
⇔ EGαt(xt*) < pt(xt*) pαt(xt*) (Bt – xt*)  
⇔ EGαt(xt*) < pαt(xt*) EGt(xt*)  
Since pαt(xt*) ≤ 1  
⇒ EGαt(xt*) < EGt(xt*)  
Thus, αB will not be sent regardless of the value of pαt(xt*).   ■ 
Theorem 4-5. (The existence of proactive ignorance) A rational agent may not 
use argument αB if it  
• incurs a high cost;  
• reduces the expected probability of the seller’s acceptance of its offer; and/or  
• raises the risk of breakdown more than the increasing rate of pt(xt*). 
Proof. By Proposition 4-14, 4-15, and 4-16.     ■ 
Proposition 4-17. (Valuation hiding) Let the buyer believe that both the seller 
valuation and the risk of breakdown are low so that the seller is willing to accept the 
buyer’s offer and also υt(αS1) is high so that the seller’s argument is trusted and  ρ is low 
so that the buyer will increase its valuation; then 
(i)  αS1 will be affirmed if pt(xt*) is steep; and 
(ii) αS1 will be ignored if pt(xt*) is flat near certainty. 
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Proof. Since υt(αS1) is high, then the buyer has only two choices in its reply: 
affirmation or ignorance. For ignoring αS1 to be an appropriate response it is sufficient to 
show that the utility of ignorance is higher than that of affirmation. From the fact that ρ is 
low, we have a new valuation Bt* = Bt + (1–ρ) (Bt’–Bt) > Bt. Since the buyer is a utility 
maximizer, a shift of Bt may change the buyer’s offer. First, we can derive the sensitivity 
of optimal offer xt* to Bt. Suppose pt(xt*) is continuous and differentiable, then we can 
use the first-order differential condition of equation (4-24) to obtain its optimal offer, i.e.  
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Now, consider case (i) when pt(xt*) is steep, or pt’(xt*) >> 0. Since pt(xt*) > 0 and 
pt’’(xt*) ≤ 0 (except in the left part of logistic function which is unlikely to be the buyer’s 
optimal offer), then we can conclude that the denominator is positive; thus dxt*/dBt > 0, 
or the buyer’s optimal offer xt* will increase when its valuation increases. Since the 
buyer will increase its optimal offer xt*, then it has no incentive to ignore αS1; thus, an 
affirmation will be sent. 
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Now, consider case (ii) when pt(xt*) is flat near certainty, or pt’(xt*) → 0 and 
pt(xt*) ≈ 1. Since pt’’(xt*) < 0, by equation (A-31) we have dxt*/dBt →  0.  Or, the change 
of the buyer valuation will not affect its optimal offer. This is also true in non-
differentiable cases, such as in the step and linear functions, where xt* is the upper 
breaking point (cf. xo and xb in Fig. 3-4). Because in this case pt(xt*) = 1, therefore the 
buyer does not have incentive to increase xt* more. Since the buyer does not have 
incentive to increase its offer, then the buyer will ignore the seller’s argument. ■ 
Proposition 4-18. Let υt(αS2) be low so that the seller’s argument is trusted and 
assume all possible counter-arguments are very costly, then αS2 will be ignored. 
Proof. This can be derived straightforwardly from Proposition 4-14 by 
substituting αB with all the buyer’s counter-arguments.     ■ 
Proposition 4-19. Let υt(αS2) be high so that the seller’s argument is not trusted 
and assume Bt is temporarily increasing over time. If rebuttal and query are more costly 
and/or may increase the risk of breakdown more than ignorance, then αS2 will be ignored 
as long as its incurred cost is lower than the marginal gain of Bt. 
Proof. Suppose by affirmation the buyer’s expected payoff is EGt(y), and if the 
deal is made at time t+n, then the buyer’s expected payoff is EGt+n(y) = EGt(y) + g, 
where g is a positive marginal gain. Since the buyer is rational and the expected cost of 
ignorance is the lowest compared to rebuttal and query, and it is lower than g, then it will 
be chosen.           ■ 
Theorem 4-6. (The existence of responsive ignorance) A rational agent may 
benefit from ignoring argument αS1 and αS2.  
Proof. By Proposition 4-17, 4-18 and 4-19.     ■ 
